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### IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY.



David Starr Jordan, LL. D., President of Leland Stanford Junior University.

## \*IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY\*

A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW, AND OTHER TENETS OF DEMOCRACY, TO THE DEMANDS OF A VIGOROUS FOREIGN POLICY AND OTHER DEMANDS OF IMPERIAL DOMINION

BY

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
"They enslave their children's children who make compromise with sin." Lower L.



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то

JOHN J. VALENTIŅE, ESQ.,

OF

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA,

IN

RECOGNITION OF HIS UNSELFISH PATRIOTISM

AND

UNSHAKEN COURAGE.



#### PREFATORY NOTE.

The present volume contains eight addresses bearing on the policy of the United States, especially concerning the war with Spain and its results.

The first address "Lest We Forget," was delivered May 25th, 1898, on the occasion of the graduation of the Class of 1808, in the Leland Stanford Junior University. As this address has in a sense a historical value, being one of the very first of many of its kind, it is here published exactly as delivered with the change of a word or two only and the omission of a brief quotation. The second address, "Colonial Expansion," delivered before the Congress of Religions at Omaha in October, 1808, is here modified by the omission of a few passages which were used also on the previous occasion. The third address, "A Blind Man's Holiday," was read on February 14th, 1800, before the Graduate Club of Leland Stanford Junior University, and afterwards repeated before the congregation of Temple Emanu-El in San Francisco and the Berkeley Club in Oakland. It was reprinted for general circulation under the title of "The Question of the Philippines," by the courtesy of Mr. John J. Valentine, who has also published a similar edition of "Lest We Forget." The essay on the "Colonial Lessons of Alaska" was delivered before the University Extension Club of San José; that on the "Lessons of the Paris Tribunal," before the Congregationalist Club in San Francisco. The essay on "A Continuing City" was delivered before the New Charter Association of San Fran-

The essay on the "Last of the Puritans" is introduced to show the substantial identity of the arguments for slavery or control

of man by man, benevolent or otherwise, with those for imperial dominion or the control of nation by nation, of race by race, each has industrial and civil good for its avowed purpose, and each has brute force for its method.

I am indebted to Mr Walter H. Page, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, for permission to reprint "The Colonial Lessons of Alaska," to Dr. N. C. Gilman, editor of the New World, for the privilege of republishing the essay on "Colonial Expansion," to Whitaker and Ray of San Francisco for permission to use "The Last of the Puritans," and to Mr. J. M. Rice, editor of the Forum, for permission to reprint "The Lessons of the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration."

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I.
"LEST WE FORGET."





# IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY

T.

#### "LEST WE FORGET."\*

As educated men and women, in your hands lies the future of the State. It is for you and such as you to work out the problems of democracy. This is my justification in speaking to you of the present crisis. For a great world crisis is on us, and this year of 1898 may mark one of the three great epochs in our history.

Twice before in our national life have we stood in the presence of a great crisis. Twice before have we come to the parting of the ways, and twice has our choice been controlled by wise counsel.

The first crisis followed the War of the Revolution. Its question was this: What relation shall the emancipated colonies bear to one another? The answer was the American Constitution, the federation of self-governing and United States.

\*"An address to the Members of the Graduating Class of 1898. in Leland Stanford Junior University; delivered May 25, 1898,

The second crisis came through the growth of slavery. The union of the States "could not endure, half slave, half free." The emancipation proclamation of Abraham Lincoln marked our decision that the Union should endure; and that all that made for division should be swept away.

The third great crisis is on us now. The war with Spain is only a part of it. The question is not: Can we capture Manila, Havana, Porto Rico or the Canaries? It is not what we can take or what we can hold. The American navy and the American army can accomplish all we ask of them with time and patience.

Battles are fought to-day through engineering and technical skill, not through physical dash. The great cannon speaks the language of science, and individual courage is helpless before it. The standing of our naval officers in matters of engineering is beyond question. There are a hundred nameless lieutenants in our warships who, if opportunity offered, could write their names beside those of Grenville and Nelson and Farragut and Dewey. The glory of Manila is not dim beside that of Mobile or Trafalgar. The cool strength and soberness of Yankee courage, added to the power of naval engineering, could meet any foe on earth on equal terms, and here the terms are not equal. Personal fearlessness our adversaries possess, and that is all they have. That we have, too, in like measure. Everything else is ours. We train our guns against the empty shell of a mediæval monarchy, broken, distracted, corrupt.

The war with Spain marks in itself no crisis. The end is seen from the beginning. It was known to Spain as clearly as to us. But her government had no re-

course. They had come to the end of diplomacy, and could only die fighting. "To die game" is an old habit of the Spaniard. "Whatever else the war may do," says the Spanish diplomat, with pathetic honesty, "it can only bring ruin to Spain."

It is too late for us now to ask how we got into the war. Was it inevitable? Was it wise? Was it righteous? We need not ask these questions, because the answers will not help us. We may have our doubts as to one or all of these, but all doubts we must keep to ourselves. We are in the midst of battle, and must fight to the end. The "rough-riders" are in the saddle. "What though the soldier knew some one had blundered?" The swifter, fiercer, more glorious our attacks, the sooner and more lasting our peace. There is no possible justification for the war unless we are strong enough and swift enough to bring it to a speedy end. If America is to be the knight-errant of the nations she must be pure of heart and swift of foot, every inch a knight.

The crisis comes when the war is over. What then? Our question is not what we shall do with Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines. It is what these prizes will do to us. Can we let go of them in honor or in safety? if not, what if we hold them? What will be the reflex effect of great victories, suddenly realized strength, the patronizing applause, the ill-concealed envy of great nations, the conquest of strange territories, the raising of our flag beyond the seas? All this is new to us. It is un-American; it is contrary to our traditions; it is delicious; it is intoxicating.

For this is the fact before us. We have come to our

manhood among the nations of the earth. What shall we do about it? The war once finished, shall we go back to our farms and factories, to our squabbles over tariffs and coinage, our petty trading in peanuts and postoffices? Or shall our country turn away from these things and stand forth once for all a great naval power, our vessels in every sea, our influence felt over all the earth? Shall we be the plain United States again, or shall we be another England, fearless even of our own great mother, second to her only in age and prestige?

The minor results of war are matters of little moment in comparison. Let us look at a few of them as we pass. Most of them are not results at all. The glow of battle simply shows old facts in new relation.

The war has stirred the fires of patriotism, we say. Certainly, but they were already there, else they could not be stirred. I doubt if there is more love of country with us to-day than there was a year ago. Real love of country is not easily moved. Its guarantee is its permanence. Love of adventure, love of fight, these are soon kindled. It is these to which the battle spirit appeals. Love of adventure we may not despise. It is the precious heritage of new races; it is the basis of personal courage; but it is not patriotism; it is push. Love of fight is not in itself unworthy. The race which cannot fight if need be, is a puny folk destined to be the prey of tyrants. But one who fights for fight's sake is a bully, not a hero. The bully is at heart a coward. To fight only when we are sure of the result, is no proof of national courage.

Patriotism is the will to serve one's country; to make

one's country better worth serving. It is a course of action rather than a sentiment. It is serious rather than stirring. The shrilling of the mob is not patriotism. It is not patriotism to trample on the Spanish flag, to burn fire-crackers, or to twist the Lion's tail. The shrieking of war editors is not patriotism. Nowadays, nations buy newspapers as they buy ships. Whatever is noisy, whether in Congress or the pulpit, or on the streets, cannot be patriotism. It is not in the galleries that we find brave men. "Patriotism," says Dr. Johnson, "is the last refuge of the scoundrel." But he was speaking of counterfeit patriotism. There could not be a counterfeit were there not also a reality.

But this I see as I watch the situation: True patriotism declines as the war spirit rises. Men say they have no interest in reform until the war is over. There is no use of talking of better financial methods, of fairer adjustment of taxes, of wiser administration of affairs, until the war fever has passed by. The patriotism of the hour looks to a fight with some other nation, not towards greater pride in our own.

The war has united at last the North and the South, we say. So at least it appears. When Fitzhugh Lee is called a Yankee, and all the haughty Lees seem proud of the designation, we may be sure that the old lines of division exist no longer. North and South, East and West, whatever our blood, birth or rank, we Yankees stand shoulder to shoulder in 1898. But our present solidarity shows that the nation was sound already, else a month could not have welded it together.

It is twenty-eight years ago to-day that a rebel soldier who says—

"I am a Southerner,
I loved the South and dared for her
To fight from Lookout to the sea
With her proud banner over me."

stood before the ranks of the Grand Army and spoke these words:

"I stand and say that you were right;
I greet you with uncovered head,
Remembering many a thundrous fight,
When whistling death between us sped;
I clasp the hand that made my scars,
I cheer the flag my foemen bore,
I shout for joy to see the stars
All on our common shield once more."

This was more than a quarter of a century ago, and all this time the great loyal South has patiently and unflinchingly accepted war's terrible results. It is not strange, then, that she shows her loyalty to-day. The "Solid South," the bugaboo of politicians, the cloak of Northern venality, has passed away forever. The warm response to American courage, in whatever section or party, in whatever trade or profession, shows that with all our surface divisions, we of America are one in heart. The impartial bitterness of Spanish hatred directed toward all classes and conditions of Anglo-Saxons alike emphasizes the real unity of race and nation.

There are some who justify war for war's sake. Blood-letting "relieves the pressure on the boundaries." It whets courage. It keeps the ape and tiger alive in men. All this is detestable. To waste good blood is pure murder, if nothing is gained by it. To let blood for blood's sake is bad in politics as it is in medicine.

War is killing, brutal, barbarous killing, and its direct effects are mostly evil. The glory of war turns our attention from civic affairs. Neglect invites corruption. Noble and necessary as was our Civil War, we have not yet recovered from its degrading influences. Too often the courage of brave men is an excuse for the depredations of venal politicians. The glorious banner of freedom becomes the cover for the sutler's tent.

The test of civilization is the substitution of law for war; statutes for brute strength. No doubt diplomacy, as one of our Senators has said, is mostly "a pack of lies," and arbitration, as we have known it, is compulsory and arbitrary compromise. But in the long run truth will out, even in diplomacy. The nations who suffer through clumsy and blundering tribunals of arbitration will learn from this experience. They will find means, at last, to secure justice as well as peace. As private war gave way to security under national law, so must public war give way to the law of civilization.

I hear men say to-day that war is necessary to the Republic because we need new heroes for our worship. The old heroes are getting stale. Those of the Revolution are half mythical. Washington and Greene were never actually alive in real flesh and blood. Even Grant and Sherman, Lee and Jackson, Thomas and Farragut are names only to most of us. Our fathers knew them, but theirs are not names to conjure with to-day. The name of Dewey fills a popular want. The heroes of the newspaper in times of peace are mere tinsel heroes. Here is one with flesh and blood in him, a man of nerve and courage and success.

All this is true, but our heroes were with us already.

In times of peace they were ready for heroism. The real hero is the man who does his duty. It does not matter whether his name be on the headlines of the newspapers or not. His greatness is not enhanced when a street or a trotting horse is named for him. It is the business of the Republic to make a nation of heroes. The making of brave soldiers is only a part of the work of making men. The glare of battle shows men in false perspective. To one who stands in its light we give the glory of a thousand. But we may applaud with the rest as the great captains pass before us. They have earned their renown, yet when "the tumult and the shouting dies," still the crisis remains. What effect must the war have on us?

Our line of action seems a narrow one. Our policy has been fully declared. Our armies invade Cuba to put an end to disorder, brutality and murderous wrong. In the words of the resolution of Congress:

"The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, and cannot longer be endured."

And in recording the necessity which forces us to act we disclaim all selfish intentions. Thus Congress used these words which are already part of the record of history and which we may not forget:

"The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The wrongs we would avenge are not new to Spain. By such cruelties she has always held her possessions. By such means she has lost most of them. Flanders, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Chili, Cuba, all tell the same story. Spain still belongs to the seventeenth century. From the seventeenth century Cuba has escaped. To her we shall bring order and relief. Her shackles once broken, then we shall stay our hand. To Cuba Libre, independent and free, we will leave the choice of her own future.

But this is easier said than done. Cuba Libre has no heart or will to choose. Her present nominal government is not that of a republic. It is a political oligarchy, which has its seat not in Havana, but in New York. Cuba is helpless now. As a republic she will be helpless still. Spanish blood and Spanish training ill prepare a land for freedom. Freedom such as we know it has never yet been won by people of Latin blood. The freedom of Spanish America is for the most part military despotism. It is said of the government of Russia that it is "despotism tempered by assassination." That of most of our sister republics is assassination tempered by despotism. Mexico, the best of them, is not a republic; it is a despotism, the splendid tyranny of a man strong and wise, who knows Mexico and how to govern her, a humane and beneficent tyrant.

There are many noble men in Cuba, men of education and character, with the culture and bearing of gentlemen. Some of these I know, and one I have been proud to call my friend, Felipe Poey, during fifty years professor in the University of Havana. Most good men in Cuba hope for the success of the insurgents, but they have not much

confidence in Cuban democracy. The common run of the Cuban population is of a very different class.

"The Cuban soldiers at Tampa," says John R. Rathom, "are very small, excitable, erratic, physically unfit. They go about the camps brandishing their machetes and telling our infantrymen who tower above them like giants, how they are going to cut the Spaniards to pieces. Their whole spirit is one of frothy boasting."

There are three things inseparable from the life of the Cuban people to-day, the cigarette, the lottery ticket, and the machete. These stand for vice, superstition and revenge. Above these the thoughts of the common man in Cuba seldom rise. Most of the people cannot read, and those who can, read largely the literature of vice.

From my own visit to Havana, two keen recollections remain. In the early morning the markets are filled by a long procession of loaded burros who came down from the mountain side. These bring everything that is eatable, with the rest live pigs and sheep. Pigs and sheep alike are tied in pairs and hung saddle-wise, head downward, from the backs of the donkeys. From two until four in the morning the long procession comes in, the pigs lustily squealing, the sheep helpless and dumb. nobody cares for an animal's pain. There is no society for prevention of cruelty to animals in Cuba. There are not many who could understand even the purpose of such a society. In Havana, bull-fights follow the church services, not fights but slaughter. A horse lame and blind is ripped up by an infuriated bull, who in turn is done to death by the stab of a skilful butcher.

At Christmas time all interest centers in the lottery.

Everybody buys lottery tickets. Charms, fortune-tellers, astrology and all the machinery of superstition are brought into play to select the lucky numbers. How many days old am I? How many days old is my Dolores? How many days old was I on my lucky day when I drew the prize last year? How can I find my lucky number? These matters are talked of everywhere on the streets, in the church, in the wine rooms, in the theaters. One hears the parrots on their posts at the gate discussing the very same questions. The birds rattle off the names and numbers as glibly as their masters, and with as high a conception of the possibilities of life.

It seems probable that most of the oppressed people, crowded from their homes by Weyler's armies, will be dead before we come to their relief. In starving out Havana we shall doubtless starve them first. Those who survive may become our bitterest enemies before the year is out. For these people prefer the indolence of Spanish rule with all its brutalities to the bustling ways of the Anglo-Saxon. Many of them would take their chances of being starved or butchered rather than to build roads, wash their faces, and clean up their towns. To suppress the lottery and the cock-fight would be to rob them of most that makes life worth living. The Puritan Sabbath and the self-control it typifies in their minds would be worse than the flames of Purgatory. Whether as a free nation under our protection or whether governed by our martial law, it will be no easy task to hold the peace in Cuba Libre. The down-trodden Cuban and the Spanish oppressor are the same in blood, the same in method.

But we may say that American enterprise will change all this. It will flow into Cuba when Cuba is free. It will clean up the cities, stamp out the fevers, build roads where the trails for mule-sleds are, and railroads where the current of traffic goes. It will make the pearl of the Antilles the fairest island on the face of the earth.

No doubt all this will come if we give a stable government. Whatever else we say or do we must give such a government. The nations of the world will hold us responsible for Cuba through the years to come. A virtual serfdom under American martial law is the fate of Cuba, though we may declare her free and independent.

Why then shall we not hold Cuba, if she becomes ours by right of conquest? Because that would be a cowardly thing to do. The justification of her capture is that we do not want her. If we want Cuba, common decency says that we must let her alone. Ours is a war of mercy, not of conquest. This we have plainly declared to all the nations. Perhaps we meant what we said, though the speeches in Congress do not make this clear. If we can trust the records, our chief motives were three: Desire for political capital, desire for revenge, and sympathy for humanity.

It was desire for political capital that forced the hand of the President. "The war," says Dr. Frank Drew, did not begin as an honorable war. If it is to become such, it must be made honorable by other men than those whose votes committed us to it."

If we retire with clean hands, it will be because our hands are empty. To keep Cuba or the Philippines would be to follow the example of conquering nations. Doubtless England would do it in our place. The habit of domination makes men unscrupulous.

Professor Nicholson of Edinburgh has said: "There

can be no question, in the light of history, that the political instinct of the English people—or to adopt the popular language of the moment, the original sin of the nation—is to covet everything of its neighbor's worth coveting, and it is not content until the sin is complete." No wonder England now pats us on the back. We are following her lead. We are giving to her methods the sanction of our respectability. Of all forms of flattery, imitation is the sincerest.

By a war of conquest fifty years ago we took from Mexico her fairest provinces. For the good of humanity we did it, no doubt, and along the lines of manifest destiny. Brave battles our soldiers fought, but for all that, the war itself was most inglorious. So it reads in history as we write it to-day. It is iniquitous in history as written in Mexico.

Shall then the war for Cuba Libre come to an inglorious end? If we make anything by it, it will be most inglorious. It will be without honor if its two millions a day are made good by conquered territory. Neither for conquest nor for revenge have we sent forth the army of the Republic. "Let us beware," says J. K. H. Burgwin, "of placing ourselves in the position of doing a noble and generous act and then demanding that a bankrupt and humbled enemy shall pay our expenses." If we are going to hold the prizes of war or to use them in thrifty trade we should never have set out on the errands of humanity.

The nations of Europe look with jealousy on our possibilities of strength. "If I only," some king may say—"if I only had all these men, all this land, all these resources, I would eclipse the glory of Cæsar, of Charlemagne, of Napoleon." If we turned everything into

fighting, what a fight we could make. But we have gone about our business, a vast nation of common people, careless of European complications, indifferent to European glory, unconscious of our power.

For the end of government by the people is to fit the people to control their own affairs. The basis of our government is the town meeting. The people manage their local business, and send their wisest men as delegates to look after the interests of the nation. This was the dream of the fathers. If there has been much change and some degeneration, yet in substance the thoughts of the fathers prevail. The liberties of the people are secure because they are everywhere in the people's hands. America is not a power among the nations. She is a nation among the powers. A "power" is a country which is concerned with affairs not her own and which develops the machinery to make such concern effective. A nation minds her own business.

The spirit of our foreign policy has been to avoid all display of power. It was set forth in Washington's farewell address, in these memorable words:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. \* \* \* Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. \* \* \* Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our

peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true course to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

The America of which Washington dreamed should grow strong within herself, should avoid entangling alliances with foreign nations, should keep out of all fights and all friendships that are not her own, should secure no territory that might not be self-governing, and should acquire no provinces that might not in time be numbered among the United States. To this policy his followers closely adhered. Even gratitude to France never made us her catspaw in her struggle against England. No outflow of sympathy has caused us to interfere in behalf of Ireland or Armenia or Greece.

But the world is smaller than in Washington's day. Steam and electricity have bound the world together. The interests of one nation are those of all nations. The interests of Armenia, Cape Colony and Ceylon are closer to us to-day than those of France and Germany were to our fathers. Traditions are worthy of respect only when they serve the real needs of the present. So it may be that with changed conditions the wise counsel of the past may be open to revision. Are times not already ripe for a change in national policy?

Let us look for a moment at the policy of England. The United States is great through minding her own business; England through minding the business of the world. In the Norse Mythology the Mitgard-Serpent appears in the guise of a cat, an animal small and feeble, but in reality the mightiest and most enduring of all, for its tail goes around the earth, growing down its own throat, and by its giant force, it holds the world together. Eng-

land is the Mitgard-Serpent of the nations, shut in a petty island; as Benjamin Franklin said, "an island which compared to America is but a stepping stone in a brook with scarce enough of it above water to keep one's shoes dry." Yet, by the force of arms, the force of trade and the force of law she has become the ruler of the earth. It is English brain and English muscle which hold the world together.

No other agency of civilization has been so potent as England's enlightened selfishness. Her colonies are of three orders—friendly nations, subject nations and military posts. The larger colonies are little united states. They are republics and rule their own affairs. The subject nations and the military posts England rules by a rod of iron, because no other rule is possible. Every year England seizes new posts, opens new ports and widens the stretch of her empire. But of all this Greater Britain, England herself is but a little part, the ruling head of a world-wide organism, "What does he know of England who only England knows?" No doubt as Kipling says, England

"thinks her empire still
"Twixt the Strand and Holborn Hill,"

but the Strand would be half empty were it not that it leads outward to Cathay. The huge business interests of Greater Britain are the guarantee of her solidarity. All her parts must hold together.

In similar relation to the Mother Country, America must stand. Greater England holds over us the obligations of blood and thought and language and character. Only the Saxon understands the Saxon. Only the Saxon and the Goth know the meaning of freedom. "A sanc-

tion like that of religion," says John Hay, "enforces our partnership in all important affairs." Not that we should enter into formal alliance with Great Britain. We can get along well side by side, but never tied together. When England suggests a union for attack and defense, let us ask what she expects to gain from us. Never yet did England offer us the hand in open friendliness, in pure good faith, not hoping to get the best of the bargain. This is the English government, which never acts without interested motives. But the English people are our friends in every real crisis, and that without caring overmuch whether we be right or not. War with England should be forever impossible. The need of the common race is greater than the need of the nations. The Anglo-Saxon race must be at peace within itself. Nothing is so important to civilization as this. A war between England and America fought to the bitter end might submerge civilization. When the war should be over and the smoke cleared away there would be but one nation left, and that, Russia.

But though one in blood with England our course of political activities has not lain parallel with hers. We were estranged in the beginning, and we have had other affairs on our hands. We have turned our faces westward, and our work has made us strong. We have had our forests to clear, our prairies to break, our rivers to harness, our own problem of slavery to adjust. We have followed the spirit of Washington's address for a hundred years, until the movement of history has brought us to the parting of the ways. Federalism or Imperialism—which shall it be?

In the direction of imperialism we have already taken

certain steps. The promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine is one of these. Its original impulse was a jealous regard for the liberties of the republics of Latin America. We made no objection to the present occupation of parts of America by European powers but we shall prevent by force any extension of such dominion. The cause of the Monroe Doctrine was the danger to republicanism through monarchial aggression. With the republics of America our interests were supposed to be in unison. But our real interests lie now in other directions. We have a thousand ties binding us to Europe for one to Latin America. Even Japan and China are more to us than the states of South America. Moreover, the republics we would guard are really only republics in name. They have no more of a republican spirit than has Italy or Spain, and vastly less than England or Germany. The aggressions of England on Venezuela which our strong protest prevented were really in the interest of civilization. These republics hate the United States, her people and her institutions. They resent our protection and repel our patronage, and as for us, we are likely to despise them rather than to love them. The guardian of the two Americas must use a strong hand if it would save all of its wards from barbarism.

So the Monroe Doctrine is not alone a willingness to protect our sister republics from European aggression. It must become a means of holding them in order. So long as the Monroe Doctrine is put forth, so long must we be in some degree surety for the good behavior of South America. This necessity has carried us away from our traditional attention to our own affairs. It will carry us still further unless the policy be reversed.

## "LEST WE FORGET."

UN2VERSIT

The purchase of Alaska marks another movement LIFORT away from self-government. This vast, wild, resourceful land, unfit for habitation for the most part, unfit for selfcontrol, we have made a province of our republic. We have placed it under our flag, but the flag is all we have given it. On stretches of coast as long as that of California, dotted with fishing villages, the United States has exercised no authority whatever. Over the whole coast of Alaska, from Sitka to Point Barrow, there have been only scattering and sporadic efforts at national rule. With a population so weak and scattered, self-government is impossible, and we have no other form of government to offer. The condition of Alaska to-day is simply a disgrace to us. The host that fare to the Klondike make their own government as they go along. What little government Alaska had in the past has now been mostly withdrawn on account of the war with Spain. We need the patrol vessels for coast defense. This is as though we sent San Francisco police to garrison Manila. In public affairs we can never attend to two things at a time. Considering our possibilities and our intentions, we have treated the Aleutian Islands as shabbily as Spain has treated Cuba, and Russia has almost as good a right to protest against our ways as we have to protest against those of Spain.

This difference obtains. The natives of Alaska are gentle and tractable and away from the eyes of the world. They have no friends, no element of the picturesque, and our cruelty is not violence but neglect. We have wantonly allowed the destruction of the sea otter, their chief means of subsistence. We have wasted the sea-lion which furnishes their boats. Starvation and death are

everywhere imminent in these coast settlements of Alaska, and the blame for it rests on us. "Reconcentrados" between Arctic snows and San Francisco greed, the Aleuts must starve and freeze. From Prince William's Sound to Attu, nearly fifteen hundred miles, not a village has a sure means of support left to-day.

According to latest reports from Port Etches, all the people of the village live together in the cellar of an abandoned warehouse. Wosnessenski was starving last year. In Belkofski, Morjovi, Atka, Attu, and a half dozen other villages, the Company's store had been closed because the people can no longer pay for supplies. Civilization has made flour, sugar, tea and tobacco necessities of life, and these they can get no longer.

As our government is constituted, men must govern themselves and send their delegates to Congress. For others we have no government at all. The great corporations in Alaska are still squatters on government land, and the disputes among their employees must be settled by blow of fist, or they are not settled at all. Open warfare with knife and gun has existed more than once along the salmon rivers. This is not the fault of the companies. They are law-abiding enough when there is any law. "But there runs no law of God nor man to the north of fifty-three." The villages of Aleuts and Esquimaux are ruled by the Company storekeeper and the Russian priest, each with authority unlimited and unsupported by law. The stanch laws of prohibition by which liquor is excluded from Alaska cannot enforce themselves, and no other adequate force is provided. The whole matter is a huge farce, and its necessary result is contempt for law. With a colonial bureau like that of England, the problems of ruling an inferior and dependent people would be simple enough. Such a bureau could take care of Alaska and could give good government to any territory over which our flag may float.

Such a bureau we must have if Alaska is not to remain a matter of public embarrassment. Such a bureau could operate Hawaii as well. Hawaii cannot govern itself under our federal forms. It is an oligarchy in the nature of things. Under colonial management it would be peaceful and prosperous. The more it had to do, the more effective such a colonial bureau would become. Every governmental department tends to aggrandize itself. Colonies would demand more colonies. If we have Alaska already and are certain to take Hawaii, why not establish such a colonial bureau and manage them as England manages Hong Kong and Singapore and Jamaica? In the same way we may control Cuba, which falls as a ripe pear into our hands. And Porto Rico must go with Cuba. The Philippines are not very far away. They are nearer to San Francisco than Boston was to Philadelphia in the times of Washington, and the transfer of news is a matter of a few hours only. The Philippines are as large as New England and New York, with a population greater than all the Rocky Mountain country and the Pacific Slope combined. They have a hard population to manage, to be sure, a substratum of Malays, lazy and revengeful, over these a social layer of thrifty Chinese and canny Tapanese, then next a Spanish aristocracy and a surface scum of the wanderers of all the world. In the unexplored interiors

of the great islands live the wild tribes of negritos, untamed black imps, as incapable of self-government or of any other government as so many monkeys. Spain has stood at the gateway of this rich land and taken toll of whatever goes out. This is all she has attempted. We could not do much more, but whatever is possible we can do as well as any one else. If we do not keep the Philippines they will surely fall into worse hands.

And all these territories are to-day virtually under the American flag. But why stop here? One great need of the world's commerce is a canal across the territory of Nicaragua, and we may seize that turbulent little republic as a guarantee for the security and neutrality of the canal. Then Costa Rica has her coffee fields, and there is a wondrous wealth in Guatemala. In the Caroline Islands we would find a good coaling station. We have literary interest in Samoa at least, and in the name of the Ladrones, the islands of the great thieves, we ought to find something suggestive. An open port of our own on the coast of China would give our commerce its proper level of equality. Perhaps Swatow would suffice for us after Russia, and Germany, and France, and England has each made its choice.

Then there are the Blue Canaries. From the tall peak of Teneriffe we can overlook the entrance to the Mediterranean and keep our watch on the politics of Europe. As England is the assignee of bankrupt Egypt, shall we not seize the assets of bankrupt Spain? To be sure we come in late in the game of territorial expansion. We must take what we can get, and we cannot get much except by force. Still we must have it. For all this and more, according to Theodore Roosevelt and a host

of others, is our "manifest destiny." To help along "manifest destiny," is the purpose of the war with Spain. The spell is on us, and it is the more irresistible because it came unawares. Recently in an address in Boston, Richard Olney, one of the wisest of our public men, who checked the bold, bad British Lion by a bluff as big as the lion's own roar, made a vigorous plea for national expansion. He says:

"But it is even a more pitiful ambition for such a country to aim to seclude itself from the world at large, and to live a life as isolated and independent as if it were the only country on the footstool. A nation is as much a member of society as an individual. \* \* \* Does a foreign question or controversy present itself, appealing however forcibly to our sympathies or sense of right-what happens the moment it is suggested that the United States should seriously participate in its settlement? A shiver runs through all the ranks of capital, lest the uninterrupted course of money-making be interfered with; the cry of 'Jingo!' comes up in various quarters; advocates of peace at any price make themselves heard from innumerable pulpits and rostrums; while practical politicians invoke the doctrine of the Farewell Address as an absolute bar to all positive action, The upshot is more or less an explosion of sympathy or antipathy at more or less public meetings, and, if the case is a very strong one, a more or less tardy tender by the Government of its 'moral support.' Is that a creditable part for a great nation to play in the affairs of the world? \* \* \* This country was once the pioneer, and is now the millionaire. It behooves it to recognize the changed conditions, and to realize its great place among the power of the earth. It behooves it to accept the commanding position belonging to it with all its advantages on the one hand, and ail its burdens on the other. It is not enough for it to vaunt its greatness and superiority, and call upon the rest of the world to admire and be duly impressed. Posing before less favored peoples as an exemplar of the superiority of American institutions may be justified and may have its uses; but posing alone is like answering the appeal of a mendicant by bidding him admire your

own sleekness, your own fine clothes and handsome house, and your generally comfortable and prosperous condition. He possibly should do that and be grateful for the spectacle, but what he really asks and needs is a helping hand. The mission of this country, if it has one, and I verily believe it has, is not merely to pose, but to act—and, while always governing itself by prudence and common sense and making its own special interests the first and paramount objects of its care, to forego no fitting opportunity to further the progress of civilization practically as well as theoretically by timely deeds as well as by eloquent words. There is such a thing for a nation as a 'splendid isolation'—as when, for a worthy cause, for its own independence, or dignity, or vital interests, it unshrinkingly opposes itself to a hostile world. But isolation that is nothing but the shirking of the responsibility of high place and great power is simply agnominious."

"The doors to that shining destiny are open wide," says a late writer in the San Francisco *Chronicle*. "Shall the Nation pass them or shall it shrink back into itself and leave to other and braver hands the prizes of the future. To broaden out in the field of enterprise and acquisition is the duty of the Republic, to strengthen itself whenever it safely can, to do its part in redeeming the victims of ignorance as well as of cruelty, to gather to itself the riches that will free it from debt, and make its influence paramount in the world's affairs as the greatest part of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood; to plant itself in the midst of events, and mold them to its mighty purpose."

Such is the dream of American imperialism. Its prizes lie in our hands unasked. The fates have forced them upon us. But before we seize them, now let us ask what it will cost? First, it will cost life and money in rich measure. Kipling tells us the cost of British Admiralty:

"We have fed our sea for a thousand years,
And she calls us still unfed,
Though there's never a wave of all her waves
But marks our English dead.

We've strewed our best to the weeds' unrest,
To the shark and the sheering gull;
If blood be the price of admiralty
Lord God! we have paid it in full."

If we have a navy that can make history we must pay for it as England does, not only in blood but in cold, hard cash. This means more taxes, heavy taxes, more expenditures, more waste. It means the revision of our tax laws, a tariff for revenue only with every element of protection for American industries squeezed out of it. The government will need all it can get. We must manage our colonies that they may yield revenue. We must cherish commerce as we have tried to cherish manufacture, and we must cherish manufacture and agriculture through commerce. Much more of a navy we need to preserve ourselves from imbecility. One victory like that of Manila may save us from a dozen insults, and we must have the means to win such victories.

So far this would not be unmixed evil, perhaps no evil at all. But we must go farther. Imperialism demands the maintenance of a standing army large enough to carry out whatever we undertake. We must wholly change our pension laws and deal with the veteran on a basis of business, not of sentiment. Imperialism leaves no place for sentiment in public affairs. To maintain strong armies the nations of continental Europe sacrifice everything else. The people are loaded with armor till they cannot rise, and they dare not throw it off. Even to-day Italy is on the verge of a revolution, and the cause is the cost of the army. The Italian proverb says that if one throws a stone from a window it will hit a soldier or a priest, and the farmer pays for both.

The whole world must become the range of our interest. We must make every American's house his castle from Kamchatka to Kerguelen. We must be quick to revenge and strong to bluff. We must never fight when the issue is doubtful, and never fail to fight if there is a point to be gained. We must give up our foolish notions that America is big enough to maintain a separate basis of coinage, a freeman's scale of wages, a peculiar republican social order different from that of the rest of mankind. We must open our own doors as we would push open the doors of the world. We must change the character of our diplomacy. We must make statecraft a profession. Hitherto we have sent out our ambassadors because to do so is the fashion among nations, not because we have anything for them to do. Hereafter they must go out to spread American influences. The plain, blunt, effective truth-telling of our present diplomacy must give way to the power to carry our point. We must not send men to foreign countries because we do not want them at home. The dull incompetence of our consular service must give way to a system of trained agents. And this, too, has its compensating reactions. As our foreign service is made efffective it will become dignified. This will help our relations abroad because foreign nations judge us by the quality of our representatives.

Our government must be changed for our changing needs. We must give up the checks and balances in our constitution. It is said that our great battleship *Oregon* can turn about end for end within her own length. The dominant nation must have the same power. She must be capable of reversing her action in

a minute, of turning around within her own length. This "our prate of statute and of state" makes impossible. We shall receive many hard knocks before we reach this condition, but we must reach it if we are to "work mightily" in the affairs of the world. If we are to deal with crises in foreign affairs we must hold them with a steadier grasp than that with which we have held the Cuban question. We cannot move accurately and quickly under the joint leadership of a conservative and steady-headed President, a hysterical or venal Senate, and a House intent upon its own re-election. That kind of checks and balances we must lay aside forever. As matters are now, President, Senate and House check each other's movements and the State falls over its own feet.

The government of the United States is the expression of the transient will of the people, so hemmed in by checks and balances that positive action is difficult whatever the will of the majority for the moment may be. This is the government for peace and self-defense, but not for aggression. The government of England expresses the permanent will of the intelligent people with such checks as shut out ignorance and control incompetence. The nation and not the individual man is the unit in its actions.

Towards the English system we must approach more and more closely if we are to deal with foreign affairs in large fashion. The town-meeting idea must give way to centralization of power. We must look away from our own affairs, neglect them if you please, until the pressure of growing expenditure forces us to attend to them again, and to attend to them more carefully than we ever

yet have done. Good government at home must precede good government of dependencies. One reason England is governed well is that misgovernment anywhere on any large scale would be fatal to her credit and fatal to her power. She must call her best men to her political service, because without them she would perish.

It may be that the choice of imperialism is already made. If so, we shall learn the lesson of dominion in the hardest school of experience. That we shall ultimately learn it I have no doubt, for ours is a nation of apt scholars. We shall hold our own in war and diplomacy, we shall tie the hands of turbulent nations and seize the assets of bankrupt ones, and we shall teach the art of money-making to the dependent nations who shall be our wards and slaves.

Some great changes in our system are inevitable, and belong to the course of natural progress. Against them I have nothing to say. Whatever our part in the affairs of the world we should play it manfully. But with all this I believe that the movement toward broad dominion so eloquently outlined by Mr. Olney, would be a step downward. It would be to turn from our highest purposes to drift with the current of manifest destiny. It would be not to do the work of America, but to follow the ways of the rest of the world. I make no plea for indifference or self-sufficiency or isolation for isolation's sake. To shrink from world movements or to drift with the current is alike unworthy of our origin and destiny. Only this I urge; let our choice be made with open eyes, not at the dictates of chance disguised as "Manifest Destiny." Unforgetting, counting all the cost, let us make our decision. Let ours be sober, fearless, prayerful choice. The federal republic—the imperial republic—which shall it be?

There are three main reasons for opposing every step toward imperialism. First, dominion is brute force; second, dependent nations are slave nations; third, the making of men is greater than the building of empires.

As to the first of these: The extension of dominion rests on the strength of arms. Men who cannot hold town meetings must obey through brute force. In Alaska, for example, our occupation is a farce and scandal. Only force can make it otherwise. Only by force can the masses of Hawaii or Cuba be held to industry and order. To furnish such power, we shall need a colonial bureau, with its force of extra-national police. A large army and navy must justify itself by doing something. Army and navy we must maintain for our own defense, but beyond that they can do little that does not hurt, and they must be used if they would be kept alive. Even warfare for humanity falls to the level of other wars, and all wars according to Benjamin Franklin, are bad, some worse than others. The rescue of the oppressed is only accomplished by the use of force against the oppressor. The lofty purposes of humanity are forgotten in the joy of struggle and the pride of conquest.

The other reasons concern the integrity of the Republic itself. This was the lesson of slavery, that no republic can "endure half slave and half free." The republics of antiquity fell because they were republics of the few only, for each citizen rested on the backs of nine slaves. A republic cannot be an oligarchy as well. The

slaves destroy the republic. Wherever we have inferior and dependent races within our borders to-day, we have a political problem—"the Negro problem," "the Chinese problem," "the Indian problem." These problems we slowly solve. Industrial training and industrial pride make a man of the Negro. Industrial interests many even make a man of the Chinaman, and the Indian disappears as our civilization touches him.

But in the tropics such problems are perennial and insoluble, Cuba, Manila, Nicaragua, will be slave territories for centuries to come. These people in such a climate can never have self-government in the Anglo-Saxon sense. Whatever form of control we adopt, we shall be in fact slave-drivers, and the business of slave-driving will react upon us. Slavery itself was a disease which came to us from the British West Indies. It breeds in the tropics like yellow fever and leprosy. Can even an imperial republic last, part slave, part free?

But England endures, and her control of slave territories is her "doom and pride." What then of British imperialism? From the standpoint of imperialism England is an oligarchy, not a republic. Her government is not self-rule, but the direction of commerce. It is admiralty rather than democracy. Americans govern themselves. Englishmen are ruled by the government of their own choosing. Englishmen govern themselves in municipal affairs, and in ways from which we have much to learn. In foreign affairs their huge governmental machine, backed by the momentum of tradition, is all-powerful. This rules Ireland, India, Gibraltar, Egypt, all England's dependencies and wards. The other colonies are republics in fact. Canada, New Zeal-

and, the states of Australia—these are republics bound to keep the peace with the mother country, but in no other way controlled by her. Only ties of sentiment bind Canada to England. In all practical matters, she is one with the United States.

The stronger the governmental machine, and the more adjustable its powers, the better the government. But government is not the main business of a republic. If good government were all, democracy would not deserve half the effort that is spent upon it. For the function of democracy is not to make government good. It is to make men strong. Better government than any republic has yet enjoyed could be had in simpler and cheaper ways. The automatic scheme of competitive examination would give us better service at half the present cost. Even an ordinary intelligence office, or statesman's employment bureau would serve us better than conventions and elections. Government too good as well as too bad may have a baneful influence on men. The purpose of self-government is to intensify individual responsibility, to promote attempts at wisdom, through which true wisdom may come at last. The republic is a huge laboratory of civics, a laboratory in which strange experiments are performed, but in which, as in other laboratories, wisdom may arise from experience, and once arisen may work itself out into virtue.

It is not true that the government "which is best administered is best." That is the maxim of tyranny. That government is best which makes the best men. In the training of manhood lies the certain pledge of better government in the future. The civic problems of the future will be greater than those of the past. They

will concern not the relations of nation to nation, but of man to man. The policing of far-off islands, the herding of baboons and elephants, the maintenance of the machinery of imperialism are petty things beside the duties which the higher freedom demands. To turn to these empty and showy affairs, is to neglect our own business for the gossip of our neighbors. Such work may be a matter of necessity; it should not be a source of pride. The political greatness of England has never lain in her navies nor the force of her arms. It has lain in her struggles for individual freedom. Not Marlborough nor Nelson nor Wellington is its exponent. Let us say rather Pym and Hampden, and Gladstone and Bright. The real problems of England have always been at home. The pomp of imperialism, the display of naval power, the commercial control of India and China,—all these are as the "bread and circuses" by which the Roman emperors held the mob from their thrones. They keep the people busy and put off the day of final reckoning. "Gild the dome of the Invalides," was Napoleon's cynical command, when he learned that the people of Paris were becoming desperate.

The people of England seek blindly for a higher justice, a loftier freedom, and so the ruling ministry crowns the good queen as "Empress of India." Meanwhile, the real problems of civilization develop and ripen. They care nothing for the greatness of empire nor the glitter of imperialism. They must be solved by men, and each man must help solve his own problems. The development of republican manhood is just now the most important matter that any nation in the world has

on hand. We have been fairly successful thus far, but perhaps only fairly. Our government is careless, wasteful and unjust, but our men are growing self-contained and wise. Despite the annual invasion of foreign illiteracy, despite the degeneration of congested cities, the individual intelligence of men stands higher in America than any other part of the world. The bearing of the people at large in these days is a lesson in itself. Compare the behavior of the American people, in this and other trying times, with that of the masses of any other nation, and we see what democracy has done. And we shall see more of this as our history goes on. Free schools, free ballot, free thought, free religion-all tend to enforce self-reliance, self-respect, and the sense of duty, which are the surest foundation of national greatness.

An active foreign policy would slowly change much of this. The nation which deals with war and diplomacy must be quick to act and quick to change. It must, like the Oregon, be able to reverse itself within its own length. To this end, good government is a necessity, whether it be self-government or not. Democracy yields before diplomacy. Republicanism steps aside when war is declared. "An army," said Wellington, "can get along under a poor general. It can do nothing under a debating society." In war the strongest man must lead, and military discipline is the only training for an army. In a militant nation the same rules hold in peace as in war. We cannot try civic experiments with a foe at our gates. A foe is always at the gates of a nation with a vigorous foreign policy. Experiments such as we freely try would wreck the British Empire. For one of England's great parties to propose a radical change like that of the free coinage of silver would produce a panic like that of the swallowing of London by an earthquake. The British nation is hated and feared of all nations except our own, and we love her only in our lucid intervals. Only her eternal vigilance keeps the vultures from her coasts. Eternal vigilance of this sort will strengthen governments, will build up nations; it will not in like degree make men. The day of the nations as nations is passing. National ambitions, national hopes, national aggrandizement—all these may become public nuisances. Imperialism, like feudalism, belongs to the past. The men of the world as men, not as nations, are drawing closer and closer together. The needs of commerce are stronger than the will of nations, and the final guarantee of peace and good will among men will be not "the parliament of nations," but the self-control of men.

But whatever the outcome of the present war, whatever the fateful twentieth century may bring, the primal duty of Americans is never to forget that men are more than nations; that wisdom is more than glory, and virtue more than dominion of the sea. The kingdom of God is within us. The nation exists for its men, never the men for the nation. "The only government that I recognize," said Thoreau, "and it matters not how few are at the head of it or how small its army, is the power that establishes justice in the land, never that which establishes injustice." And the will of free men to be just one toward another, is our best guarantee that "government of the people, for the people, and by the people, shall not perish from the earth."

- "God of our fathers, known of old— Lord of our far-flung battle line— Beneath whose awful Hand we hold Dominion over palm and pine— Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet, Lest we forget—lest we forget.
- "The tumult and the shouting dies—
  The captains and the kings depart—
  Still stands Thine ancient Sacrifice,
  An humble and a contrite heart.
  Lord God of Hosts be with us yet,
  Lest we forget, lest we forget!
- "Far-called our navies melt away—
  On dune and headland sinks the fire—
  Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
  Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
  Judge of the nations spare us yet,
  Lest we forget—lest we forget!"



## ·II. COLONIAL EXPANSION.



## II.

## COLONIAL EXPANSION.\*

LAST May I spoke before my people at home on the subject of Imperialism. I took my title, as I take now my text, from Kipling's "Recessional," the noblest hymn of our century: "Lest we forget." For it seemed to me then, just after the battle of Manila, that we might forget who we are and for what we stand. In the sudden intoxication of far-off victory, with the consciousness of power and courage, with the feeling that all the world is talking of us, our great stern mother patting us on the back, and all the lesser peoples looking on in fear or envy, we might lose our heads. But greater glory than this has been ours before. For more than a century our nation has stood for something higher and nobler than success in war, something not enhanced by a victory at sea, or a wild bold charge over a hill lined with masked batteries. We have stood for civic ideals, and the greatest of these, that government should make men by giving them freedom to make themselves. The glory of the American

<sup>\*</sup>Address before the Congress of Religions at Omaha in October, 1898, published in the "New World" for December, 1898, under the title of "Imperial Democracy."

Republic is that it is the embodiment of American manhood. It was the dream of the fathers that this should always be so,—that American government and republican manhood should be co-extensive, that the nation shall not go where freedom cannot go.

This is the meaning of Washington's Farewell Address: that America should grow strong within herself, should keep out of all fights and friendships that are not her own, should secure no territory in which a free man cannot live, and should own no possessions that may not in time be numbered among the United States. In other words, America should not be a power among the nations, but a nation among the powers. This view of the function our country rests on is no mere accident of revolution or isolation. It has its base in sound political common-sense, and in the rush of new claims and new possibilities we should not forget this old wisdom.

This year 1898 makes one of the three world-crises in our history. Twice before have we stood at the parting of the ways. Twice before have wise counsels controlled our decision. The first crisis followed the war of the Revolution. Its question was this, What relation shall the weak, scattered colonies of varying tempers and various ambitions bear to one another? The answer was, the American Constitution, the federation of self-governing United States.

The second crisis came through the growth of slavery. The union of the States, we found, could not "permanently endure half slave, half free." These were the words of Lincoln at Springfield in 1858,—the words that made Douglass Senator from Illinois, that made Lincoln the first President of the re-united States. These are the

words which, fifty years ago, drove the timid away in fear, that rallied the strong to brave deeds in face of a great crisis. And this was our decision: Slavery must die that the Union shall live.

The third crisis is on us to-day. It is not the conquest of Spain, not the disposition of the spoils of victory which first concerns us. It is the spirit that lies behind it. Shall our armies go where our institutions cannot? Shall territorial expansion take the place of Democratic freedom? Shall our invasion of the Orient be merely an incident, an accident of a war of knighterrantry, temporary and exceptional? Or is it to mark a new policy, the reversion from America to Europe, from Democracy to Imperialism?

It is my own belief that the crisis is already passing. Our choice for the future is made. We have already lost our stomach for Imperialism, as we come to see what it means. A century of republicanism has given the common man common sense, and the tawdry glories of foreign dominion already cease to dazzle and deceive. But the responsibilities of our acts are upon us. Hawaii and Alaska are ours already. Cuba and Porto Rico we cannot escape, and, most unfortunate of all, the most of us see no clear way to justice toward the Philippines. The insistent duties of "Compulsory, Imperialism" already clamor for our attention.

In the face of these tremendous problems, the nation should at least be serious. It is not enough to swell our breasts over the glories of national expansion, roll up our eyes, and prate about the guiding finger of Providence, while the black swarm of our political vultures swoop down on our new possessions. To the end that we may

understand the serious work of "Compulsory Imperialism," let us look briefly at a number of easy propositions or axioms of political science, pertinent, each in its degree, to the topic before us.

Colonial expansion is not national growth. By the spirit of our Constitution our Nation can expand only with the growth of freedom. It is composed not of land but of men. It is a self-governing people, gathered in self-governing United States. There is no objection to national expansion where honorably brought about. there were any more space to be occupied by American citizens, who could take care of themselves, we would cheerfully overflow and fill it. But Colonial Aggrandizement is not national expansion; slaves are not men. Wherever degenerate, dependent or alien races are within our borders to-day, they are not part of the United States. They constitute a social problem; a menace to peace and welfare. There is no solution of race problem or class problem, until race or class can solve it for itself. Unless the Negro can make a man of himself through the agencies of freedom, free ballot, free schools, free religions, there can be no solutions of the race problem. Already Booker Washington warns us that this problem unsettled is a national danger greater than the attack of armies within or without. problems of the tropics are perennial and insoluble, for free institutions cannot exist where free men cannot live.

The territorial expansion now contemplated would not extend our institutions, because the proposed colonies are incapable of civilized self-government. It would not extend our nation, because these regions are already full

of alien races, and not habitable by Anglo-Saxon people. The strength of Anglo-Saxon civilization lies in the mental and physical activity of men and in the growth of the home. Where activity is fatal to life, the Anglo-Saxon decays, mentally, morally, physically. The home cannot endure in the climate of the tropics. Mr. Ingersoll once said that if a colony of New England preachers and Yankee schoolma'ams were established in the West Indies, the third generation would be seen riding bareback on Sunday to the cock-fights. Civilization is, as it were, suffocated in the tropics. It lives, as Benjamin Kidd suggests, as though under deficiency of oxygen. The only American who can live in the tropics without demoralization is the one who has duties at home and is not likely to go there.

The advances of civilization are wholly repugnant to the children of the tropics. To live without care, reckless and dirty, to have no duties and to be in no hurry, with the lottery, cock-fight and games of chance for excitement, is more to them than rapid transit, telegraphic communication, literature, art, education, and all the joys of Saxon civilization. The Latin republics fail for reasons inherent in the nature of the people. There is little civic coherence among them; feelings are mistaken for realities, words for deeds, and boasting for accomplishment. Hence great words, lofty sentiments, fuss and feathers generally take the place of action.

We are pledged to give self-government to Cuba. This we cannot do in full without the risk of seeing it relapse into an anarchy as repulsive, if not as hopeless, as the tyranny of Spain. Only the splendid apparition of the man on horseback could bring this to an end.

The dictator may bring Law, but not democracy. Its ultimate fate and ours is Annexation. It is too near us and our interests for us to leave it to its fate, and to the schemes of its own politicians. It therefore remains for us to annex and assimilate Cuba, but not at once. We must take our time, and do it in decency and order, as we have taken Alaska and Hawaii. We take Cuba, Porto Rico and Hawaii, not because we want them, but because we have no friends who can manage them well and give us no trouble, and it is possible that in a century or so they may become part of our nation as well as of our territory.

The Anglo-Saxon nations have certain ideals on which their political superstructure rests. The great political service of England is to teach respect for law. The British Empire rests on British law. The great political service of the United States is to teach respect for the individual man. The American republic rests on individual manhood. The chief agency in the development of free manhood is the recognition of the individual man as the responsible unit of government. This recognition is not confined to local and municipal affairs, as is practically the case in England, but extends to all branches of government.

It is the axiom of democracy that "government must derive its just powers from the consent of the governed." No such consent justifies slavery; hence our Union "could not endure half slave, half free." No such consent justifies our hold on Alaska, Hawaii, Cuba, Porto Rico, the Ladrones or the Philippines. The people do not want us, our ways, our business, or our government. Only as we displace them or amuse them with cheap

shows do we gain their consent. These are slave nations, and their inhabitants cannot be units in government. In our hands, as Judge Morrow has pointed out in a recent decision, they will have no voice in their own affairs, but must be subject to the sovereign will of Congress alone. This implies taxation without representation, a matter of which something was said in Boston one hundred and thirty years ago. Our Constitution knows no such thing as permanently dependent colonies, else the acquisition of such would have been formally forbidden.

To be subject to the will of Congress, as the history of Alaska has clearly shown, is to be subject to vacillation, corruption, tyranny, parsimony and neglect. The greatest scandals England has known have come from her neglected colonies. It is not that Americans or Englishmen are incompetent to handle any class of problems. It is because the public weary of them; colonial affairs are trivial, paltry and exasperating. When a colony ceases to be a new toy, it falls into neglect. The record of American occupation of our one colony of Alaska is the same in kind (climate and blood excepted) with that of Spanish rule in Cuba or the Ladrones. We are blind to this because we do not care. Alaska is none of our business; we have no money invested in it. In a few years Alaska will have no resources left; then we may throw it away as we would throw a sucked orange. The American-Spanish idea of a colony is a place to be exploited, to make its captors rich by its resources and its trade. We have cured Spain of that idea, by taking all her colonies away. But we have not attained to the idea that we must spend our money on our colonies, enriching them with enterprise and law.

It is said nowadays that wherever our flag is raised it must never be hauled down. To haul down an American flag is an insult to Old Glory. But this patriotism rings counterfeit. It would touch a truer note to say that wherever our flag goes it shall bring good government. It should, as Senator Mason suggests, "never float over an unwilling people." Whatever land comes under the American flag should have the best government we know how to give. It should be better than we give ourselves, for it lacks the noble advantages of self-rule.

Take the Philippines or leave them! No half-way measures can be permanent. To rule at arm's length is to fail in government. These islands must belong to the United States, or else they must belong to the people who inhabit them. If we govern the Philippines, so in their degree must the Philippines govern us.


There are some economists who intelligently favor colonial extension to-day because to handle colonies successfully must force on us English forms of government. A dose of Imperialism would stiffen the back of our Democracy. English forms are better than ours in this, that they can deal more accurately with outside affairs. This is because the people of England are never consulted by the foreign office, the colonial office or the Bureau controlling coinage and finance. To remove these matters from popular control makes for good government at the expense of training of the people. As to which is the better there is room for honest difference of opinion. The essence of this argument is that pressure from without will force us to take all difficult matters out of the people's hands, intrusting them only to trained representatives. It is true, no doubt, that

our standing in the world is lowered because our best statesmen are not in politics to the degree that they are in England. The rules of the game shut them out. But I believe that we can change these rules by forces now at work. Wiser voters will demand better representatives, but these must keep in touch with the people, acting with them and through them, never in their stead. For reasons I shall give later on, I believe that to adopt British forms, with all their unquestioned advantages, would be a step backward and downward.

Leaving political philosophers aside, the noisiest advocates of colonial expansion are among men least interested in good government at home. Chief among these are ministers, ignorant of the difficulties of wise administration, and politicians contemptuous of them. If it were not for the petty offices which the Philippines promise, half the political impulse in favor of their annexation would evaporate. Half the rest comes from the desire to dodge the issues of labor and coinage by setting people to talking of something else.

There are two parties in every free country, and only two. These are, first, those who strive for good government, and second, those who hope to gain something—money, glory, prestige—from bad government. These two parties are not called republican or democrat, not whig or tory. They do not present separate tickets—the first party never presents tickets at all. It is always in the minority, but it is the glory and the hope of the democracy that it always comes out victorious after the election is over.

The chief real argument for the retention of the Philippines rests on the belief that if we do not take them,



This, according to John Morley,\* is England's experience in bringing peace to suffering humanity in the tropics: "First, you push on into territories where you have no business to be, and where you had promised not to go; secondly, your intrusion provokes resentment, and, in these wild countries, resentment means resistance; thirdly, you instantly cry out that the people are rebellious and that their act is rebellion (this in spite of your own assurance that you have no intention of setting up a permanent sovereignty over them); fourthly, you send a force to stamp out the rebellion; and fifthly,

<sup>\*</sup> As quoted in the New York Nation.

having spread bloodshed, confusion and anarchy, you declare, with hands uplifted to the heavens, that moral reasons force you to stay, for if you were to leave, this territory would be left in a condition which no civilized power could contemplate with equanimity or with composure. These are the five stages in the Forward Rake's progress." It was of England in Chitral that Morley said this, not of America in Luzon. No wonder England now cheers us on. We are following her lead. We are giving to her methods the sanction of our respectability.

There are many who say, "Take whatever we can get. Who is afraid? What is there for the strongest, richest, bravest, wisest nation on earth to fear?" But it is not force we fear. Armies, navies, kings and Kaisers, so long as we behave ourselves, can never harm our republic. It is bad government we fear, the dry rot of official mismanagement, corruption and neglect, the decay which the Fates mete out "when the tumult and the shouting dies" to the nations that forget their ideals. To come to "our place among the nations" will be to show that democracy can give good government, government firm, dignified, economical, just. It does not mean to have everybody talking about us, to carry our flag into every sea and to spread rank imbecility over a hundred scattered islands.

So far as the Philippines are concerned, the only righteous thing to do would be to recognize the independence of the Philippines under American protection, and to lend them our army and navy and our wisest counselors, not our politicians, but our jurists, our teachers, with foresters, electricians, manufacturers, mining

experts, and experts in the various industries. We should not get our money back, but we should save our honor.

The only sensible thing to do would be to pull out some dark night and escape from the great problem of the Orient as suddenly and as dramatically as we got into it.

To take a weak nation by the throat is not the righteous way to win its trade. It is not true that "trade follows the flag." Trade flies through the open door. To open the door of the Orient is to open our own doors to Asia. To do this hurries us on toward the final "manifest destiny," the leveling of the nations. Where the barriers are all broken down, and the world becomes one vast commercial republic, there will be leveling down of government, character, ideals, as well as leveling up.

It is the duty of nations with ideals to struggle against "manifest destiny." In the Norse Mythology the Fenris-Wolf in the Twilight of the Gods shall at last devour them all. So at last in the Twilight of the Nations shall all of them succumb to "Manifest Destiny." The huge armaments of Europe, its invincible armies, its mighty navies, are but piled up as fagots for the burning which shall destroy dynasties and nations. Lowering of national character, of national ideals, of national pride, follows the path of glory.

"We want," some say, "our hands in oriental affairs when the great struggle follows the breaking up of China." Others would have "American freedom upheld as a torchlight amidst the darkness of oriental despotism." We cannot show American civilization where

American institutions cannot exist. But the spirit of freedom goes with its deeds.

I do not urge the money cost of holding the Philippines as an argument against annexation. No dependent colony, honestly administered, ever repaid its cost to the government, and this colony holds out not the slightest promise of such a result. In fact, the cost of conquest and maintenance in life and gold is in grotesque excess of any possible advantage to trade or to civilization.

Individuals grow rich, but no honest government gets its money back. But with all this, if annexation is a duty, it is such regardless of cost.

But America has governmental ideals of the development of the individual man. England has no care for the man, only for civic order. This unfits America for certain tasks for which England is prepared. In Zanzibar, when the king dies, the first of the royal family to reach the throne is made king. Once a king who hated England was thus chosen. A British man-of-war in the harbor promptly shelled the royal palace and killed so many followers of the new king that the mistake was quickly rectified and the *Pax Britannica* restored. Our ideals stand in the way of our doing such things as this.

To govern colonies it is necessary to have an automatic non-political civil service. That our navy is organized on such a basis makes its strength. That the volunteer army is not, is the reason why the air is full to-day of charges and counter charges. The colonial policy must be continuous, hence out of the people's hands. It must be flexible, hence not limited by constitutional checks and balances. An annexationist lately said to me, "I am just tired of hearing of the

Constitution." A labor agitator says that all our troubles come from the fact "every reform needed by the people is prevented by the Constitution." But to prevent foolish acts, inside and outside the country, the Constitution was devised.

Government derives its "just powers from the consent of the governed." This is the foundation of democracy. But where such consent is impossible, government may derive powers in another way. It may justify itself because it is good government. This is the maxim of Imperialism. This is the justification of Mexico. It is the justification of Great Britain. The function of British Imperialism is to carry law and order, the Pax Britannica, to all parts of the globe. This function has been worked out in three ways corresponding to England's three classes of tributary districts or colonies. The first class of these consists of regions settled by Englishmen imbued with the spirit of the law, and capable of taking care of themselves. Such colonies rule their own affairs absolutely. The bond of Imperialism is little more than a treaty of perpetual friendship. Over the local affairs of Canada, for example, England claims little authority and exercises none. When difficulties arise with Canada, we see British Imperialism cringing before provincial politicians as a weak mother before a spoiled child. Should Canada or Australia break from her nominal allegiance, the whole sham fabric of Imperialism would fall to pieces.

A second class of colonies consists of military posts, strategic points of war or commerce, wrested from some weaker nation in the militant past. In the control of these outposts "the consent of the governed" plays no part. The inhabitants of Gibraltar, for example, count for no more than so many "camp-followers." They remain through military suffrance, and the forms of martial law suffice for all the government they need.

The third class of colonies is made up of conquered or bankrupt nations, people whose own governmental forms were so intolerable that England was forced to take them across her knee. These nations still govern themselves in one fashion, but each act of their rulers is subject to the firm veto of the British Colonial Office. "Said England unto Pharaoh, 'I will make a man of you,'" and with Pharaoh, as with other irresponsibles of the tropics, England has in some degree succeeded. But this success is attained only through the strictest discipline of military methods. It is not along the lines by which we have made a man of "Brother Jonathan." England has thus become the guardian of the weak nations of the earth, the police force of the unruly, the assignee of the bankrupt.

Good government is the justification for British imperialism. If victories at sea, the needs of humanity, "manifest destiny," and political dalliance with fate force foreign dominion on the United States, American imperialism must have the same justification. Whatever lands or people come under our flag are entitled to good government, the best that we can give them. This should be better than we give ourselves, for it is not accompanied by the inestimable advantages of self-government. There are duties as well as glories inherent in dominion, and the duties are by far the more insistent. We have had our own set of problems as important as those of England and more difficult. It is easier to

govern others by force than to rule ourselves by intelligence.

Though one in blood with England, our course of political activities has not lain parallel with hers. England has been making trade we have been making men. We have no machinery to govern colonies well. We want no such machinery if we can help it. The habit of our people and the tendency of our forms of government are to lead people to mind their own business. Only the business of individuals or groups of individuals receives attention. Our representatives in Congress are our attorneys, retained to look after our interests, the interest of the state or district, not of the nation. A colony has no attorney, and its demands, as matters now stand. must go by default. This is the reason why we fail in the government of colonies. This is the reason why our consular service is weak and inefficient. This is the reason why our forests are wasted year by year. Nothing is well done in a republic unless it touches the interest or catches the attention of the people. Unless a colony knows what good government is and insists loudly on having it, with some means to make itself heard, it will be neglected and abused. This is why every body of people under the American flag must have a share in the American government. When a colony knows what good government is, it ceases to be a colony and can take care of itself.

The question is not whether Great Britain or the United States has the better form of government or the nobler civic mission. There is room in the world for two types of Anglo-Saxon nations, and nothing has yet happened to show that civilization would gain if either

were to take up the function of the other. We may not belittle the tremendous services of England in the enforcement of laws amid barbarism. We may not deny that every aggression of hers on weaker nations results in some good to the conquered, but we insist that our own function of turning masses into men, of "knowing men by name," is as noble as hers. Better for the world that the whole British Empire should be dissolved, as it must be late or soon, than that the United States should forget her own mission in a mad chase of emulation. He reads history to little purpose who finds in imperial dominion a result, a cause or even a sign of national greatness.

It is not true that England's escape from political corruption is due to the growth of her imperial power. It is due to the growth of individual intelligence, the spread of the spirit of democracy. To this development Imperialism has been a hindrance only. Sooner or later Imperialism must be abandoned by England. The subject peoples must share with England the cost and the responsibility of rule else the mother country will be crushed under its burdens. Sooner or later, says a recent writer:

"England must take all her colonies into political copartnership (of taxation and of responsibility) or else abandon them, or in the end be crushed by the burden of their care."

We may have a navy and coaling stations to meet our commercial needs without entering on colonial expansion. It takes no war to accomplish this honorably. Whatever land we may need in our business we may buy in the open market as we buy coal. If the owners will

accept our price it needs no Imperialism to foot the bills. But the question of such need is one for commercial experts, not for politicians. Our decision should be in the interest of commerce, not of sea power. We need, no doubt, navy enough to protect us from insults, even though every battleship, Charles Sumner pointed out fifty years ago, costs as much as Harvard College, and though schools, not battleships, make the strength of the United States. We have drawn more strength from Harvard College than from a thousand men-of-war. Once Spain owned some battleships, as many and as swift as ours, but she had no men of science to handle them. A British fleet bottled up at Santiago or Cavite would have given a very different account of itself. It is men not ships which make a navy. It is our moral and material force, our brains and character and ingenuity and wealth that make America a power among the nations, not her battleships. These are only visible symptoms designed to impress the ignorant or incredulous. The display of force saves us from insults-from those who do not know our mettle.

Men say that we want nobler political problems than those we have. We are tired of our tasks "artificial and transient," "insufferably parochial," and seek some new ones worthy of our national bigness. I have no patience with such talk as this. The greatest political problems the world has ever known are ours to-day and still unsolved,—the problems of free men in freedom. Because these are hard and trying we would shirk them in order to meddle with the affairs of our weak-minded neighbors. So we are tired of the labor problem, the corporation problem, the race problem, the problem of

coinage, of municipal government and the greatest problem of all, that of the oppression of the individual man by the social combinations to which he belongs, by those to which he does not belong, and by the corporate power of society which may become the greatest tyrant of all. Then let us turn to the politics of Guam and Mindanao, and let our own difficulties settle themselves! Shame on our cowardice! Are the politics of Luzon cleaner than those of New York? We would give our blood to our country, would we not? Then let us give her our brains. More than the blood of heroes she needs the intelligence of men.



## III.

## A BLIND MAN'S HOLIDAY.

And unregretful, threw us all away
To flaunt it in a Blind Man's Holiday."

LOWELL.



## III.

## A BLIND MAN'S HOLIDAY.\*

I wish to maintain a single proposition. We should withdraw from the Philippine Islands as soon as in dignity we can. It is bad statesmanship to make these alien people our partners; it is a crime to make them our slaves. If we hold their lands there is no middle course. Only a moral question brings a crisis to man or nation. In the presence of a crisis, only righteousness is right and only justice is safe.

I ask you to consider with me three questions of the hour. Why do we want the Philippines? What can we do with them? What will they do to us?

These questions demand serious consideration, not one at a time but all together. We should know clearly our final intentions as a nation, for it is never easy to retrace false steps. We have made too many of these already. It is time for us to grow serious. Even the most headlong of our people admit that we stand in the presence of a real crisis, while, so far as we can see, there is no hand at the helm. But the problem is vir-

<sup>\*</sup> Read before the Graduate Club of Leland Stanford Junior University, Feb. 14, 1899: and afterwards (April 3) published for the Club by the courtesy of Mr. John J. Valentine.

tually solved when we know what our true interests are. Half the energy we have spent in getting into trouble will take us honorably out of it. Once convinced that we do not want the Philippines it will be easy to abandon them with honor. If we are to take them we cannot get at it too soon. The difficulty is that we do not yet know what we want, and we are afraid that if we once let these people go we shall never catch them again. With our longings after Imperialism we have not had the nerve to act.

Let us glance for a moment at the actual condition of affairs. By the fortunes of war the capital of the Philippine Islands fell, last May, into the hands of our navy. The city of Manila we have held, and by dint of bulldog diplomacy our final treaty of peace has assigned to us the four hundred or fourteen hundred islands of the whole archipelago. To these we have as yet no real title. We can get none till the actual owners have been consulted. We have a legal title, of course, but no moral title and no actual possession. We have only purchased Spain's quitclaim deed to property she could not hold, and which she cannot transfer. For the right to finish the conquest of the Philippines and to close out the insurrection which has gone on for almost a century we have agreed, on our part, to pay \$20,000,000 in cash, for the people of the Islands and the land on which they were born, and which, in their fashion, they have cultivated. This is a sum absurdly large, if we consider only the use we are likely to make of the region and the probable cost of its reconquest and rule. It seems criminally small if we consider the possible returns to us or to Spain from peddling out the islands as old junk in the open market, or from leasing them to commercial companies competent to exploit them to their utmost. The price is high when we remember that the United States for a century has felt absolutely no need for such property and would not have taken any of it, or all of it, or any other like property as a gift. The price is high, too, when we observe that the failure of Spain placed the islands not in our hands but in the hands of their own people, a third party, whose interest we, like Spain, have as yet failed to consider. Emilio Aguinaldo, the liberator of the Filipinos, the "Washington of the Orient," is the de facto " ruler of most of Luzon. In our hands is the city of Manila, and not much else, and we cannot extend our power except by bribery or by force. We may pervert these fragile patriots as Spain claims to have done; or, like Spain, we may redden the swamps of Luzon with their rebellious blood.

"Who are these Americans?" Aguinaldo is reported to ask, "these people who talk so much of freedom and justice and the rights of man, who crowd into our islands and who stand as the Spaniards did between us and our liberties?"

What right have we indeed? The right of purchase from Spain. We held Spain by the throat and she could not choose but sell.

If, at the close of our Revolutionary War, the King of France, coming in at the eleventh hour and driving the English from our capital, had bought a quit-claim deed to the colonies, proposing to retain them in the interest of French commerce, he would have held exactly the position in which our administration has placed the United States-

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In that case George Washington would have insisted, as Aguinaldo has done, that only the people who own it have any sovereignty to sell. He would have held his people's land against all comers, not the least against his late allies. He might even have led a hope as foolish and forlorn as that which inspired the late pitiful attack upon our forces at Manila, if, indeed, there was such an attack, for there is not the slightest evidence that hostilities were begun by Aguinaldo.

The blood shed at Manila will rest heavy on those the people hold responsible for it. There is not the slightest doubt where this responsibility rests. A little courtesy, a little tact, on the part of those in power, would have spared us from it all. These men have not led a forlorn fight against Spain for all these years to be tamely snubbed and shoved aside as dogs or rebels at the end. If the President had assured Aguinaldo that his people would not be absorbed against their will, there would have been peace at Manila. If he had assured the people of the United States that no vassal lands would be annexed against their will, there would be peace at Washington. The President has no right to assume in speech or in act that the United States proposes to prove false to her own pledges or false to her own history. Unlike the fighting editor, he is sworn to uphold the Constitution.

If we may trust the record, Aguinaldo became our ally in good faith, in the belief that we were working with him for the freedom of his people. In good faith our consuls made him promises we have never repudiated, but which, after six months of silence, by the casting vote of our Vice-President, we refuse to make good. These promises were in line with our pledges to Cuba. The consuls, like Aguinaldo, supposed that we meant what we said. When we pledged ourselves to give up the prisoners he had taken we acknowledged him as our ally; and our threats to arrest him, for holding his prisoners, as shown in the published correspondence brought on the present wanton bloodshed. In any case, we should have lost nothing through courteous treatment, and our dignity as a nation would not have suffered even though a civil hearing had been given to his envoy, Agoncillo. It may be that Agoncillo is a coward as our newspapers picture him, but that should not make him lonesome in Washington.

We know nothing of Philippine matters, save through cablegrams passed through government censorship, and from the letters and speech of men of the army and navy. The letters and cablegrams do not always tell the same story. It is certain, however, that General Otis has been promoted for gallantry at the slaughter of the fifth of February and in the subsequent skirmishes which have left 20,000 natives homeless. This is right, if he acted under orders, for a soldier must obey. If he acted on his own motion, he should have been cashiered. He should neither have provoked nor permitted a conflict if any leniency or diplomacy could have prevented it. Even taking the most selfish view possible as to our plans, their success must depend on our retention of the respect and good will of the subject people.

If the Filipinos are our subjects, they have the right to be heard before condemnation. If they are our allies, they have the right to be heard before repudiation. Their rights are older than ours. It was their struggle for freedom before most of our people had even heard of their existence. We may treat these matters as we will, but, in the light of history, we shall appear with the tyrant and the coward, and our act be the fit conclusion of the "century of dishonor." "The wreck of broken promises," says General Miles, referring to our Indian treaties, "is strewn across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific." We have broken the record now for we have extended it to the Orient. "Why is it," a friend once asked General Crooks, "that you have such influence with the Indians?" "Because I always keep my word," was the reply.

To be sure Aguinaldo may not be much of a Washington, a Washington of the hen-roost type, perhaps, as the brigand patriots of Spanish colonies have been in the past. As to this we have not much right to speak. We have never heard his side of the case, and we have listened only to Spanish testimony. It is worthy of note that our returned officers from Manila, who are men competent to judge, speak of him in terms of the highest respect. His government, which we try to destroy, is the most capable, enlightened and just these islands have ever known. These germs of civic liberty constitute the most precious product of the Philippines. But whatever his character or motives, he has one great advantage which Washington possessed-he is in the right. By that fact he is changed from an adventurer, a soldier of fortune, into a hero, an instrument of destiny. If Aguinaldo betrays his people by selling out to us, the heroism of the people remains. When men die for independence there is somewhere a hero. Self-sacrifice for an idea means some fitness for self-government.

Whatever we may choose to do Aguinaldo is a factor, and our sovereignty over his islands must be gained through peaceful concession, if it is gained at all. We could crush Aguinaldo easily enough, but we dare not. "Instans tyrannus!" However feeble he may be while we run our fires around "his creep-hole" he has only to "clutch at God's skirts," as in Browning's poem, and it is we who are afraid. This great, strong, lusty nation is too brave to do a cowardly deed.\* In spite of the orgies of our newspapers, we are still bothered by a national conscience. We do not like to fight in foreign lands against women with cropped hair defending their own homes; against naked savages with bows and arrows, nor in battles likened to a Colorado rabbit drive.

The Filipinos are not rebels against law and order, but against alien control. As a republic under our protection, or without it, I am informed, they stood apparently ready to give us any guarantee we might ask as to order and security.

We may easily destroy the organized army of the Filipinos, but that does not bring peace. In the cliffs and jungles they will defy us for a century as they have defied Spain. According to Dewey, the Filipinos are "fighters from away back." These four words from Dewey mean more than forty would from an ordinary warrior. In Sumatra it has cost the Dutch upwards of 300,000 men to subdue Achin, a peninsula with a total population estimated at 328,000, and its native chieftains are still defiant. Three hundred thousand men, of whom two-

<sup>\*</sup>I let this stand as originally written. While we have carried on relentless war in Luzon neither the American people nor their congress have been consulted in regard to it.

thirds rotted in the swamps, never seeing a foe or a battle. Our people are ashamed of shame, and their eyes once opened they cannot be coaxed nor driven.

Let us consider the first of our propositions. Why do we want the Philippines? To this I can give no answer of my own. I can see not one valid reason why we should want them, nor any why they should want us, except as strong and friendly advisers. As vassals of the United States they have no future before them; as citizens they have no hope. But even if we could by kind paternalism make their lives happier or more effective, I am sure that we will not. Our philanthropy is less than skin deep. The syndicates waiting to exploit the islands, and incidentally to rob their own stockholders, are not interested in the moral uplifting of negroes and "dagoes." On the other hand I am sure that their possession can in no wise help us, not even financially or commercially.

The movement for colonial extension rests on two things: Persistent forgetfulness of the principles of democratic government on the one hand; hopeless ignorance of the nature of the tropics and its people on the other.

But while I give no reason of my own, I have listened carefully to the speech of others, and the voices I have heard are legion. Their opinions I shall try in a way to classify, with a word of comment on each. And, first, I place those which claim some sort of moral validity, though I acknowledge no basis for such claim. For the only morality a nation can know is justice. To be fair as between man and man, to look after mutual interests and to do those necessary things out of reach of the individual is the legitimate function of a nation. It cannot

be generous, because it has no rights of its own of which it can make sacrifice. Moral obligations belong to its people as individuals. Legal obligations, financial obligations, the pledges of treaties, only these can bind nation to nation. A nation cannot be virtuous, for that is a matter of individual conduct. It must be just. So far as it fails to be this, it is simply corrupt.

It is said that if we do not annex the Philippines we shall prove false to our obligations. Obviously there are two primary pledges which must precede all others; first the obligation of our whole history that we shall never conquer and annex an unwilling people; second, our pledge at the beginning of the war, that the United States has no disposition to seize territory or to dictate its government.

"The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The plea that these words were intended for Cuba only and do not pledge us to like action elsewhere is too cowardly to permit of discussion.

Several questions arise at once. What are those obligations? To whom are they held? By what responsibility have they been incurred?

To the first question we may get this answer: We are under obligations to see that the Philippines are no longer subject to Spanish tyranny and misrule. In the words of General Miles, "Twelve millions of people that a year ago were suffering under oppression, tyranny, and

cruelty are to-day under our protection. It would be the crime of the nineteenth century to turn them back again." Very well, then, we shall not turn them back, nor could we do it if we would. Spain is helpless and harmless. She has ceased to be a factor in the world's affairs. What next? Let us quote further from General Miles: "If you cannot give them government in their own country, if you cannot establish government for them, you can, at least, protect them until such time as they shall be prepared for self-government. And if they do not care to come and be part of this country you can see to it that they have a liberal and free government such as you enjoy yourselves."

This is, perhaps, an average statement of our supposed obligations. If we had adopted this view we should have had no war at Manila and our honor would be untarnished. Some would put it more strongly. Our obligations demand that we take the islands by force, lest they fall back into the hands of Spain, or, still worse, lest they become victims of the cruel schemes of the German Emperor, ever anxious to try his hand on matters of which he knows nothing. For the House of Hohenzollern, as well as ourselves, is afflicted with a "manifest destiny."

But this German bugaboo is set up merely as an excuse. No nation on earth would dare set the heel of oppression on any land our flag has made free. The idea that every little nation must be subject to some great one is one of the most contemptible products of military commercialism. No nation, little or big, is "derelict" that minds its own business, maintains law and order, and respects the development of its own

people. If we behave honorably towards the people we have freed, we shall set a fashion which the powers will never dare to disregard.

We can be under no obligations under our Constitution and theory of government, to do what cannot be done, what will not be done, or ought not to be done.

Still others put the case in this way! "We have destroyed the only stable government in the Philippines. It is our duty to establish another." But if this is really the case we have done very wrong. We were told that the rule of Spain was not stable, that it was not just, and that it was far worse than no rule at all. Our sympathies were with those who would destroy this government of Spain, and our armies went out with our sympathies. Either we were on the wrong side in the whole business, or else we should now respect the rights of the people we set forth to help. If, by ill chance, we have overturned the only stable government, we must help the people to make another. "A government of the people, for the people, and by the people," would be a good kind to help them to establish; one made in their own interest not in ours, even though we think them a sorry sort of folk. We should not talk in the same breath of our duty to humanity and of the demands of American commerce, not even though both speeches be canting falsehoods. As a matter of fact, of all the people of the tropics the inhabitants of Luzon have shown most promise of fairly wise self-rule. All competent judges speak in the highest terms of the cabinet and parliament at Malolos and of their wisdom and self-restraint. At the same time under whatever rule, these people will not cease to be orientals.

To better define these obligations let us find out to



whom they were incurred. Nobody in particular lays claim to them. Surely we are not bound to Spain, for she feels outraged and humiliated by the whole transaction. The Filipinos ask for nothing more of us. Doubtless their rulers would return our twenty millions and give us half a dozen coaling stations if that would hasten our departure. It is their firm resolve, so their spokesmen in Hong Kong have declared, that they will not consent "to be experimented upon by amateur colonial administrators." Even our "benevolent assimilation" is intolerable on the terms which we demand.

It was for freedom, not for law and order, that the Filipinos and the Cubans took up arms against Spain. Good order we are trying to bring to the Filipinos, but that does not satisfy. The grave is quiet, but it is not freedom. Perhaps it is wrong for these people to care for freedom, but we once set them the example, as we have to many poor people, to strive for a liberty they have never yet enjoyed.

More likely we owe obligations to the city of Manila. Her business men look with doubt on Aguinaldo and his cabinet, with gold bands and whistles and peacock quills to indicate their rank and titles. Doubtless they fear the native rabble and the native methods of collection of customs. But, again, we have as to this only prejudiced testimony. According to Lieutenant Calkins, an honored officer in Dewey's fleet, the life and property of foreigners has been as safe in Malolos as in San Francisco. Moreover, these peddlers from all the world have no claims on us. They have long fished in troubled waters and they have learned the art. The pound of flesh they have exacted from the Filipinos, in times of

peace serves as an insurance against all losses in war. It was not to accommodate a few petty tradesmen, for the most part Chinese, a few English, and a dozen Germans and Japanese, that we entered into this war. If we owe them protection, they owe something to us. The shelter of the American flag is the birthright of Americans. Maybe it is to Germany and France that we owe obligations. To keep their rulers from falling out over the rich spoils of the Philippines, we are under bonds to take them all ourselves. But these nations are not in the slightest danger of fighting each other or fighting us over the Philippines. The Philippines would be as safe as an independent republic, with our good will, as they would be in another planet. The huge bloodless commercial trusts are afraid of a nation with a conscience. Maybe we are under bonds to England alone. Her advice is "take it," "take it," and those of her politicians hitherto most prone to snub and humiliate us are now most loud in their encouragements. No doubt these clever schemers want to see us entangled in the troubles of the Orient. No doubt England is sincere in thinking that a few years' experience in the hardest of schools will teach us something to our advantage as well as to hers. In our compactness lies a strength which alarms even England. It means our future financial and commercial supremacy. It is England's way to play nation against nation, so that the strong ones will keep the peace, while the weaker ones are helpless in her hands.

The essential spirit of British diplomacy is to recognize neither morality nor justice in relation to an opponent. This has been explained and defended by

Chamberlain as a matter of course in questions of party rivalry or imperial dominion. The only wrong is failure to carry one's point. This feature of British diplomacy has been exemplified a hundred times. The career of Cecil Rhodes, the struggle with Parnell, the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration in 1893, are all cases in point. This gives the clue to British diplomatic success, and it explains also the cordial hatred the world over for "Anglo-Saxon" methods. From beginning to end of British colonial dealings with lower races there has never appeared the word nor the thought of justice in the sense in which our fathers used the word—equality before the law. Law and trade constitute her sole interest in tropical humanity, and law for trade. Paternal helpfulness there has been in large store, but the thought of human equality, in any sense of the term, is foreign to British methods. To emphasize and perpetuate inequality lies at the basis of British polity.

To give up the idea of "equality of all men before the law" would be to abandon our sole excuser for being as a nation. We would then become a mere geographical expression or police arrangement, and logically might as well join Canada as a dependency of Great Britain. The hope that we may do so is the source of much English "good-will."

If we feel edgewise toward Germany,\* or if Germany is unfriendly toward us, we have England to thank for it. That is her diplomacy. She means nothing wrong

<sup>\*</sup> Doubtless German industrial jealousy is acute and well-grounded and the loss of many good soldiers each year by emigration displeases German militarism. But these matters have gone on for years and have no relation with the war with Spain.

by it. She is our friend, and in politics no water is thicker than her blood. We shall cease twisting the British Lion's tail when we have parts equally vulnerable. We shall not thwart England when we are dependent upon her good will. But all this constitutes no obligation. We did not go into the war on England's account, nor must we settle it to suit her. It is our first duty to follow our own best interests.

I yield to no one in admiration for the British people or the British character. The best thoughts of the world spring from British brains, and British hands have wrought earth's noblest deeds. "Let us not forget," observes Lowell, "that England is not the England only of the snobs who dread the democracy they do not comprehend, but the England of history, of heroes, statesmen and poets, whose names are as dear and their influence as salutary to us as to her." But British inequality is not the source of lofty thought or brave deed. We may emulate England in all matters of political administration save the very one in which she now urges on us her cynical advice. It was in protest against British inequality that the United States became a nation. British politics have changed their form, but the basal principles remain, and inequality and injustice are no more lovely now than in the days of '76.

A London journal recently pictures America as a rosycheeked, unsophisticated youth who has left parental boundaries and now "goes out to see the world." We may accept this "lightly proffered laurel," but we may note that the youth is gaining this experience under the convoy of the toughest old pirate of the whole water front.

Moreover, England welcomes our intrusion in the Orient because she finds in us a necessary ally. We become a partner in her games. More than this our new relations must break down our protective tariff, which is most offensive to her, as, perhaps, it should be to us. The possession of Asiatic colonies makes nonsense of our Monroe Doctrine. To realize this fact will teach us needed caution. We shall not go at diplomacy in our shirt-sleeves any more as though it were a game of poker on a Mississippi flat-boat. Besides to follow in England's footsteps is the sincerest form of flattery. gives her methods the sanction of our respectability. takes from the opposition party in Parliament one of its strongest weapons. But this, again, is no national obligation. If any obligation whatever exists, it is to the Filipinos. It is met by insuring their freedom from Spain. For the rest, their fate is their own.

A higher class of English public men advise us to hold the Philippines because they do not understand the purpose or basis of our government. Our machinery of rule is so constructed that it will not work with unwilling people, nor with people lacking in the Saxon instinct for co-operation. England has no scruples and no ideals. Her only purpose, in the tropics, is to hold the doors open to trade. In this business she has the lead, and all gains of all trade swell her wealth. In her capital is the clearing house of all the world. There all prices are fixed and all bills are settled. What is good business for her might be impossible for us, who are not as a nation in business.

Admitting, however, an obligation to do something to somebody, by whom was such obligation incurred? To

whom have we given authority to bind us to change the whole current of our history? Who is the mighty agent that brings about such things? The Constitution prescribes methods in which our people may incur obligations by concurrent action of Congress and the President. Have we empowered a commodore or even a rear-admiral to change our national purposes? Did the victory at Manila bind our people to anything? To say that it did is simple nonsense. This was an incident of war, not a decision of peace. Did the action of the President in sending eighteen thousand soldiers to Manila oblige us to keep them there, even if the Constitution of the United States had to be changed to give this act justification? If so, where did the President get his authority? This, too, was an incident of war. Moreover, the President is not our ruler but our servant. The people of the United States are subject to no obligations save those they impose on themselves. Neither the President nor the Cabinet have the slightest right to incur national obligations. None have been incurred.

But it may be that efforts have been made to bind the people to "expansion" in advance of their own decision. The victory at Manila was so unexpected, so heroic, so decisive, that it fired the imagination of our nation. It set the world to talking of us, and it inspired our politicians with dreams of empire. Such dreams are far from the waking thoughts of our people, though while the spell was on us we made some movement toward turning them into action. These steps taken in folly our nation must retrace. It is not pleasant to go backward. For this reason those responsible for our mistakes insist that we are sworn to go ahead

whatever the consequences. Political futures are involved in the success of these schemes. And so every effort has been used to rush us forward in the direction of conquest. Our volunteer soldiery is held as an army of invasion to rot in the marshes when summer comes, as brave men once rotted in Libby and Andersonville. Each step in the series has been planned so as to make the next seem inevitable. To stop to reconsider our steps is made to appear as backing down. The American people will not back down, and on this fact the whole movement depends. This movement was not a conspiracy, because every step was proclaimed from the housetops and shouted back from the newspapers and the mobs around the railway stations. No wonder the fighting editor claims to dictate our national policy. The current of "manifest destiny" is invoked as the cover for the movement of Imperialism. At each step, too, the powers that be assure us that they are not responsible, for the invisible forces of Divine Providence have taken matters from their hands.

In the one breath we are told that it is the will of God that we should annex the Philippines and make civilized American christians of their medley population. In another, we must crush out the usurper, Aguinaldo, drive his rebel followers to the swamps and fastnesses and build up institutions with the coward remnant that survive.

All this is in the line of least resistance. Along this line Spain ruled and plundered her colonies. In such fashion her colonies impoverished and corrupted Spain. Because she had no moral force to prevent them, cruelty and corruption became her manifest destiny. It will

be ours if we follow her methods. Toward such a manifest destiny, "the tumult and the shouting" of to-day are hurrying us along. The destiny which is manifest is never a noble one. The strong currents of history run deep, and the fates never speak through the daily newspapers. "Hard are the steps, rough-hewn in flintiest rock, States climb to power by." Providence acts only through men with strong brain and pure heart. The hand of Providence is never at the helm when no hand of man is there. Nations like men must learn to say No, when Yes is fatal. To have the courage to stop throwing good money after bad is the way nations keep out of bankruptcy. To back out now, we are told, would expose us to the ridicule of all the nations. to go on will do the same. It is we who have made ourselves ridiculous. We have already roused the real distress of all genuine friends in Europe, because we have given the lie to our own history and to our own professions. That a wise, strong, peaceful nation should rise and fight for the freedom of the oppressed, rescuing them with one strong blow, touches the imagination of the world. The admiration fades into disgust in view/ of the vulgar scramble for territory and commercial advantage, and the inability of those responsible to guide the course of events in any safe direction.

I know that words of this sort are not welcome. The newspapers have their jokes about Senator Hoar and Cassandra, a person who once took a dark view of things in very gloomy times. But there are occasions when optimism is treason. Only an accomplice is cheerful in presence of a crime. The crisis once past we may rejoice in the future of democracy. It is a hopeful sign to-day

that the people have never consented, nor have those directing affairs dared trust the plain issue of annexation either to the people or to Congress. Their schemes must pass through indirection, or not at all.

We need a cheerful and successful brigand like Cecil Rhodes to pat us on the back and stiffen our failing nerves. He is not afraid. Why should we flinch from the little misdeeds we have in contemplation?

Alfred Russell Wallace, in the London Chronicle, expresses the

"Disappointment and sorrow which I feel in common, I am sure, with a large body of English and Americans, at the course now being pursued by the government of the United States toward the people of Cuba and the Philippine Islands.

"The Americans claim the right of sovereignty obtained by the treaty, and have apparently determined to occupy and administer the whole group of islands against the will and consent of the people. They claim all the revenues of the country and all the public means of transport and they have decided to take all this by military force if the natives do not at once submit. Yet they say that they come 'not as invaders and conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, their employments and their personal and civil rights,' and for the purpose of giving them 'a liberal form of government through representatives of their own race.' But these people who have been justly struggling for freedom are still spoken of as 'insurgents' or 'rebels,' and they are expected to submit quietly to an altogether new and unknown foreign rule which, whatever may be the benevolent intentions of the President, can hardly fail to be a more or less oppressive despotism.

"It may be asked what can the Americans do? They cannot allow Spain to come back again.... They are responsible for the future of the inhabitants. But surely it is possible to revert to their first expressed intention of taking a small island only as a naval and coaling station and to declare themselves the protectors of the islands against foreign aggression.

"Having done this they might invite the civilized portion of the natives to form an independent government, offering them advice and assistance if they wish for it, but otherwise leaving them completely free. If we express our disappointment (as Englishmen) that our American kinsfolk are apparently following our example, it is because, in the matter of the rights of every people to govern themselves, we had looked up to them as about to show us the better way by respecting the aspirations towards freedom, even of less advanced races, and by acting in accordance with their own noble traditions and republican principles."

From France, M. de Pressensée voices the same feeling in an article in the *Contemporary Review*:

"In the United States of America we see the intoxication of the new strong wine of warlike glory carrying a great democracy off its feet, and raising the threatening specter of militarism, with its fatal attendant, Cæsarism, in the background. Under the pretext of 'manifest destiny,' the great republic of the Western Hemisphere is becoming unfaithful to the principles of her founders, to the precedents of her constitutional life, to the traditions which have made her free, glorious and prosperous. The seductions of Imperialism are drawing the United States toward the abyss where all the great democracies of the world have found their end. The cant of Anglo-Saxon alliance, of the brotherhood-in-arms of English-speaking people, is serving as a cloak to the nefarious designs of those who want to cut in two the grand motto of Great Britain, 'Imperium et Libertas,' and to make 'imperium' swallow 'libertas.' In the United Kingdom a similar tendency is at work. Everybody sees that the present England is no longer the England, I do not say of Cobden or Bright, but of Peel, Russell, Palmerston, Derby, or even Disraeli. A kind of intoxication of power has seized the people. Chamberlain has known how to take the flood in time, and to ride the crest of the new wave. The Unionist party is disposed to believe that it is to the interest of the privileged classes to nurse the pride of empire; first, because they govern it and profit by it; secondly, and chiefly, because nothing diverts more surely the spirit of reform than the imperialist madness. It is a curious thing, but a fact beyond dispute, that when the masses are on the verge of rising in their majesty and asking for their rights, the classes have only to throw into their eyes the powder of imperialism, and to raise the cry of 'The Fatherland in danger,' in order to bring them once more, meek and submissive, to their feet."

Do we say that these obligations were entailed by chance, and that we cannot help ourselves? I hear many saying, "If only Dewey had sailed out of Manila harbor, all would have been well." This seems to me the acme of weakness. Dewey did his duty at Manila; he has done his duty ever since. Let us do ours. his duty makes it harder for us, so much the more we must strive. It is pure cowardice to throw the responsibility on him. Who are we to "plead the baby act?" If Dewey captured land we do not want to hold, then let go of it. It is for us to say, not for him. It is foolish to say that our victory last May settled once for all our future as a world power. It is not thus that I read our history. Chance decides nothing. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution; the Emancipation Proclamation, were not matters of chance. They belong to the category of statemanship. A statesman knows no chance. It is his business to foresee the future and to control it. Chance is the terror of despotism. A chance shot along the frontier of Alsace, a chance brawl in Hungary, a chance word in Poland, a chance imbecile in the seat of power, may throw all Europe into war. In a general war the nations of Europe, their dynasties, and their thrones, will burn like stubble in the prairie fire. Our foundation is less combustible. Our Constitution is something more than a New Year's resolution to be

broken at the first chance temptation. The Republic is, indeed, in the gravest peril if chance and passion are to be factors in her destiny. It was not fear of foreign powers, nor fear of destiny that led Senator Sewell to urge, last May "For God's sake, bring Dewey home." It was fear of the rising tide of our own folly.

One of the ablest of British public men, one known to all of us as a staunch friend of the United States through the Civil War, when our allies in the present British Ministry could not conceal their hatred and contempt, writes in a private letter to me these words:

"I could not say this in my public writings," he says, and so I do not give his name, "but it seems to me that expansionism has in it a large element of sheer vulgarity, in the shape of a parvenu desire for admission into the imperialist and military camp of the Old World."

This is the whole story. Our quasi-alliance with Aguinaldo obliges us to see that he and his followers do not rot in Spanish prisons. Here or about here our obligation ends, though our interest in freedom might go further. "Sheer vulgarity" does the rest. The desire to hold a new toy, to enjoy a new renown, to feel a new experience, or the baser desire to gain money by it, is at the bottom of our talk about the new destiny of the American republic and the new obligations which this destiny entails.

We have set our national heart on the acquisition of the Philippines to give Old Glory a chance in a distant sea, to do something unheard of in our past history. We look on every side for justification of this act, and the varied excuses we can invent we call our obligations. We have saved Manila from being looted by the barbarians. This may be true, though we have not the slightest evidence that it was ever in such danger. But we have made it a veritable hell on earth. Its saloons, gaming halls and dives of vice have to-day few parallels in all the iniquitous world.

But we have incurred, some say, the obligation to civilize and christianize the Filipinos, and to do this we must annex them, that our missionaries may be safe in their work. "The free can conquer but to save." This is the new maxim for the ensign of the Republic, replacing the "consent of the governed," and "government by the people," and the worn out phrases of our periwigged fathers.

But to christianize our neighbors is no part of the business of our government. Dr. Worcester says of the Filipinos that "as a rule the grade of their morality rises with the square of the distance from churches and other civilizing influences." This means that the churches are not keeping up with our saloons and gaming houses. If they are not we cannot help Missionary work of Americans as against Mohammedanism, Catholicism, or even heathenism, our government cannot aid. It is our boast, and a righteous one, that all religion is equally respected by our state. It has been the strength of our foreign missionaries that they never asked the support of armies. "The force of arms," said Martin Luther, "must be kept far from matters of the Gospel." The courage of devoted men and women and the power of the Word, such is the only force they demand. When the flag and the police are sent in advance of the Bible, missionaries fall to the level of ordinary politicians. It is the lesson of all

history that the religious forms and aspirations of any people should be respected by its government. From Java, the most prosperous of oriental vassal nations, all missionaries are rigidly excluded. They are disturbers of industry.

It is the lesson of England's experience that all forms of government should be equally respected. In no case has she changed the form, however much she may have altered the administration. Success in the control of the tropical races no nation has yet achieved, for no one has yet solved the problem of securing industry without force, of making money without some form of slavery. But those nations which have come nearest solution have most respected the religions and prejudices and governmental forms of the native peoples. Individual men may struggle as they will against heathenism. A government must recognize religions as they are.

It is said again that the whole matter does not deserve half the words given it. We destroyed the government, such as it was, in Cuba and Manila; we must stay until we have repaired the mischief. When we have set things going again it will be time to decide what to do. The answer to this is that it is not true. We are not repairing the damages anywhere, but are laying our plans for permanent military occupation, which is imperialism. Those responsible for these affairs have kept annexation steadily in view. It is safe to say that there is no intention to withdraw even from Cuba, or to permit any form of self-government there, until American influences shall dominate.

It is not because the governed have some intangible right to consent that we object to this, but because the

machinery of democracy, which is acquiescence in action, will not work without their co-operation.

But we must take the Philippines, some say, because no other honorable course lies before us. Some civilized nation must own them; Spain is out of the question; so are the other nations of Europe, while Aguinaldo and the Filipinos themselves, "big children that must be treated like little ones," are unworthy of trust and incapable of good government.

But, again, what guarantee is there that we shall give good government? When did it become our duty to see that anarchy and corruption are expelled from semi-barbarous regions? When did we learn how to do it? We have had six months in which to think about it. Who has ever suggested a plan? For thirty years we have misgoverned Alaska \* with open eyes and even now

\* Recently, according to the Springfield Republican, Senator Carter asked unanimous consent for the consideration of a code of laws for Alaska. "Various senators objected. Gallinger and Bate thought a night session for such a purpose a very bad precedent. Mr. Tillman thought the time should be devoted to the anti-scalping bill, and Mr. Chandler was anxious to discuss a ticket brokerage bill." There being no senator from Alaska to enter into trade or combination there is no hope for legislation to bring order into the territory.

In a recent address Governor Roosevelt is reported as saying: "Have you read in the papers that an Alaskan town (Wrangel) wants to be transferred to Canada? It wants to get out from under our flag merely because no one has thought it worth while to give Alaska good government. If we govern the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico and Hawaii as we have governed Alaska, we shall have the same results."

Mr. Brady, the excellent Governor of Alaska, says:

"There are sixty men in charge of the government of the ter-

scarcely a visible sign of repentance. We are not sworn to good government even in our own cities. We give them self-government and that is all. The people everywhere make their own standards. The standard of Arizona is different from that of Massachusetts, and South Carolina has another still. There is no good government in America except as the people demand it. We want good government on no other terms.

China, Corea, Siam, Turkey, Tartary, Arabia and the peoples of Asia generally, "half devil and half child," are none of them under good government. The rulers of Central America, of Venezuela, Bolivia, and, worst of all, the unspeakable Hayti, are no more efficient or more virtuous than the Filipinos. As men we may care for these things and work for their improvement. As a nation they are none of our business so long as the badness of government does not harm our national interests. We have no nearer concern in the government of the Philippines, nor can we give their people a government any better than they know how to demand. We might do so possibly, but we shall not. We are not in V knight-errantry "for our health," and we are in no mood for trying fancy experiments. Those among us who might lead child races to higher civilization are not likely to be called on for advice.

Others say with swelling breasts that the finger of Providence points the way for us, and we cannot choose but obey. The God of battles has punished Spain for her

ritory. They have no interests in Alaska except to grab what they can and get away. They are like a lot of hungry codfish. Seven of these officials, eleven per cent of the entire government, are now under indictment for malfeasance in office."

centuries of cruelty, corruption, and neglect, and we are but as the instrument in His hand.

There is a story of a man and his boys who got their breakfast at a tavern where food was scarce and bills were high. As they left the place they complained loudly of the bad treatment they had received. At last one of the boys spoke up: "The Lord has punished that man. I have my pocket full of his spoons."

"The terrible prophecy of Las Casas," says an eloquent orator, " has come true for Spain. The countless treasures of gold from her American bondsmen have been sunk forever, her empire richer than Rome's has been inherited by freemen, her proud armada has been scattered, her arms have been overwhelmed, her glory has departed. If ever retributive justice overtook an evil-doer it has overtaken and crushed this arrogant power. An army of the dead, larger by far than the whole Spanish nation, stormed the judgment seat of God demanding justice-stern, retributive justice. God heard and answered. This republic is now striking the last blow for liberty in America, an instrument of justice in the hands of an omnipotent power. In the interest of civilization, of imperative humanity, we now go forth to the rescue of the last victim, strong in the consciousness of the purity of our purpose, and the justice of our cause."

Again let us say, "The Lord has punished that nation. We have our pockets full of her spoons."

Doubtless Spain was very corrupt and very weak and very wicked, but that is not for us to judge while we have our pockets full of her spoons.

The plain fact is this: the guiding hand of Providence,

in such connection as this, is mere figure of speech, intended for our own justification. Doubtless Providence plays its part in the affairs of men, but not in such fashion as this. Providence is our expression for the ultimate inevitable righteousness which rules in human history. It "hath put down the mighty from their seats and hath exalted them of low degree;" but its voice is not the "sound of popular clamor." "Fame's trumpet" does not set forth its decrees and it is not interested in increasing volume of trade.

The war with Spain was in no sense holy, unless we make it so through its results. Our victories indicate no accession of divine favor. We succeeded because we were bigger, richer, and far more capable than our enemy. Our navy was manned with trained engineers, while that of Spain was not. Our gross wealth made sure the final success of our army in spite of incompetence and favoritism which has risen to the proportions of a national shame. When we have cast aside all hopes of booty we shall be .fit to sit in judgment on the sins of Spain. Till then, to say that we alone are led by Divine Providence is wanton blasphemy. Four very different impulses carried us into the war; the feeling of humanity, the love of adventure, the desire for revenge, and the hope of political capital. Strength and wealth and our prestige led us to success. The decision of history as to the righteousness of the war will be determined by the motive that finally triumphs.

Again, some say we went to war in the interests of humanity, civilization, and righteousness. To this end we have poured out blood and treasure. It is only fair that we should be paid for our losses. Let us fill our

pockets with the spoons. It ceases to be a war for humanity when we have forced a humbled enemy, condemned without a hearing, to foot all the bills.

But we would plant the institutions of freedom in the midst of the Orient. Freedom cannot be confined. Expansion is her manifest destiny. "We are like the younger sons of England who, finding their own country inadequate, have gone forth to fill the unoccupied places of the East, and now the time comes when our children are beginning to face the conditions that hedged around our fathers and made us turn our faces toward the West. The United States on this continent have been pretty well surveyed, explored, conquered, and policed. Shall we not see to it that our children shall have as good a forward outlook as we have? We have proved our capacity to expand. We have proved our capacity to compete with any man. It were worse than folly, yea, criminal, to attempt to set back the onward march of manifest destiny."

So runs the current of yellow patriotism. But if the Anglo-Saxon has a destiny incompatible with morality and which cannot be carried out in peace, if he is bound by no pledges and must ride roughshod over the rights and wills of weaker people the sooner he is exterminated the better for the world. In like strain we are reminded that the arguments against expansion to-day were used to oppose the Louisiana purchase in Jefferson's time and the less glorious acquisition of the provinces of conquered Mexico. If expansion to Nebraska, Kansas, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Dakota, and California was good national policy, why not still further to the Philippines? But the differences between the one case

and the others are many and self-evident. The Louisiana territory and the territory of California were adjacent to our States. They were in the temperate zone with climate in every way favorable to the Anglo-Saxon race and to the personal activity on which free institutions depend. They were virtually uninhabited districts, being peopled chiefly by nomad barbarians who made no use of the land, and whose rights the Anglo-Saxon has never cared to consider. The first governments were established by the free men who entered them. Finally the growth of railroads and the telegraph brought these vast regions almost from the first into the closest touch with the East and with the rest of the world. If it were not for the development of transportation, unforeseen by the fathers, the arguments they used against expansionism would have remained valid even as agains the Louisiana purchase.

It is said that "Jefferson was a rank expansionist." But there is no record that he favored expansion for bigness' sake, the seizure or purchase of all sorts of land and all sorts of inhabitants, regardless of conditions, regardless of rights, and regardless of the interests of our own people.

The Philippines are not contiguous to any land of freedom. They lie in the heart of the torrid zone, "Nature's asylum for degenerates." They are already densely populated—more densely than even the oldest of the United States. Their population cannot be exterminated on the one hand, nor made economically potent on the other, except through slavery. Finally the conditions of life are such as to forbid Anglo-Saxon colonization. Among hundreds of colonial experiments in Brazil, in

India, in Africa, in China, there is not to-day such a thing as a self-supporting European colony in the tropics. White men live through officialism alone. There are military posts, so placed as to appropriate the land and enslave the people, but there is not one self-dependent, self-respecting European or American settlement.

Individual exceptions and special cases to the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon or any other civilized race degenerates in the tropics mentally, morally, physically. This statement has been lately denied in some quarters. As opposed to it has been urged the fact that Thackeray and Kipling, the most virile of British men of letters, were born in India, and many other distinguished men have first seen the light in tropical Africa or Polynesia. Several Stanford athletes are natives of Hawaii, and Cuba has furnished her full share of the men of science of the blood of Spain. But this argument indicates a confusion of ideas. Degeneration may be of any one of three different kinds: race decline, personal degeneration, and social decay.

The essential of race degeneration is the continuous lowering of the mental or physical powers of each successive generation. Such a process is very slow, requiring centuries before it shows itself. It finds its cause in unwhole-some conditions which destroy first the bravest, strongest, and most active, leaving the feeble, indolent and cowardly to perpetuate the species. Military selection, or the seizure of the strong to replenish the armies, has produced race degeneration in many parts of Europe. Such degeneration has been the curse of Italy and parts of France and Switzerland and doubtless of Spain and Germany also. The dull sodden malarial heat of the

tropics spares the indolent longest. In the Song of the Plague, written by some unknown British soldier, we find these words as to India:—

"Cut off from the land that bore us,
Betrayed by the land we find,
When the brightest are gone before us,
And the dullest are left behind."

This is the beginning of race degeneration. The Anglo-Saxon in the tropics deteriorates through the survival of the indolent and the loss of fecundity; but this is met or concealed by a number of other tendencies, and is not soon apparent. The birth of a Kipling, a Thackeray, or a Dole could not in any way affect the argument. The British child born in India to-day must be reared in England; and it is to be remembered that not all the regions south of the Tropic of Cancer are to be classed as tropical; most of Mexico, much of India, and the whole Andean region belong to the temperate zone. The equable climate of the Hawaiian Islands is not in any proper sense torrid.

In the tropics the tendency to personal decay is more directly evident. The swarm of malarial organisms, the loss of social restrictions, the reduced value of life, the lack of moral standards, all tend to promote individual laxity and recklessness. "Where there are no Ten Commandments," and "the best is as the worst" there, life is held cheap and men grow careless. Kipling's fable of "Duncan Parenness" tells the story of personal degeneration, and this case is typical of thousands and thousands. Vice and dissipation are confined to no zone, but in the tropics few men of northern blood can escape them.

From a personal letter from Manila, Mr. John J. Valentine publishes these words:

"Moral suicide await's nine out of every ten young men, who, lacking the elements of christian training and influence, visit the far East. The morality of the treaty ports from Yokohama to Suez presents a darker picture than the slums of Europe can offer. There temptation is all but overpowering; it stalks on the streets, is registered at the hotels, and put-up at the social clubs. representatives are prowling into Manila from Hong Kong and Singapore. November and December last witnessed a veritable Klondykan rush to the former Spanish capital. As a result, Manila is becoming a den of vice. The Escolta, the leading street, facetiously referred to as the 'Yankee beer chute,' resembles somewhat a midway, and is all but literally lined with saloons. I counted four hundred in a little over a mile. These are mostly kept by Americans. The largest cafe, known as the Alhambra, has frequently closed its bar at four in the afternoon because its stock of liquor was exhausted. Do the Filipinos form the larger complement of their patrons? Not at all, our own boys are their customers, and many of them boys, who prior to their arrival at Manila, had not, I venture to say, ever touched a glass of intoxicating liquor.

"The young man without capital has no business in these islands. Until order is brought out of chaos, the situation becomes more stable, the clouds lift, and the necessity of maintaining a large force to hold in check the native population is removed, the best place for our young men is at home, and even under the most favorable conditions, had I a son, I would feel somewhat as though

I was consigning him to almost certain destruction did I permit him to take up residence in the Orient, when necessity did not compel his passing beyond our shores."

With individual deterioration goes social decay. Man becomes less careful of his dress, his social observances, his duties to others. Woman loses her regard for conventionalities, for her reputation, and for her character. The little efforts that hold society together are abandoned one by one. The spread of the "Mother Hubbard," crowding out more elaborate forms of dress, indicates a general failure of social conventionalities. The decay of society reacts on the individual. Where it is too warm or too malarial to be conventional, it is too much trouble to be decent. Without going into causes, it is sufficient to say that Anglo-Saxon colonies of self-respecting, self-governing men and women are practically confined to the temperate regions.

The annexation of the Philippines is, therefore, not a movement of expansion. We cannot expand into space already full. Our nation cannot expand where freedom cannot go. Neither the people nor the institutions of the United States can ever occupy the Philippines. The American home cannot endure there, the town-meeting cannot exist. There is no room for free laborers, no welcome for them, and no pay. The sole opening for Americans in any event will be as corporations or agents of corporations, as Government officials or as members of some profession requiring higher than native fitness. There is no chance for the American workman, but for syndicates they offer great opportunities. Yes, for the syndicates who handle politics as an incident in business. But the fewer of such syndicates we shelter under our flag,

the better for our people. Let them take their chances without our help.

If it were possible to exterminate the Filipinos as we have destroyed the Indians, replacing their institutions and their people by ours, the political objections to annexation would, in the main, disappear, whatever might be said of the moral ones.

For our extermination of the Indian, there is, in general, no moral justification. There is a good political excuse in it—that we could and did use their land in a better way than was possible to them. We have no such excuse in Luzon; we cannot use the land except as we use the lives of the people.

We cannot plant free institutions in the Orient because once planted they will not grow; if they grow they will not be free. We cannot exterminate these people, and if we did we could not use their land for our own people; we could only fill it with Asiatic colonists, Malay, Chinese, or Japanese, more of the same kind, not of our kind.

"Any attempt to govern the tropical possessions of the United States on democratic principles, says Professor W. Alleyne Ireland, one of our wisest authorities, "is doomed to certain failure. It has been already shown that without forced labor, or at least some form of indentured labor, large industries cannot be developed in tropical colonies." Such forced labor can be controlled only by the compulsion of the government as in Java, or by the activity of great corporations as in Hawaii and Trinidad.

"It is thought by many," says Mr. Ireland, "that though it may be unadvisable to grant the (tropical)

colonies representative government at present, the time will soon come when the people will show themselves capable of self-government. Judging from past experience there would seem to be little hope that these pleasant anticipations will ever be realized. We look in vain for a single instance within the tropics of a really well-governed country."

The notion that in these fertile islands our surplus working men shall find homes is the height of absurdity. Our labor leaders understand this well enough, and for once they stand together on the side of common sense. Scarcely any part of the United States is so crowded with people as Luzon or Porto Rico; in no part is the demand for labor less or its rewards so meager. Ten cents a day is not a free man's scale of wages; and no change of government can materially alter this relation. In the tropics the conditions of subsistence are so easy and the incentives to industry so slight that all races exposed to relaxing influences become pauperized. It is the free-lunch system on a boundless scale, the environment of Nature too generous to be just, too kind to be exacting.

For the control of dependent nations and slave races the fair sounding name of Imperialism has lately come into use. It has been hailed with joy on the one hand, for it is associated with armorial bearings and more than royal pomp and splendor. It has been made a term of reproach on the other, and our newspaper politicians now hasten to declare that they favor expansion only when it has no taint of Imperialism. But to our British friends nothing could be more ridiculous. You must have an iron hand or you get no profits. To cast aside Imperialism is to cast away the sole method by which

tropical colonies have ever been made profitable to commerce or tolerable in politics. On the other hand these same people tell us that they have not the slightest thought of making states of Cuba or the Philippines, or of admitting the Filipinos to citizenship. But if the Filipino is not a citizen of his own land, who is?

We are advised on good patrician authority that all is well, whatever we do, if we avoid the fatal mistake of admitting the brown races to political equality—of letting them govern us. We must rule them for their own good—never for our advantage. In other words, lead or drive the inferior man along, but never recognize his will, his manhood, his equality; never let him count one when he is measured against you.

These maxims should be familiar; they are the philosophy of slavery, and they only lack the claim of the right to buy and sell the bodies and souls of men. Our purchase of the Filipinos from Spain, and our subsequent treatment of the resultant slave insurrection supplies the missing element.

"Benevolent Despotism," is Mr. Kidd's expression for the sole method of control possible in the tropics, leading to industrial success. "Slavery" is an older term of similar meaning. "I am for the black man, as against the alligator," Douglas is reported to have said, "but as between black man and white man, I am for the white man every time." This is inequality before the law, the essence of slavery, the essence of Imperialism which is slavery as applied to nations. Every argument used in defense of it, applies as well to the defense of slavery and has been worn out in that cause.

One plan or the other we must adopt; either self-

rule or Imperialism; there is no middle course, and both under present conditions are virtually impossible. Let the friends of annexation develop some plan of government, any plan whatever, and its folly and ineffectiveness will speedily appear. To go ahead without a plan means certain disaster, and that very soon; whatever we do or do not do, there is no time to lose.

Conquest of the Orient is not expansion, for there is no room for free manhood to grow there. It is vecless to disclaim Imperialism when we are red-handed in the very act. Annexation without Imperialism is sheer anarchy. Annexation with Imperialism may be much worse, for so far as it goes it means the abandonment of democracy. The Union cannot endure "half slave, half free," half republic, half empire. We may make vassal tribes of the Filipinos, but never free states in the sense in which the name "state" applies to Maine, Iowa, or California. The Philippines can have no part in the Federal Union. Their self-government must be of a wholly different kind, the outgrowth of their own needs and dispositions. What they need is not our freedom, but some form of paternal despotism or monarchy of their own choosing which shall command their loyalty and yet keep them in peace.

"It is no man's duty to govern any other man." Still less is it a nation's duty to govern another nation. All that the weak nations ask of the strong is: "Stand out of my sunlight and let me alone."

We have never adopted the theory that each small nation must be tributary to some other, and that each nation of the lazy tropics must have slave drivers from Europe to make its people work.

Under the terms of our Federal Union, the United States has jurisdiction over Louisiana and California. But in like degree California and Louisiana have jurisdiction over the United States. If under republican forms we assert our authority over Luzon and Mindanao we grant in like degree to Luzon and Mindanao authority over us. The authority of democracy is equal and reciprocal.

Imperialism means such a control of tropical lands that they may be economically productive or that their doors may be thrown open to commerce. It is a definite business, difficult and costly, with few rewards and many dangers. It is fairly well understood by some of those engaged in it. It has been successfully conducted along certain very narrow lines by Great Britain and by Holland, although both countries have the record of many failures before they learned the art. Germany has tried it for a little while, as have also Japan and Belgium, none of these with successful results. Spain is out of the business in utter bankruptcy and her assets are in our hands for final disposition. France has made failures only, and this because she has held colonies for her own ends, regardless of their own interests.

"No sooner," says Lionel Dècle, "was the island (of Madagascar) in the hands of these (French colonial leaders) than they closed it to all foreign prospectors. They imposed prohibitive duties on all foreign goods, keeping the country for the French colonists that never came, and that never will come."

Control of the tropics has none of the glories we vulgarly associate with imperial sway. Its details are trivial, paltry and exasperating in the last degree. The more successful as to money, the more offensive to freedom.

In some regions, as Guiana, no nation has yet accomplished anything either in bringing civilization or in making money, while in Java and Trinidad the results, however great, have been financial or commercial only. In Jamaica, the abolition of slavery marked the end of industrial prosperity. Every dollar made in Java has been blood money, red with the blood of Dutch soldiers on the one side and with that of the Malay people on the other.

Concerning the conditions in Java, Mr. Valentine uses these words:

"The history of Netherlands India—the Dutch Colonies in Malaysia—is a light-and-shadow picture. Its bright side depicts the wealthy plantation owner in Europe surrounded by every luxury of his home land, annually in receipt of millions of guilders from his East Indian plantations. The contrast is found in the humid tropic lands, where some 30,000,000 patient, cowed Malays, working under the harsh supervision of agents, produce the wealth that rightfully is theirs, because earned by them on lands which have been wrested or tricked from them and held by the foreigners at the expense of thousands of lives annually among the white troops sent out to maintain a usurped supremacy, gained gradually over the unsuspecting and friendly natives by false pledges, broken promises and ultimately by force of arms."

## Again he says:

"The language of these people is soft and musical,—the Italian of the tropics—their ideas are poetic and their love of flowers, perfumes, music, dancing, heroic plays and emotional art of every description proves them highly æsthetic. Their reverence for rank and age, coupled with an elaborate etiquette and punctilious courtesy to one another, marked even in the common people, when contrasted with their abject crouching humility before their despotic Dutch masters, are themes for sad reflection and arouse just indignation. The sight of quiet, in-

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offensive peddlers, who beseech chiefly with their eyes, being furiously kicked out of a hotel courtyard or any other public place, when Mynheer does not choose to buy, causes the casual looker-on to recoil; but to see little native children actually lifted by the ear and hurled away from a humble vantage point on the curbstone to make way for a pajamaed Dutchman who wishes to view some troops that may be marching by, makes one sick at heart.

"Said a Dutch official to a visitor: 'I noticed you looked at the whipping-post in the jail.' 'Yes; we sometimes flog them lightly. If a man on parole does not return to the jail in time a gendarme generally finds him in his hut and brings him back, when, as he expects, he gets a few lashes. We don't punish severely—they would never forget that.' Can they ever forget the indignity of a single lash, which, though lightly laid on, yet stifles or destroys the spirit of manhood?

"It is said that the disposition of the Javanese is now changing. The Dutch have lost confidence in native troops. The people now come freely into contact with Europeans, the education given them has had an effect, and communication has been rendered easy. They do not fear the Europeans as they formerly did. The time is past when the entire population of a village could be driven with a stick to a far-off plantation—the pruning knife and the axe would be quickly turned against the driver in these latter days. They no longer believe that the European is interested in their welfare, and are well aware that they are cheated out of a large proportion of the value of the coffee harvest. However much the colonist may regret it, the period of darkness is passing away and the time of coercion in Java giving place to better conditions, and any attempt to stay the tide of progress will only call forth the enmity of the natives. The Malay spirit of revenge has done much, perhaps, to bring about the present governmental era of comparative kindness, fair-dealing and justice in Java."

The state committee, on government coffee plantations is quoted as saying in its latest reports:

"If the native has not become more progressive and sensible, he is, at least, wiser in matters about which he should be kept in the dark, unless the government means to remove coercion at the expense of the exchequer."

Concerning "contract labor" as now developed in Hawaii, Mabel Craft,\* makes the following observation:

"One glaring instance of this political immorality existed in Hawaii for years in the shape of a system of contract labor, with penal enforcement, which differed little from southern slavery. They will tell you down there that this labor was necessary for the development of the island—that sugar could not be produced without it, and that without sugar the islands would never have been rich. And what they tell you is perfectly true. For sugar the contract-bound Chinese and Japanese were necessary, and for the commercial prosperity of the islands there must be sugar. I believe that the southern owners of cotton plantations pleaded a similar necessity for almost a hundred years.

"The contract laborer is a wage-slave. For a long time he had no name, being known only by a number, like a convict, until public opinion forced a change. His contract was penally enforced, and if he ran away he was recaptured and brought back and forced to serve out his time. The only difference between this slavery and that of the South is that the Hawaiian slaves are paid a certain wage, and that the consuls look after the rights of their countrymen when abuses become too flagrant. There is, too, a suggestion of free-will in the fact that the Orientals are supposed to bind themselves willingly in their own countries. But there are on the island of Hawaii whole villages of fugitive laborers, hidden in inaccessible places in the mountains—camps whither other laborers flee, somewhat as they did to the Dismal swamp.

"It is something of a shock to the calloused Westerner to find a government almost entirely composed of the thin, cool New England blood—the blood of Phillips and of Garrison—so calmly determining that the labor of the country needs must be given it. If the kings had done it there would have been no surprise—they knew no better; but these political sons of priestly sires, who had overturned a government because they believed in the

<sup>\*</sup> Hawaii-Nei. p. 30.

equality of men—how could they reconcile it with their consciences? It seems almost as though in their anxiety to instruct the natives, the missionaries had forgotten to teach the Golden Rule to their own sons."

Since the annexation of Hawaii the importation of coolie laborers from Asia has been checked, and similar importation of Portuguese indentured laborers has taken its place.

The voice of common British opinion seems to be that it is our turn to take a hand in the control of the tropics. This idea is assumed in Kipling's appeal, "Take Up the White Man's Burden," and the real force of his verse is a warning that there is no easy way to success. The motive is to be not glory, but the profit to the world. It is our duty, with the others, to share the burden of tropical control that we may increase the wealth and commerce of the nations. There is some reason in this appeal. It is a business we cannot wholly shirk. I maintain, however, that so far as we are concerned, this is a matter purely for individual enterprise. The American merchant, missionary, and miner have taken up the white man's burden cheerfully; the American Government cannot.

"A certain class of mind," says Mr. Charles F. Lummis, "froths at the bare suggestion that the United States cannot 'do anything any other nation can.' Well, it cannot—and remain United States. A gentleman has all the organs of a blackguard. But a gentleman cannot lie, steal, bully nor ravish. A republic cannot be a despotism."

I notice that not one of our tried friends in England, men like Bryce, Morley, and Goldwin Smith, who understand our spirit and our laws, urge the holding of the Philippines. In England, as in America, the call to hold the Philippines is mainly that of the jingo and the politician, the reckless and conscienceless elements in the public life of each nation joining hands with each other.

The white man's burden, in the British sense, is to force the black man to support himself and the white man, too. This is the meaning of "control of the tropics." The black man cannot be exterminated at home as the red man can; therefore, let us make him carry double. The world needs all that we can get out of him. This may be all the better for the black man in need of exercise, but it is the old spirit of slavery, and its disguise is the thinnest.

Our Monroe Doctrine pledges us to a national interest in the tropics of the New World. This is because throughout the New World American citizens have interests which our flag must protect. In matters of legitimate interest no nation has been less isolated than America; but our influence goes abroad without our armies. Force of brains is greater than force of arms, more worthy and more lasting. Of all the recent phases of American expansion the most important and most honorable is that which is called the "peaceful conquest of Mexico." We hear little of it because it sounds no trumpets and vaunts not itself. The present stability of Mexico is largely due to American influences. Every year American intelligence and American capital find better and broader openings there. In time, Mexico shall become a republic in fact as well as in name, side by side in the friendliest relation with her sister republic

of broader civilization. It is not necessary that the same flag should float over both. If one be red, white, and blue, let the other be green, white, and red—what matter? The development of Mexico, the "awaking of a nation," is thus a legitimate form of expansion. It is not a widening of governmental responsibility, but a widening of American influence and an extension of republican ideas. The next century will see Mexico an American instead of a Spanish republic, and this without war, conquest or intrigue.

The purpose of the Monroe Doctrine is not to keep the European flag from America. Its function is to prevent the extension here of European colonial methods, the domination of weak races by strong, of one race for the good of another, of the principle of inequality of right which underlies slavery.

The spread of law and order, respect for manhood, of industrial wisdom and commercial integrity, this is the true "white man's burden," not the conquest and enslavement of men of other races. Expansion is most honorable and worthy, if only that which is worthy and honorable is allowed to expand. The love of adventure, a precious heritage of our race, may find its play under any flag if it cannot honorably take our own to shelter it.

The world of action is just as wide to-day as it ever was, and if the red, white, and blue floated over every foot of it, it would be no wider.

If after our conquest of Mexico, while our flag floated over Chapultepec, we had never hauled it down but had seized the whole land, we should have gained nothing for civilization. The splendid natural development of the country by which, in Diaz's own words, it has become "the germ of a great nation," would have been as impossible under our forms as under the imperial forms of Napoleon and Maximilian. The modern growth of Japan would never have taken place had she, like India, been numbered with England's vassals. A nation must develop from within by natural processes if it is to become great and permanent.

But some urge that we must hold far-off colonies, the farther the better, for the sake of our own greatness. Great Britain is built up by her colonies. "What does he know of England, who only England knows?"

"Just pride is no mean factor in the state,
The sense of greatness makes a people great."

The grandeur of Rome lay in her colonies, and in her far and wide extension must be the greatness of the United States.

But the decline of Rome dates from the same far and wide extension. Extension for extension's sake is a relic of barbarous times. An army in civilization must exist for peace not for war, and it should be as small as it can safely be made. A standing army means waste, oppression, and moral decay. Carlyle once said something like this, "It is not your democracy or any other ocracy that keeps your people contented. It is the fact that you have very much land and very few people." But this is not half the truth. The main reason of our prosperity is our freedom from war. Our farmer carries no soldier on his back. We fear no foreign invader because we invite none. Were the people of the continent of Europe once freed from the cost of militarism, their

industrial progress would be the wonder of the ages. As it is they are ground down by worse than medieval taxation. A French cartoon represents the farmer of 1780 with a feudal lord on his back. The French farmer of 1900 is figured as bearing a soldier, then a politician, and on the back of these a money-lender. Without these, industry would buy prosperity and prosperity contentment; with contentment would rise new hope. The hopelessness of militarism is the basis of European pessimism; men see no end to the piling up of engines of death. Were the continent of Europe freed from killing taxation, England could no longer hold her primacy in trade. War has destroyed the life of her rivals. Could bankrupt Italy disband her armies and sink her worthless navies the glories of the golden age would come again. Could France cease to be militant she would no longer be decadent. If politics in the army is fatal to military power the army in politics is fatal to the state. No nation can grow in strength when its bravest and best are each year devoured by the army. This has gone on in southern Europe for a thousand years.

"War's great purpose," says Edward Markwick, "is the fostering of strength, not physical strength alone, but the combination of moral, intellectual and physical strength." But the actual effect of war is exactly the reverse of this. Its call is ever in Kipling's words, "Send forth the best ye breed." And the best never return. With the selection of the best for exile and destruction the standard of the race at home inevitably declines. This is the story of the failure of the Latin races. It is at least a warning to all others. Some one thus apostrophizes ancient Greece:

"Of all your thousands grant but three To make a new Thermopylæ."

But this cannot be. The heroes are dead. The sons of heroes were never born, and the men of old who ever "with a frolic welcome took the thunder and the sunshine" have given place to a race of clodhoppers and cowards, the lineal descendants of men like themselves whom the warriors could not use. "'Tis Greece, but living Greece no more."

The most insidious foe to race development is military selection. The destruction of the brave in the Roman wars finally, according to Otto Sech, left the Romans a race of "congenital cowards." In proportion as a nation succeeds in war, it must lose its possibility of future success in war or peace. The greatest loss to America in her Civil War rests in the fact that a million of her strongest, bravest, most devoted men have left no descendants. More than the men who died we miss the men who never were. Such loss has gone on in Europe since war began. It has grown more destructive since the individual strength of the warrior ceased to count—lost in the multitude of battalions. If we cannot stop fighting, civilization will have nothing left worth fighting for.

The terrible wastes of war are recognized by Great Britain. These she has tried to minimize by letting alone everything which does not relate to commerce. She has ceased to hope for the impossible and has come down to business principles. The British Empire is a huge commercial trust. England has no illusions. "England neither fears nor admires any nation under heaven," writes an Oxford scholar. She never fights save when she is sure to win and to throw the costs on her opponent.

She has secured all points of real commercial advantage and is making the most of the ignorance and folly of those who strive to emulate her.

Great Britain expands where order and trade extend. Our expansion demands one thing more, equality of all men before the law. All expansion of our boundaries brought about by honorable means and carrying equal justice to all men, I, for one, earnestly favor. To that limit, and that only, I write myself down as a "rank expansionist." I see no honor in our seizure of the Philippines, nor prospect of justice in our ultimate rule.

Our British friends speak of the smoothness of their colonial methods, especially in the Crown colonies, which Parliament cannot touch. Everything runs as though newly oiled and the British public hears nothing of it. Exactly so. It is none of the public's business, and the less the public has to say the less embarrassment from its ignorant meddling. The Colonial Bureau\* belongs to the Crown, not to the people. The waste and crime and bloodshed do not rest on their heads. But we are not ready for that kind of adjustment. Our Executive is a creature of the public. We have no governmental affairs which are sacred from the eyes or the hand of the people. "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people" implies that the people are to be interested in all its details; every one to the least and the greatest, even at the risk of destroying its

<sup>\*</sup> In the journals, to-day, I see a record of a question addressed in Parliament to the British Minister of Finance. "This is the question of government with government," said he, in refusing to answer. In other words, imperial affairs in England are none of the people's business. If they were, there would be fewer of them.

smoothness of operation. Hence, colonial rule as undertaken by us must be marred by vacillation, ignorance, incompetence, parsimony, and neglect. All these defects appear in our foreign relations as well. For the reason of the greater intelligence of our people in public affairs, our government will enter on the control of the tropics with a great handicap. The people want to know all about it. The Administration must keep open books and justify itself at every step. This will act against its highest efficiency. The forms of self-government are not adapted to the government of others. The very strength of the Republic unfits it for complicated tasks, because its power can be brought at once into effect only as the people understand its purposes. Popular government and good government are two very different things. Often they are for generations not on speaking terms with each other.

The advantages of sound nationality over strong government were the subject of the fullest discussion a hundred years ago. The feeble rule of democracy is the strongest of all governments when it has the force of the popular will behind it; when this fails it is paralyzed as all government should be. A monarchy is more effective in foreign affairs and calls out better service than democracy. If that were all we might revert to monarchy and close the discussion. But that is not all, and every move toward centralization costs on the other side. The essential fact of monarchy is not the presence of the king, but the absence of the people in all large transactions.

This subject has been ably discussed by Goldwin Smith, who calls special attention to our want of governmental apparatus for the control of dependencies. That

we cannot have such apparatus most other British writers have failed to note. Imperialism demands the powers of an emperor.

"The British Crown, for the government of the Indian Empire, has an imperial service attached to it as a monarchy, and separate from the services which are under the immediate control of Parliament. British India, in fact, is an empire by itself; governed by a Viceroy who is a delegate of the Crown, exempt as a rule from the influence of home politics and reciprocally exercising little influence over them. Before the Mutiny, which broke up the army of the East India Company, India was still the dominion of that Company; and the transfer of it to the Crown, though inevitable, was not unaccompanied by serious misgiving as to the political consequences which might follow. Even for the government of other dependencies Great Britain has men like the late Lord Elgin, detached from home parties and devoted to the Imperial Service. In her dependencies Great Britain is, in fact, still a monarchy, though at home she has become practically a republic. In the case of the United States it would seem hardly possible to keep the imperial service free from political influence, or, reciprocally, to prevent the influence of the empire on politics at home. Imperial appointments would almost inevitably be treated as diplomatic appointments are treated now."

"In what, after all," continues Goldwin Smith, "does the profit or bliss of imperial sway consist? The final blow has just been dealt to the miserable and helpless remnant of that empire on which, in the day of its grandeur, the sun was said never to set, and to which Spanish pride has always desperately clung. It may safely be said that not the expulsion of Moriscos or Jews, nor even the despotism of the Inquisition, did so much to ruin Spain as the imperial ambition which perverted the energies of her people, turning them from domestic industry and improvement to rapacious aggrandizement abroad. The political and religious tyranny was, in fact, largely the consequence of the imperial position of the monarchy, which, by the enormous extent of its dominions and its uncontrolled sources of revenue, was lifted above the nation."

In the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations which followed it we have examples of the conditions of colonial rule. At no step since the beginning has the American people been consulted. At no point has consultation been possible. In managing affairs like this there can be no divided councils. The responsible head must rule, and it matters not a straw what is the wish of the people who foot the bills. The only check on the Executive is the certainty that the people will have the last word. What you think or I think or the people think of the whole business cuts no figure whatever in the progress of events, because our opinion can at no time be asked. After all, we are not so much worried because we have not asked the consent of the people of the Philippines. It is because the American people have not been consulted. In a matter most vital to the life of the nation they are represented only by the rabble of the streets. When their consent should be asked they are told that it is too late to say, No!

But there are many wise economists who would make permanent just this condition of affairs. The certainty that success in colonial matters would take them absolutely out of the hands of the people is their argument for imperial expansion as opposed to democracy.

Through concentration of power in the Executive we may be able to make of Havana and Manila clean and orderly cities. Shall we not by similar means sooner or later purify San Francisco and New York? If martial law is good for Luzon or for Santiago, why not for Wilmington, or Virden, or even for Boston?

If military methods will clean up Havana and Santiago, why not use them for the slums of all cities? If it is our

"white man's burden" to make the black man work in the tropics, why not make white men work outside of the tropics? If we furnish public employment in the tropics, forcing the unemployed to accept it, why not do the same with the unemployed everywhere? Why not makes slaves of all who fail to carry the black man's burden of toil?

To be good, it is argued, government must first be strong, and the difficulties before us will demand and at last secure the strong hand.

Impressed by the weakness and corruption of popular government these economists wish, at any cost, to limit it. To decide by popular vote scientific questions like the basis of coinage, the nature of the tariff, the control of corporations, is to dispose of them in the most unscientific way possible. The vote of a majority really settles nothing, and a decision which the next election may reverse exposes us to the waste which vacillation always entails.

It is said that in the ideal of the fathers our government was not a democracy. It was a representative republic, and the system of representation was expressly designed to take the settlement of specific affairs out of the hands of the people. It was not the part of the people to decide public questions, but to send "their wisest men to make the public laws." Nowadays this ideal condition has been lost. The people no longer think of choosing their wisest men for any public purpose. They try to choose those who will do their bidding.

The daily newspaper and the telegraph carry to every man's hand something of the happenings of every day the world over. On the basis of such partial information every man forms his own opinion on every subject. These opinions for the most part are crude, prejudiced, and incomplete; but they serve as a basis for public action. The common man's horizon is no longer bounded by the affairs of the village, to be settled in town-meeting in accordance with the expectations of the fathers. He knows something about all the affairs of state, and as local affairs receive scant notice in the newspapers it is these which he neglects and forgets. The town-meeting has decayed through the growth of newspaper information, the introduction of the voter to broader interests—interests less vital no doubt to the average man but more potent to affect his fancy.

Having opinions of his own, however crude, on all public questions, the citizen demands that his representatives should carry out these opinions. If he has, or thinks he has, a financial interest in any line of policy, he will vote for men whose interests are the same as his. In such manner Congress has become not an assembly of "the wisest men to make the public laws," but a gathering of attorneys, each pledged to some local or corporate interest, and each doing his best, or appearing to do it, to carry out lines of policy dictated by others. This condition the fathers could not foresee. The telegraph and the newspaper have brought it about. It has great disadvantages, but it cannot be helped and it is with us to stay.

Because of this condition economists of a certain type welcome all extensions of administrative functions. They would prescribe a dose of Imperialism to stiffen the back of our democracy. If we complicate the duties of government, if we plunge into delicate and dangerous

foreign relations, our failures and humiliation will increase the demand for skill. The business of horse-stealing quickens a man's eye and improves his horsemanship. In such fashion the business of land-grabbing improves diplomacy. The old idea of representation by statesmen unpledged to any line of action will arise again. The choice of attorneys will be limited to local assemblies, and real leaders of parties will come to the front.

Such a change England has seen since her aggressive foreign policy forced upon her the need of eternal vigilance. Such a change makes for better government at the expense of popular choice. "This may not be republicanism," say Lummis, speaking of the work of Diaz in Mexico, "but it is business." The ruler of England is not the people's choice nor the choice of the Queen. He is the cleverest mouthpiece of the dominant oligarchy.

It is currently said that British imperial experiences have caused the purification of British politics and the expulsion from them of the spoils system. For this statement there is no foundation in fact. It is through the growth of individual intelligence in a compact homogeneous nation that higher political ideas have arisen. It is through the pressure of money that waste of public funds has been checked. The conquest of tropical races has accompanied this, but has been in no degree its cause. As well claim for colonial dominion that it has abolished imprisonment for debt, as that it has purified the civil service. On this important question I present the following quotation from a paper of Dr. George Elliott Howard, on "British Imperialism and the Reform of the Civil Service."

<sup>\*</sup> Published in the Political Science Quarterly, June, 1899.

"DISTINGUISHED teachers of political and social science are asserting that besides the alleged economic and other advantages sure to come from the adoption of a 'colonial' policy by the United States, there will follow a purification of our civil service, an elevation and regeneration of our entire national administrative system. For 'responsibility,' we are assured, 'is a powerful moralizing influence.' In proof of this doctrine the experience of Great Britain is appealed to. At first, it is conceded, there will undoubtedly be 'corruption and scandals' in our colonial governments; but, continues Professor Giddings, 'so far from despairing of the republic if we enter into more complicated and more delicate relations to world politics, we may rather anticipate that the change will prove to be precisely what was needed, and that our new responsibilities will operate more surely and more continuously than any other influences to improve the morale and the wisdom of American administration. this belief we are supported by the experience of British Colonial government. As every student of history knows, the age of Walpole was marked by corruption greater and apparently more irremediable than any which we have yet known in American political life. Who could have predicted that, after a century of continuous territorial expansion, with a correspondingly rapid multiplication of official positions, the administrative side of British government, instead of becoming hopelessly incapable under the increasing strain, would have become the purest and most nearly perfect mechanism thus far known in political history? Have we, then, any right to despair of our own experiment, under a similar broadening of opportunities and responsibilities? If we have, our estimate of American character must be a sorry one.' Yet compared with the colonial empire of Great Britain, the territory and the population which we may be called upon to administer is very small. Therefore, 'if the republican form of government is to be undermined and destroyed in a nation of 70,000,000 of the most resourceful, energetic and, all in all, conscientious human beings that have yet lived upon this planet, under the strain of devising and administering a workable territorial government for outlying island possessions of such modest dimensions as these, it would appear that our estimate of the excellence and stability of republican institutions must have been a grotesque exaggeration.'\*

"Already the argument of Professor Giddings that wider responsibility will prove a great moral stimulant in the regeneration of our domestic civil service, with appeal to the alleged example of Great Britain, has become a favorite one among American expansionists. Some of them even go the length of declaring that Imperjalism has been almost the sole cause of the rise of the admirable civil system of Great Britain. Yet, with sincere respect for the candor and learning of the scholars who have set up this theory—for facts have not been forthcoming,-it seems very clear that there has seldom been committed a more dangerous perversion of history. In the main, it is a striking illustration of the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; though it would indeed be strange if three centuries of British Imperialism, with its awful mistakes, its colossal crimes, and its vast "successes,"

<sup>\*</sup> Professor Franklin P. Giddings, American Imperialism: in Polit. Science Quarterly, December, 1898, p. 601-603.

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should not have afforded to society some useful lessons.

"The fact is the purification of the British administrative system has come as one of the results of moral and social evolution. Whatever throughout the ages has been the subtle and complex cause of the rise of a loftier standard of social righteousness among the children of men has contributed to this result. In other words, the renovation of the British civil service has come as the gift of triumphant democracy. In political history, the spirit of social righteousness and the democratic spirit are so closely related that it is not always easy to say which has been the cause and which the effect. For the point under consideration, they are practically interchangeable terms.

"It is quite impossible in this short space even to touch upon the many details, crowding the pages of English social, economic, and constitutional history, which establish beyond question the view here presented. Only the trend which a full inquiry would take can here be noted. In the outset, it may be stated as morally certain, that the rise of the British empire, beginning with the charter of the East India Company in 1600 and the settlement of the first permanent colony in America a few years later, greatly favored the perpetuity of the ancient spoils system, which had its source in the so-called 'prerogative' of the king. That patronage in Church and State should be determined by favoritism and not by merit was a matter of course in the Middle Ages. This doctrine was lived up to by kings and prelates with brutal frankness. It was sanctioned by the social morality of the times. It was the morality of despotism,

which, though disguised, survived in England for eight hundred years after the Conquest before it yielded to the influence of democracy. 'To say that a man is entitled to an office simply because he is a man of worth and capacity and not otherwise,' says Eaton, 'is in principle to say that he is entitled to become a knight, a baron, a duke, or a king for the same reason—obviously a principle as utterly repugnant to the theory of all arbitrary governments as it is essential to the prosperity of a republic. Therefore the spoils system was the natural outgrowth of despotism and aristocracy. It is in its very nature a royal and aristocratic and not a republican agency of government.'\*

"The medieval theory of patronage was in full force at the beginning of the seventeenth century when the foundations of the British empire were laid and James Stuart, with his dogma of the 'divine prerogative,' ascended the English throne; for under the Tudors, instead of reform, there was a corruption of the public service, local and central, even deeper than had existed since before the House of Lancaster came to power. The rise of the new empire increased the value of the royal prerogative because it increased the royal patronage. This is a fact of primary significance in accounting for the astonishing tenacity of the spoils system. The new world was parceled out through the royal charters; and it was ruled in part and in varying degree by the king's favorites. By the side of the old hereditary privileged class arose a new privileged class, a bourgeoisie or mercantile plutocracy, fattening itself on the spoils of colonial and imperial trade, which was taking the

<sup>\*</sup> Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain (N. Y., 1880), p. 40.

place of the 'monopolies' of the Elizabethan age. This new privileged order became the ally of the despotism which called it into being. It is true in fact that the planting of the American colonies under commercial charters by the three Stuarts gave a great opportunity to democracy—but not in England. If the spirit of democracy became fierce in America, and the colonists enjoyed the practical benefits of self-government, these blessings were the result of their circumstances, of their isolation, not of the beneficent purposes of the king. According to the colonial theory, adopted by the Crown and by Parliament, Englishmen who left the old home to conquer a new one, to face the dangers and hardships of the wilderness, became ipso facto an inferior class of British subjects. Instead of being generously treated, they were to be exploited for the benefit of those who stayed at home, partly on the alleged ground of exemption from imperial burdens. If they flourished. it was because the king was too indifferent or too busy to enforce his theory. Perhaps for the moment there was in this course a positive advantage. The same bigoted and pedantic James, who drove the Separatists to Holland, was willing that they and the Puritans should go to America and practise their beliefs. It will scarcely be questioned that the withdrawal of so many thousand sturdy enemies of prerogative to settle the New England was a real gain to absolutism and gave a longer lease of life to prerogative and the spoils system. What would have been the result had there been no empire and had the Puritan and the Pilgrim been compelled to cast in their lot with Cromwell? And a like question must be asked again and again during the next two centuries and a half as the empire expands and the most courageous and enlightened children of Britain go forth to seek their fortunes in every zone of the habitable globe. Whatever compensations they or the world may have gained by this process, it is certain that the social movement at home would have been different had they there remained. Is it not highly probable that the resistance of prerogative to the rising tide of democracy has been greatly protracted by it?

"It is coolly assumed by the advocates of the theory under consideration that the bracing and broadening effects of British expansion soon made themselves felt. We get the impression that the character of English domestic administration was affected by it in a reasonable time; as if the British experiment of empire were something which might well be imitated by us as a proper and rational means to an important end. Only "at first," we are led to believe, may we expect to find corruption in the management of our new empire; while at home, we infer, the evils of our present civil service will presently disappear. Therefore we are expected to marvel that within a hundred years of Robert Walpole British civil service rose from its lowest level of corruption and inefficiency to a point of excellence never anywhere attained in history before. In the first place, it is well to remember that when the rule of Walpole closed, England's colonial empire had already been in existence nearly a century and a half; and that if government under Walpole had actually reached an abyss of cynical depravity, lower even than that which disgraced the reign of the Stuarts, the fact, prima facie, may well lead the observer to a very different conclusion from that which the expansionists have drawn. One might be tempted off-hand to infer that, under the stimulus of colonial empire, the royal prerogative had by the time of Walpole brought the British civil service to its nadir of abasement, from which, notwithstanding the growth of democracy and general social culture, it has required more than another century to raise it. Indeed there is abundant evidence of the kind already suggested to show that such an inference would not come far short of the truth.

"It is very significant that a thorough reform in the British civil service, either in India or at home, was not effected until after the middle of the nineteenth century: two hundred and fifty years after the beginning of the empire. Verily the mills of the gods grind slowly. The lesson of moral discipline and responsibility was slow in learning. Only in 1853 was the system of open competitive examination of candidates for the India service resolved upon; although some years earlier a partial reform had taken place. In 1855 the new plan was put in force. But the change came too late to prevent the horrible Sepoy massacre of 1857,—the last scene in the tragic history of the India Company whose charter was surrendered in the following year. It was in 1853, likewise, that the first step was taken towards an effective reform in the method of choosing members of the domestic civil service. A parliamentary committee made an inquiry into the state of the existing service and recommended a system of open competitive examinations. No action was taken by parliament; but in 1855, by an order in council, a civil service commission was appointed, under whose direction all candidates

for junior positions in the departments were to be examined before they could receive a probationary appointment for six months. The order, however, did not provide for "open" competition as recommended. Only a limited number of candidates—in practise three or more-could compete for each place; and these were "nominated" by the heads of the different offices. Thus "patronage was still permitted to have full sway in the nomination of the candidates. Appointments might still be made for political and personal reasons as freely as before. The only condition imposed was that the nominee should obtain a certificate of qualification from the civil service commission." \* Yet the experiment proved encouraging; and improvements were made from time to time. But it was not until 1870 that patronage received its death-blow through the adoption of the system of open competition. From the fall of Lord North onward many reforms in matters of detail, both in the imperial and the domestic administration, had been made. Bribery in particular and various forms of pecuniary corruption had been severely checked. Still, in 1853, many years after parliamentary and municipal, as well as many social and industrial, reforms had been accomplished, the evils of patronage were grave indeed. For the Indian service, the incompetent and the illiterate were "nominated" to compete in the restricted examinations then in use. "In the years 1851 to 1854, both inclusive, 437 gentlemen were examined for direct commission in the Indian army; of this number 132 failed in English, and 234 in

<sup>\*</sup>Graves (E. O.), How it was done in Great Britain: in Scribner's Monthly, Vol. XIV, p. 243.

Arithmetic. The return requires no comment."\* There was, in short, declares Eaton, "a hotbed of abuses prolific of influences which caused the fearful outbreak of 1857."† Even more serious abuses existed in the domestic service.‡

"The reform of the British civil service beginning in 1853 appears clearly in the discussions of the times as a democratic movement. It came as the gain of the plain man at the expense of privilege, although some members of the privileged classes were among its champions. It was distinctly regarded by its enemies as another onslaught on the royal prerogative. A noble privy councilor, after sneeringly declaring that 'the world we live in is not . . . half moralized enough for the acceptance of a scheme of such stern morality as this,' reveals his true sentiment by exclaiming, 'why add another to the many recent sacrifices of the royal prerogative?' § It was a victory for social righteousness, under guidance of the best thought and the most enlightened conscience of England. Among its prominent supporters were members of the universities, philosophers like John Stuart Mill, and humanitarian scientists like Mill's friend, the sanitary reformer, Edwin Chadwick, who had advocated the system of open competitive examinations as early as 1827. It is instructive that trial of this plan in the Indian service, fifteen years before it was possible to do so in the home administration, was

<sup>\*</sup> Civil Service Papers, pp. 21-2: cited by Eaton, p. 178.

<sup>†</sup> Eaton, Civil Service, 178.

<sup>‡</sup> Civil Service Papers, pp. 21-2: cited by Eaton, 189.

<sup>§</sup> Eaton, Civil Service, 196-7.

<sup>||</sup> Molesworth, Hist. of England, III., 126-7.

largely due to the fact that prerogative had less at stake while Indian offices were still nominally under the patronage of the Directors of the East India Company. The "government," says Molesworth, "which would probably have strenuously resisted such an attempt to interfere with its patronage in England, consented, without much reluctance, to a trial of the experiment in India.\*

"In the days of the Missouri Compromise, well-meaning proslavery expansionists, while yielding to the clamor of the South for more territory, soothed their consciences with the deceitful dream that, were importations of foreign negroes cut off, the evils of American bondage would be lessened by spreading it over the new lands of the west. Even Clay and, in his old age, Jefferson were beguiled by an illusion which has long since passed into history as one of the most curious fallacies which political casuistry has ever conceived. Yet the belief that the evils of slavery could be mitigated by 'dilution' bears a remarkable likeness to the theory of the modern expansionists. We cannot get rid of the spoils system by 'dilution;' by throwing open to partisan greed rich and distant fields whose helpless inhabitants may not be even partially protected from exploitation by the possession of the ballot. It is no doubt true, should we retain Porto Rico and the Philippines, that American genius, energy, and courage will in the end solve the problem of giving them fairly good government. Nor will it be wise to assume that even in the outset American administration would be marked by the rapacity of a Clive or a Hastings. But, considering the present state of American political ethics, new and sinister glimpses of

<sup>\*</sup> Molesworth, Hist. of Eng., III., 126 7.

which have recently been revealed in the war investigation scandals, we are forced to believe that frightful abuses in the management of our 'Colonies,' would follow and that a new lease of life would be given to mal-administration at home.

"Moreover, if we are to read the lesson of British Imperialism aright, it is needful to avoid another common and alluring fallacy. Doubtless all human experience is in some way profitable to the race. Social crime and social virtue may each in the end confer a social benefit. It by no means follows, however, for the sake of the lesson, that crime and virtue are alike to be imitated. Doubtless, as Professor Giddings reminds us, all great national or social changes have come in obedience to historic forces and are as inevitable as a hurricane or the change of the seasons. Doubtless vast social movements, great national policies, the rise and fall of empires, regardless of the sufferings and the crimes which may attend them, are in harmony with the law of 'social struggle,' and their ultimate results the 'survival of the fittest.' It does not follow, however, that 'artificial selection' on the part of self-conscious society should imitate the methods of cosmic evolution. It may be that Attila or Jenghiz Khan with their Tartar hordes taught the Aryan men of Christian Europe some lessons -especially that of unity-which they sorely needed to learn. Still, the modern moralist will scarcely prescribe the 'Scourge of God' to cure similar ills in existing society. It may be also, as Bishop Stubbs suggests, that the Norman Duke 'forced out' the latent energies of the English race, stimulated the sense of liberty and nationality, and by rough discipline whipped the native

populations into shape to preserve and develop all that was good in English institutions; and it may be that Napoleon, that 'heaven-sent law-giver from Corsica,' was just the cosmic force needed to free Europe from the bondage of feudal privilege and prerogative. Still, a democratic American will scarcely commend either William or Bonaparte as a social missionary. One may concede that a reactionary George III was needed to force the American colonists into united action, to mold the feeble spirit of resistance to administrative abuses into a national sentiment of independence, in order that the American republic might be born. Still, if here is a lesson for imitation, it is a lesson for the Filipinos and not for us. It may be that Canada, New Zealand, and the other free, self-governing colonies dominated by men of English blood, are the splendid product of the imperial expansion of England. But we must not forget that the existing liberal colonial policy of Great Britain came only after she tasted the bitter fruit of the American revolution.\* It is indeed true, as John Fiske insists, that the battle of Yorktown was in the end a victory for democracy on both sides the sea. The old mercantile or restrictive system was doomed—though it died very hard. Reforms were set on foot by Pitt and Burke which might have anticipated the reform bill of 1832 by half a century, had not the panic caused by the French revolution drawn away the energy of the nation into the struggle with Napoleon: thus fostering into renewed vigor the spirit of militarism and the thirst for conquest —the twin vices of imperialism—and gaining a respite for

<sup>\*</sup>See especially Sir George Trevelyan, The American Revolution, Part I. (N. J., 1899).

prerogative in its deadly struggle with democracy. Yet the effect of the successful revolt of the American colonies did not at once lead to the grant of political liberty, of responsible self-government, to those which remained loyal. On the contrary a strict paternalism was adopted as a policy. 'Politically the Colonies were no longer to be treated "with salutary neglect." were to be watched, that the first signs of discontent might be crushed, and a repetition of the American disaster prevented.' \* Commercially a system was set up which has been happily called a system of 'reciprocity in advantage.' † A differential tariff actually gave the Canadian and the other northern colonists an advantage at the expense of the London consumer; while, on the other hand, England retained a monopoly of the colonial trade, giving her a theoretical but not a real advantage for it would naturally have come to her without governmental interference. Against both elements of this illogical system the English reformers arose, and, after more than fifty years' struggle, gained a complete victory. Now, it is a remarkable proof of the view here presented as to the influence of the colonial empire on the domestic civil service, that these reformers resisted the new paternalism, because 'they found that the patronage which the home government controlled in the Colonies was one of the principal causes of corruption in England. To abolish the colonial patronage was to weaken the government at home; and the struggle for colonial constitutional government was a part of the

<sup>\*</sup>Davidson, England and her Colonies, 1783-1897: in Polit. Science Quarterly, March, 1899, pp. 42-3.

<sup>†</sup> By Professor Davidson, Op. cit., p. 51.

general struggle for political freedom. From the time of Fox onwards, there is a continuous protest against the tyranny of the political system in the Colonies; and the protest was the more vigorous, because the system seemed to exist solely for the benefit of the place-hunters.'\*"

"Let us beware how we misread the lesson of British imperialism, and especially that part of it afforded by the American revolution; lest, to our shame in the eyes of the nations, some dusky Patrick Henry of the tropics arise to teach us its true moral." (George Elliott Howard.)

In the British system, the Parliament of the people is behind the Premier, who can act as freely, as boldly and as quickly as he dare. In the Federal system, the Congress of the people stands first and the President acts behind them and by their permission. Only in time of war are these conditions reversed and then only partially. For this reason the severe blame visited on the President for failure to declare any tangible policy in regard to the Philippines is only partially deserved.

A movement toward the British system would require changes in the Constitution, a movement toward further centralization and toward greater party responsibility. This its advocates usually recognize. "It may not be republicanism, but it is business." Such a change, it is maintained, would soon do away with our poisonous and shameful spoils system. It would insure strong, sound, and dignified party administration, because anything short of this would ruin party or country. Under such conditions no place-hunter could hold a seat in our

<sup>\*</sup> Davidson, Op. Cit., p. 44.

cabinets, no weakling could thrust himself forward in our civil service, and our Presidents would be men who would make public opinion, never supinely wait for it, still less accept its vulgar counterfeit of mob opinion.

With such conditions in the Executive, and an automatic, persistent, competent colonial service, with army and navy to match, we could dictate to the whole earth. We could have our hand in the affairs of all nations, and the diplomacy of all the world would tremble at our frown.

All this in its essence, it is claimed, is to return to the ideals of the fathers before Jackson's vulgarity corrupted our civil service, and before Lincoln's "bath of the people" led the common man to regard himself as the main factor in our government. "Of the people, by the people," were Lincoln's additions. The right word is "Government for the people," and by those who know better than the people how the people should be governed.

In this vein we are told that the people have been "debauched by freedom." They have come to fear the bugaboo of too much government, too much army. Because we are "debauched by freedom" we have lost our respect for authority, our respect for law.

Some of our historians now assure us that government by the consent of the governed was only a catch-phrase. We never meant what we said when we took these glittering generalities from the philosophers of France. We governed our Louisiana territory just as we pleased with these phrases in our mouths, asking no advice of the French Creoles. We never sought consent of the Indian. We override the will of the negro even yet. His vote is only a farce. We have never even asked our women, half our whole number, whether they consent to our government or not. All of this is petty quibbling. These exceptions only prove the rule. The principle holds in spite of temporary failures justified by local conditions or not justified at all. So far as women are concerned it is still, right or wrong, the theory of most civilized governments, ours with the rest, that women have no governmental interests at variance with those of men. They consent tacitly but constantly to be represented by their fathers, brothers, or husbands. Doubtless this condition is not eternal, but it exists at present, and no one can claim that "consent of the governed" is reached only by a formal vote.

As to this Lincoln once said:—"The framers of the Declaration of Independence meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all, and revered by all, constantly looked to, constantly labored for, even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all peoples of all colors everywhere." One year later, speaking at Philadelphia, he said that he would "rather be assassinated on the spot than to act in the view, that the country could be saved by giving up the principles of the Declaration of Independence."

"Our own country," says Lowell, in the name of Homer Wilbur, "is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and the west by justice, and where she oversteps these invisible bounds, even so much as by a hair's breadth, she ceases to be our mother." Inside these boundaries our flag is the banner of freedom; outside it

is the standard of the pirate. Whether on a stolen guano Mexican island or on a sugar plantation wrenched or bought from Spain, its truest friends shall be the first to haul it down.

Doubtless the imperialists are partly in the right. It is certain that the formation of a colonial bureau and a foreign bureau wholly outside of popular control would make, for the time at least, for better government and stronger administration. Doubtless needs like those of England will hasten British methods of meeting them. But government for the people and not of them has its weakness as well as its strength. The strength of democracy lies not in its apparent force. It lies latent, to be drawn on in times of great need.

Because of its latent power our great blundering democracy, slow in war and simple or clumsy in diplomacy, is strong above all other nations. It can safely try civic experiments the very thought of which, if, taken seriously, would throw all Europe into convulsions. The imperial government is a swift express train which will run with great speed on a proper track but which is involved in utter ruin by a moment's slip of mismanagement. The republic is an array of lumbering farm wagons, not so swift nor so strong, but infinitely more adaptable, the only thing you can use on a farm.

The strength of democratic institutions is that without the intelligent consent of those affected by them they will not work at all. All permanent government rests on acquiescence of the people, but democracy demands more. It insists on their positive action.

The strength of empire, however disguised, lies in brute force and that alone. That of democracy lies in

the self-control and the self-respect of its individual citizens. The work of Great Britain through the centuries has been to teach its people and its vassals the lesson of respect of law. It has been the mission of the United States to teach respect of manhood, a matter vastly more difficult as well as more important.

A nation self-governed is the most powerful of all nations, because she is at peace within herself-and being sound at heart she has taken the first step toward good government, a step by which the best government possible to men must be reached in time. Even the blunders and corruptions of democracy make for good government at last. When the people find out what hurts them, that particular wrong must cease. Even the spoils system with all its waste and shame has its educacative value, and tremendous will be the educative value of the process by which it is at last thrown off. The reaction from the conquest of Luzon will save us from Imperialism for the next fifty years.

Democracy is always wiser than it seems. The common politician knows the weaknesses of the people and tries to profit by them. The true statesman knows the strength of the people and tries to lead it, and the results he attains are the marvel of the world. Such a leader of the people was Lincoln. He could touch the noblest springs in our national character. Such leaders will rise when occasion shall demand them. Meanwhile, the men are not wanting. Sound common sense and devoted patriotism are needed in all walks in life and are found there. The froth on the waves may fill our public offices, but the great deep is below them.

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"Are all the common ones so grand, And all the titled ones so mean?"

was asked in 1863 of the Army of the Potomac. "The common men so grand," though all the titled ones be mean, is the experience of all democracy. It is far better and far safer than the reverse condition when only titled men are great and all the common men are mean. Such nations are like inverted pyramids resting on the strength of one man.

For a nation to be ruled by leaders may be considered as a survival of primitive conditions, when there was no politics save war. Then all men were warriors and the tribes were but an array with a camp-following of women, children, and civilians.

When militarism gives away to industrialism we have the rise of the individual man at the expense of the relative standing of his leaders; for leadership is necessary only as collective danger threatens. The rulers are transformed from leaders to agents. These are at first under democracy responsible to self-constituted managers, demagogues, and bosses who usurp control when no imminence of danger forces the necessity of strong leadership.

From this transition stage, democracy must pass on to settled institutions and good service. In the stage which comes next, the intelligent citizen shall be the unit and head of political affairs with servants elected, appointed, or chosen by competitive examinations to do his bidding and carry out his will. "The citizen is at the head," says Walt Whitman, and President, Congress and courts "are but his servants for pay." The de-

cay of leadership must accompany the rise of the individual man.

Let us assume by way of illustration a few impossible things. Let us suppose that the Emperor of Germany should die suddenly, and with him should disappear the whole royal family, the army, the judiciary, and all others in power with all the force over which they have control. Who can say what would happen next? Can we even guess at the map of the next new Germany?—for the German Empire has no strength in itself. It is strong in battle because it owns millions of fighting men. It has little strength in the hearts of the people. The failure of the force of arms even for a day might mark the end of the German Empire.

On even frailer basis rests the Republic of France. Could such fortune befall her as the loss of her army and all others in power, no one could foretell her protean changes. If, perchance, the scepter fell into the hands of the people, the new Republic of France would be very different from any she has ever yet seen.

If in Great Britain the same change could take place what should we see? If every official of whatever grade, all the army, and all the navy were swallowed in the sea, can we forecast the result?

Evidently in England herself no great change would arise. Respect for law and respect for tradition are firmly ingrained in the English character. What had been would be established again, and the commonwealth of England would lose not a whit of its power or stability. But what of the British Empire? Its scattered fragments could never be collected again. Ireland, held by force, would go in her own way, and the

different factions would again repel one another. Selfgovernment for Ireland means disunion of the Empire. and this the English statesmen know too well. India is no nearer England to-day than she was a hundred years ago. There is not one of her vassal nations which would not escape if it could. There is not one whose presence does not weaken the British Empire. Shrewd administration has learned to count on this and to find out compensating advantages. A vast business on a small capital is the type of British dominion. No wonder England cherishes her relation to Canada and Australia, elder children of hers, who give her moral help but who take care of themselves. England dare not release Ireland from federal union, because only as a helpless minority can Ireland be controlled. On the other hand, she dare not admit the rest of the empire to the same federation lest she be thrown into the minority herself. Sooner or later both these questions will become burning ones. When they are solved Great Britain will be no longer an empire.

"Gladly," says Dr. Woolsey, "would Great Britain limit her responsibilities if she could; but it would be construed as a sign of weakness, and she fears the consequences. She cannot let go." "Imperial expansion," says Frederick Harrison, speaking of conditions in England, "means domestic stagnation. It swallowed the energies of Liberalism and bartered progress for glory." The fabric of Imperialism, whatever its form, is built in shifting sands. The only solid foundation for any government is "the consent of the governed," and here lies the strength of the United States, the soundest government on the face of the earth. Not the wisest, not

the most economical, most dignified, or most just, but the firmest in its basis, and, therefore, the most enduring.

At the close of the Civil War, when more than ever before in its history the nation was dependent on a single man, and he the wisest, bravest, tenderest of all, Lincoln was murdered. The land was filled with sorrow and distress, but there was no alarm in our body politic. It was left to Lincoln, says Brownell,

"Even in death, to give
This token for freedom's strife,
A proof how republics live,
Not by a single life,
But the right divine of man
The million trained to be free."

Our government would have endured, even in that troubled time, had every official of every state fallen with Lincoln.

Should our whole body of officers, our army, our navy, perish to-morrow, all would go on as before. Some veteran of the Civil War, or some schoolmaster, perhaps, would take the chair and call the people to order. The machinery of democracy would be started, and, once started, would proceed in its usual way. We should not have Cuba nor the Philippines, but we should retain all that was worth keeping. This stability of administration would not arise from our respect for law. That feeling is none too strong in our "fierce democracy." Still less would it spring from respect for tradition. We don't care a continental for tradition. We should act on the common-sense of the common man. To cultivate this common-sense is the chief mission of democracy. In

this it is effective, and for that reason, our Republic is the strongest and soundest government under heaven.

"I have yet to learn," \* says John Brown, "that God is a respecter of persons." There is "God in our Constitution," not in name, but in fact, for by it "all men are equal before the law," which "is no respecter of persons." Men are men, whether white or black or brown or yellow. The British government rests on a foundation of inequality. Its rewards are titles of nobility, which imply that the plain man is ignoble. The word law is written on its every page; the word justice occurs only as between equals. Neither the word nor the idea of justice as resting on human equality before the law finds place in England's dealing with other nations.

"How long will the United States endure?" Guizot once asked of James Russell Lowell. "So long as the ideas of its founders remain dominant," was his answer. Just so long as her government rests on the intelligent "consent of the governed." When it rests in part on force, no matter how wisely applied, in so far will it be unstable. A standing army contains the seeds of decay. As militarism grows democracy must die. But without the constant pressure of force of arms, law and order and

<sup>\* &</sup>quot;I think, my friends, you are guilty of a great wrong against God and humanity, and it would be perfectly right for any one to interfere with you so far as to set loose those you wilfully and wickedly hold in bondage. I have yet to learn that God is a respecter of persons.

<sup>&</sup>quot;I pity the poor in bondage who have none to help them: that is why I am here. . . . It is my sympathy with the oppressed and the wronged that are as good as you are and as precious in the sight of God." (John Brown, at Harper's Ferry: speaking from the floor of the Armory).

industry have never in any high degree existed in the tropics. Mexico to-day is a land of law and order, but the soldier is everywhere. Every railway train in the Republic carries at least three rurales, or national guardsmen. Every flag station has two or three, and every considerable town has its battalion or its regiment. These soldiers are drawn from the body of the people; very many of them are ex-brigands, reformed to the higher use of the enforcement of law. "This may not be republicanism, but it is business." The conditions of law and order in the Philippines are just the same. You may use native soldiers if you like, but without force order cannot exist.

The cost of this whole business may be urged as an argument against annexation. It will appeal to our people as the discussion of the bill for the enlargement of the army plainly shows. The financial statements of Congress have proved the strongest arguments against persistency in folly. It is clearly evident that the cost of conquest or even military occupation of the Philippines is far in excess of any possible gain to the government. The whole trade of the islands for five years, if we get all of it, would not pay for a second-class battle-ship. People who live in straw houses do not make international trade. We may open the way for individuals and corporations to grow rich, but the people can never get their money back.

No possible development of the islands can profit the people at large. There are no openings in the tropics for the small farmer, none for the American laborer, and in general none for any of the rank and file of the American people; nor can any be made by any act of

ours. We cannot alter the conditions of life in the Orient. The question of flag, other things being equal, affects neither commerce nor industry. Trade never "follows the flag" because it is a flag. Trade "flies through the open door" because it is a door. Men buy or sell wherever they can make money.

The whole argument that the needs of our commerce demand the occupation of the Philippine archipelago is both fallacious and immoral. It is untrue in the first place, and unworthy in the second. The needs of commerce demand no act of injustice and they excuse none. The total cost of maintenance of our proposed government in the Philippines cannot fall short of \$10,000,000 per year, and may be far greater. Our actual trade with the islands now amounts to less than \$500,000 per year, imports and exports together, and the whole trade of the Philippines with all the world is less than \$30,000,000. No form of government could increase this much, and, under republican forms it might fall off. The less compulsion, the less labor. Allowing a net profit of ten per cent on all transactions, a complete monopoly of Philippine trade would leave the people a debt of seven millions for every three millions our trading companies might gain. In time, perhaps, the outlook would be less unequal. Trade might increase, expenses grow less, but in no conceivable event would the people get their money back. The returns either in money or civilization would always be below their cost. The argument for commercial expansion has its roots in our experience of booming towns and has no value with careful financiers. The whole trade of all the tropics will, at the best, be but a trifling part of the commerce

of the world. Certain drugs, dyes, and fruits, mainly natural products, with sugar, tobacco, coffee, and tea make almost the whole of it.

Yet it is true that commercial imperialism might pay if we were free to act as England would with her wisdom, her experience, and her selfishness; but only on a vast and generous scale, considering commercial results only, could we make her policy effective. The function of the British army and navy in these days is not glory nor dominion. It is to clear away the barriers to trade. When England subjugates a nation she lets it alone as much as she can. Interference means waste of men and money. She never meddles with the religion nor the form of government of her vassals. The people may choose king, or president, or sultan, and each may conduct his own court in his own way, with all the goldlace and peacock-feathers that his barbaric taste may demand. England does not care for this. On her coatof-arms are these three words only, VOLUME OF TRADE.

All that England now asks of the nations she calls colonies is this, and this she gets, that there shall be law and order, and all doors wide open to the commerce of all the world. So long as other nations keep closed doors at home, England can undersell them in the markets of the world. Imperialism, then, as Lord Beresford truthfully insists, means with England simply this, Volume of Trade. All the rest is mere flummery. The sole purpose of the British navy, accident aside, is to hold the doors of the world open to British merchant ships. Except as an adjunct to an open door of commerce all foreign possessions are costly and ruinous folly.

The maintenance of Algiers, Madagascar and the Indo-China as tariff-bound colonies for Frenchmen to exploit has wrought the financial ruin of France. The militarism these follies made necessary has wrought her civic ruin. But with Great Britain army and navy are but adjuncts used with marvelous skill toward one great purpose, Volume of Trade.

The United States cannot be thus turned into a vast machine for helping its manufacturers and merchants. She has many other interests, and the greatest are educational and moral. To drop all these and plunge into the promotion of commerce she must cast aside all the checks and balances of her Constitution and to stand unhampered, just as England stands.

The British Government acts on the instant. Its only limitation is the confidence of the people. So long as it holds this by success there is no restraint on its achievements. One doubt or failure throws the power into the hands of the opposing party. This forces to the front the cleverest and strongest men in all England. It forbids incompetence in every branch of government.

Our government is not an organism which can think and act as a unit. It is simply the reflex of the people themselves; the mirror of the mass, with all its crudities and inconsistencies. It exists for the purpose of exalting men, not for developing industry or swelling the volume of trade. The British flag extends the trade of England because it insures local peace and clears away the rubbish of tariff which obstructs traffic. The Dutch flag helps the trade of Holland because it means enforced industrialism, slavery that pays its way. The American flag, outside of America, as yet means nothing;

neither greater industry nor freer commerce, nor yet increased observance of law. To plant it anywhere cannot help our trade.

If we were to follow in England's footsteps, let us see what we should have done. Let us begin with the war for Cuban freedom, though with England in our place there would have been no war. She would have found a way of saving Cuba for herself without humiliating Spain.

But the war once begun would have been pushed on business principles. Our navy shows the British method. Our army suggests the methods of Spain. Great Britain would have no scandal in her army because she would have no politicians there. There would have been no officials not trained to the profession; no colonels who had not earned their promotion by success. Severe training and faithful service give military precedence in England. Political services or favor of the Minister do not count. Faithful men find their reward in titles of nobility. In England, political scheming in army or navy or civil service alike stands on the plane of forgery or counterfeiting. The nation could not endure it and live.

The war once finished, peace would be made with the blade of the sword. No civil commission would be sent to wrangle over the details. They would be settled on the instant. Spain would be given a day to relinquish whatever England wanted, and England would speak her wishes in no uncertain tones. What England would do with these possessions is evident enough. She would put down rioting and brigandage, and she would employ the native soldiery to do it. She would press the strongest

leaders into her service, humoring their vanity with titles and making her interests their own. She would let the people form whatever government their fancy chose, with only this limitation, all factions must keep the peace. To show what peace means she might knock down a fortress or two, or blow a few hundred rebels from her guns for an object lesson to the rest.

All this in England's case would have taken place long ago with the sinking of the navies of her foes, and once accomplished the door of commerce would be flung open to all the world. All this has its glories, it may be its advantages, and we have men enough who, with force in hand, could carry out its every detail. But it could not be done under our Constitution, nor under our relation of parties, nor under the administration now at the head of our affairs. To pause in its accomplishment would be fatal. To hesitate is to fail, and our opportunity, such as it was, as well as our imperial prestige, was lost when we made the leaders of the Filipinos our enemies.

"If ever," says Dr. William James, "there was a situation to be handled psychologically, it was this one. The first thing that any European government would have done would have been to approach it from the psychological side: Ascertain the sentiments of the natives and the ideals they might be led by, get into touch immediately with Aguinaldo, contract some partnership, buy his help by giving ours, etc. Had our officers on the ground been allowed to follow their own common sense and good feeling, they would probably have done just this. Meanwhile, as they were forbidden by orders from Washington no one knows what they would have done.

"But it is obvious that for our rulers at Washington the Filipinos have not existed as psychological quantities at all, except so far as they might be moved by President McKinley's proclamation. \* \* \* When General Miller cables that they won't let him land at Iloilo, the President, we are told, cables back: 'Cannot my proclamation be distributed?' But apart from this fine piece of sympathetic insight into foreigners' minds there is no clear sign of its ever having occurred to anyone at Washington that the Filipinos could have any feelings or insides of their own whatever, that might possibly need to be considered in our arrangements. It was merely a big material corporation against a small one, the 'soul' of the big one consisting in a stock of moral phrases, the little one owning no soul at all.

"In short we have treated the Filipinos as if they were a painted picture, an amount of mere matter in our way. They are too remote from us ever to be realized as they exist in their inwardness. They are too far away; and they will remain too far away to the end of the chapter. If the first step is such a criminal blunder, what shall we expect of the last?"

In grim and graphic fashion the clear-sighted editor of the San Francisco Argonaut sets forth the lines on which we may succeed in our schemes of conquest.

"If we persevere in our imperialistic plans, we shall have to rely upon native troops, for the reason that we cannot get Americans. It is becoming more and more apparent that the youth of America will not volunteer for regular service in the tropics. We shall have to adopt the same methods pursued by European colonial powers, if we continue in our imperialistic groove. We shall have to lay aside a great many scruples to which we now cling.

"For example, in the Philippines we may have to adopt Spanish methods in many ways. We may find it necessary to stir up one tribe of natives against another. Thus we could arm the Visayans, drill them, and ship them to Luzon. The Visayans hate the Tagalos, and we could set the two tribes to fighting together, and with the Visayans we might exterminate the Tagalos. Then, after the Tagalos were exterminated or subjected, we could stir up the fierce Moros of Mindanao against the Visayans. By judiciously fomenting strife we could exterminate the Visayans. There would then remain only the Moros, and probably we could get away with them ourselves.

"Here is another suggestion. The Spaniards have always found it necessary to use treachery, torture, and bribery in the Philippines. We shall probably have to do the same. The Anglo-Saxon methods of warfare do not appeal to the Malay. In pursuance of our imperialistic plans, it would be well to hire some of the insurgent lieutenants to betray Aguinaldo and other chieftains into our clutches. A little bribery, a little treachery, and a little ambuscading, and we could trap Aguinaldo and his chieftains. Then, instead of putting them to death in the ordinary way, it might be well to torture them. The Spaniards have left behind them some means to that end in the dungeons in Manila. The rack, the thumbscrew, the trial by fire, the trial by molten lead, boiling insurgents alive, crushing their bones in ingenious mechanisms of torture—these are some of the methods that would impress the Malay mind. It would show them that we are in earnest. Ordinary, decent, christian, and civilized methods, such as the United States have always pursued in warfare, will only lead them to believe that we are weaklings and cowards, and that we are therefore to be steadily and sturdily combated.

"This may seem to some of the more sentimental of our readers like grim jesting. It is not. It is grim earnest. We assure them that the Malay race can be ruled only by terror. The Dutch can tell us a little about that from their experiences in Java. If there be a belief throughout the United States that these mediæval methods are unfitted for us, than we shall have to retire from attempting to manage Malays. Malays are more than mediæval. They hark back to the old, cruel days of prime-

val man. They are primeval rather than mediæval, and if we want to manage Malays, we will have to do it in such ways that mere murder would be kindness."

Others say that China is soon to be looted by the powers of Europe. We wish to be on hand in the center of the fight to get a share of her land and trade. "I held the enemy down," said brave John Phœnix at San Diego, "with my nose, which I inserted between his teeth for that purpose." The vultures are already at the huge Mongolian carcass. Let the Eagle of Freedom join his fellow buzzards till his belly is full. Too proud to attack for ourselves, we will be close at hand to seize whatever the others may drop in the scramble. Why not? If we do not enter the struggle, they "will forever shut us out of the trade of China." But is this true? Trade demands customers, and China will never have a better customer than the United States. To shut out anybody shuts out trade, and the wrangling powers will bid for our markets, even if we leave to them the cost, the waste and the shame of the spoliation of China. To secure our share of the China trade we have only to be ready with something to exchange and ships to carry it. No nation can afford to subjugate China or to hold any large part of it under military force. The sphere of influence is the open door. We have only to meet the open door with open door. To hold the Philippines will not make our commerce. Annex them and we shall be just as far from the goal as before. Bind them with our tariffs and we shall leave them practically no commerce at all. In any case, beyond the conveniences of a coaling station they do not enter into the Chinese question to any visible degree.

The argument that annexation is a violation of our Constitution does not impress me as conclusive. Constitution is an agreement to secure justice and prudence in our internal affairs. Its validity is between state and state, and between man and man. The hope of this country lies in the intelligence, morality and virility of its people, not in the wisdom of its leaders, still less in the perfections of its Constitution. Constitutions are mere paper at best, unless they rest on the consent of the governed; unless the principles they represent are ingrained deep in the hearts of the people. If the United States is a nation, she holds all national prerogatives. As a nation she may do whatever she chooses, if no other power prevents. The Constitution cannot test the wisdom of an action. She may annex barbarous countries, make war on the universe, or do any other wicked or foolish thing, if the decision to do so keeps within proper forms of law. If, however, the Constitution offers an effective barrier against folly we shall soon find it out. We may be sure that no weapon against Imperialism will be left unused. Whether the letter of the Constitution forbids the acquisition of vassal provinces and rotten boroughs is an open question. But there is no question that the spirit is opposed to both. Had such conditions been foreseen, the annexation of either would doubtless have been formally forbidden.

I do not myself believe that the annexation of the Philippines will prove fatal to our Constitution or fatal to democracy. It will be endlessly mischievous, but it will not kill. The only poison that can kill is personal corruption, the moral rottenness of our people. The govern-

ment by the people has wondrous vitality, and it has already survived gigantic crimes. It has outlived the monstrous blunder of secession and the headless spasms of "organized labor." It will outlive the aftermath of this war with Spain. "You cannot fool all the people all the time." This epigram of Lincoln's expresses the final strength of democracy. When the craze of the day has subsided, and we have counted our loss in blood and treasure, we shall "walk backward with averted gaze to hide our shame." May this shame be enduring, for it is our guarantee that we shall not do the like again.

Of late the argument of annexation assumes a different form. It is justified because it is inevitable. Let us enter the movement to rule it. Some of our ablest students of political affairs argue in this fashion. The treaty with Spain is sure to be ratified. The Philippines will be ceded to the United States. Cession compels annexation. We are in the current—not of divine Providence nor of abstract destiny, but of inevitable public opinion. It is no more use to struggle against this than against winds and tides. "The King can do no wrong." All the prestige of power is with the administration. The American people are bent upon keeping all the territory won from Spain. It is all a great joke with them, and they will never stop to look at the thing seriously. The one-sided, freakish and chivalrous war has intensified the humor of the situation. As well argue against a cyclone as against a national movement. The American people are fearless and determined. They go ahead to the aim in view, and can take no backward step. They have solved many difficulties in the past by sheer headlong obstinacy. They will solve these difficulties in the

same fashion. Let us join the procession. Let us not cheapen our influence by mugwumpery, but accept the inevitable, step to the front as leaders and handle the movement as best we can. Especially, they tell us, we must seize the occasion to emphasize the value of wise methods, and, above all, the vital needs of thorough civil service reform.

But civil service reform is the special abhorrence of most of the leaders in the movement for annexation. The petty offices the Philippines promise are the basis of half their influence. The promises of the men in power lavishly scattered before nomination as before election are still far in excess of their fulfilment. Because of these outstanding promises our volunteer army has been cheapened and disgraced. Is there any promise of better things when civil rule in the islands shall succeed martial law and the natives are turned over to "amateur experimenters in colonial administration?"

As a matter of fact we know that the pressure of the spoilsman has been and is greater than most presidents can resist. The appointment of civil officials in the Philippines means the carnival of the spoilsmen. The United States must prepare itself for scandal and corruption in greater measure than it has ever yet known. Already such scandals are ripening at Manila, if we may trust the guarded language of our volunteer soldiers. The universities of California have more than one hundred men in the ranks at Manila to-day, men of culture and education, volunteers who rushed forward at the call of their country. Over these men are some officers brave and manly, a few of them even trained for their business. But the officers placed in authority

over our patriotic soldiers are not always gentlemen. Too many of them are men to whom in civil life these same volunteers would not entrust their dogs. Had our volunteers been sent to Cuba or Manila with only corporals chosen by themselves and not an officer of staff or line, brave as most of the latter were, they would have made as good a record as is shown to-day. Officers competent to lead, willing to share privations, could accomplish anything with these soldiers. The tinsel sons of politicians were an insult to patriotism. The feeling of the volunteer army to-day is that of men insulted on every side. Compare this with the feelings of the men who came home from Appomattox in 1865; and the difference is not in the soldiers; it is the work of the spoilsman.

The American soldier will gladly suffer every hardship necessary in the work on which his country sends him. Under real officers, men whose special training makes their orders effective, men who are not afraid to live or die in his company, he will face every danger. But he will not willingly endure imposed hardships which serve no purpose and which he thinks due to carelessness or greed, nor serve under pasteboard officers who riot in luxury while he rots in the swamps.

Very soon the preacher, the economist, and the politician who now work together for expansion shall part company. The politician does not enter the Philippines to convert the heathen—unless, indeed, he can, convert them into coin. He is there for the same reason that the Spaniards were, what he can make out of it. He has shown no signs of repentance in the matter of spoils. He has not joined the economist in devising

schemes for a purified automatic colonial civil service. When he is mustered out from one place he must be cared for somewhere else.

Let me give an illustration or two from past experience. Some ten or twelve years ago Congress made an effort to protect the buffalo herd in the Yellowstone Park. To this end provision was made for a certain number of experts to act as keepers of the Park. Professor Baird, of the Smithsonian Institution, wished to have these keepers drawn from the ranks of trained naturalists, that the Park might be investigated while the animals were cared for. He asked me to nominate one of these and my choice fell on a young man, a person of eminent fitness, a doctor of philosophy in Zoology and a man of physical strength and woodcraft. He is now curator in the Field Columbian Museum at Chicago. When the Congressman from his district in Indiana learned of this choice he demanded the right to make it himself. This the appointing power dared not refuse, and the Congressman proceeded to redeem his outstanding promise. He first chose a man whom I will call C. He could not accept as he was serving a sentence in the Monroe County jail for larceny. His second choice, H., received the notice of his appointment while under arrest for riding a mule into a Martinsville saloon on Sunday morning. The mule was sober and would not go in. H. died of alcoholism at Mammoth Hot Springs, and the buffaloes were slaughtered in the Absarokie Hills unprotected and unavenged.

In 1890 the Census Bureau asked me to send them an expert in fishery matters, at a low salary, below that offered in the classified service. I suggested the name of a young man from Kansas. At once the representative from Topeka claimed the appointment. He had promised the first plum that fell to his district to Major Somebody, and the Major must have it. So the Census Bureau was obliged to find in the Post Office Department a position at the same salary for the Major. This the Major declined in indignant disgust.

Meanwhile the census of the marine industries went on in the hands of men grotesquely incompetent. They were set to doing things that could not be done. They copied their figures from the magnificent census report of 1880. They made statistics at random, which were changed in the Bureau itself to tally with the records of 1880. The expert wrote me: "However little confidence the outside public has in our census figures, it is vastly greater than the confidence of anyone inside the Bureau." Finally he resigned in disgust. The resignation was not accepted. Then he brought charges of incompetence and falsification against the chief of the division and all his clerks and enumerators save one or two. On investigation all were dismissed and the expert was directed to compile the census of the fisheries for 1890 from the report of the Fish Commission for 1888. The sound and thorough work of Willcox and Alexander was thus utilized, but the whole manuscript of the Census Bureau on the same subject costing several thousands of dollars went into the waste basket. The courage of one clerk saved us from trusting for our information to a lot of "amateur experimenters" in statistics.

The appointment of drunken idlers to positions of trust was an every-day affair in all departments not many years ago. The civil service regulations have saved the minor positions, but at the same time they have intensified the pressure on those above the classified list. It is a maxim of our politics that anybody will do for positions outside the country or where newspapers do not send their reporters. All of last year the parlors of the White House were crowded daily with friends of politicians, and the Senators forced to stand as their unwilling sponsors. Every one familiar with the facts knows that the day of appointments for merit only has not yet come to Washington. I have purposely chosen two cases from another administration. I can parallel both of these from the present one. I see in Mexico the President and his advisers using every effort to select a wise and effective successor to Matias Romero, their late accomplished and manly ambassador at Washington. They have found, at last, a man worthy of their country and ours. When we have chosen Ministers to Mexico, with one exception, Pacheco (himself a Spanish-Californian), not one of them has understood the language of the country to which he was sent. Fitness does not interest our politicians. The President at the best is almost helpless in the hands of the Congressional influence. The administration has rarely tried to rise above it. In the international commissions, belated as most of them have been, we yet see an effort to secure the best service possible. This fact we must recognize, and I do so with real satisfaction.

We may counsel together, economists and preachers; we may discuss in conventions the wise management of alien colonies; we may pass our virtuous resolutions; we may analyze the successes of the Dutch and the failures of the French, but our masters care not for our dis-

cussions and our resolutions. Even now the rough riders of our politics do not conceal their contempt of the whole business of good government. They are not in the Philippines "for their health," and our mugwump remonstrances are but as the idle wind which they regard not.

Still the deed is not accomplished. I have tried to keep up with the progress of events, but I have never heard that we have constitutionally annexed any territories since we absorbed the little nation of Hawaii.

But if annexation is our final decision, the nation must begin at once its life and death grapple with spoilsmen in high places as well as in low.

We are told that the Philippine question is bringing our best men forward, and that it therefore furnishes a needed "stimulus to higher politics." But the higher politics has not yet been shown in our official action. It appears only in the earnest protest of all classes of men who look forward to the inevitable disaster. Their warning voices are outside of politics.

Admitting, however, that somewhere or other a reason exists for taking the Philippines; admitting that we have conquered Aguinaldo somehow by gold or by sword, what shall we do with them?

Shall we hold them as vassal nations, subject to the sovereign will of Congress? Shall we make them territories, self-governing so far as may be under republican forms? Shall we devise tariffs and other statutes in their interest alone or shall we extend to them unchanged our protective tariff, our navigation laws, and our Chinese Exclusion Act, just as they stand, without modification? At this point the annexationists fall apart one from another. To hold the Philippines as a vassal nation is

Imperialism. It is the method of Great Britain and of Holland. Its justification is its success. It teaches respect for law, which is the first essential in industrial development. It holds the open door, which is the first essential to commerce.

In promoting industrial progress in the tropics we have two successful methods on record, through enforced labor and through contract labor. Neither of these is slavery, as Mr. Ireland has pointed out, but the distinction is not one worth wrangling over. Java, with law and order, perfect cultivation, fine roads and great industrial activity, the fairest garden in all the world, furnishes the highest type of industrial success. The island is one vast plantation, owned by the kingdom of Holland. The natives have lost the title to the land and cannot buy or sell it. They pay their taxes to the government in work; the labor is obligatory and the obligation is enforced by law. In such manner the people are rescued from natural indolence. There is prosperity everywhere. The state derives a large revenue, the people are relatively contented, though a stranger to the idea of freedom. With politics the native has nothing to do. Missionaries are excluded from the island and the people have only to work as they are told, and enjoy themselves as they can. "This may not be republicanism, but it is business."

This is a way to a certain prosperity in the Philippines, but with us it is not a possible way. Our temper, our traditions, our machinery of government leave no room for such despotic paternalism. Even this method has failed in other Dutch colonies. It fails with the negroes in the Dutch colony of Surinam. In the midst of the

coffee harvest the people go off to the woods for a month of devil worship. The spell comes on them, and off they go. The only recourse of the plantation owners is to bring contract labor from China or Japan. This method has failed in Sumatra, where the natives still hold out against the civilization that would make money out of their work.

Only through coolie contract labor has industrial success in any of the British West Indies been possible. The natives will not work continuously unless they are forced to work as slaves. But contract labor from the outside means the ultimate extermination of the natives themselves.

In tropical Mexico the industrial situation is not much better. The great haciendas in the sugar and coffee region, cheap as labor is (six to ten cents a day), are never sure of help when needed. Even now Señor Wollheim, Mexican Minister to Japan, is arranging for Japanese contract laborers to work the great coffee plantations of Chiapas and Tabasco. Enforced labor of the natives, contract labor from the outside—between these we must choose, if the tropics are made economically profitable. Both systems are forms of slavery, but slavery is endemic in the tropics. Freedom in the warm countries means freedom from work, but without work there is no wealth in mines or sugar.

"If the Antilles are ever to thrive," says James Anthony Froude (as quoted by Mr. Ireland), "each of them should have some trained and skilful man at its head unembarrassed by local elected assemblies . . . Let us persist in the other line, let us use the West Indian governments as asylums for average worthy persons to be pro-

vided for, and force on them black parliamentary institutions as a remedy for such persons' inefficiency, and these beautiful countries will become like Hayti, with Obeah triumphant and children offered to the devil and salted and eaten, and the conscience of mankind wakes again and the Americans sweep them all away."

Concerning Dominica, Mr. Froude says: "Find a Rajah Brooke if you can, or a Mr. Smith of Scilly . . . Send him out with no more instructions than the Knight of La Mancha gave Sancho,—to fear God and do his duty. Put him on his metal. Promise him the praise of all good men if he does well; and if he calls to his help intelligent persons who understand the cultivation of soils and the management of men, in half a score of years Dominica will be the brightest gem of the Antilles . . . The leading of the wise few, the willing obedience of the many, is the beginning and end of all right action. Secure this and you secure everything. Fail to secure this and be your liberties as wide as you can make them, no success is possible."

This ideal of Mr. Froude is not without precedent in American colonial affairs. The wonderful development of New Metlakahtla by William Duncan is the perfection of wise paternalism. Single-handed, by the sheer force of his religion and his personal character, he has changed these cannibal Indians into intelligent, sober, self-respecting, God-fearing citizens. But the element of failure lies in the almost certain collapse of his work when the strong hand of the founder is withdrawn. The rule of the Pribilof Islands is the same in theory, and under competent men, as it is to-day, it works well in practice.

But government by rulers not responsible to the people

they rule is Imperialism. It is contrary to our ways and traditions, and our newspapers and politicians alike hasten to repudiate it. It is, in fact, industrial success at the expense of political development. The alternative is to bring the Filipinos into politics, to endow them with the rights of our citizens, to give them the services of our own politicians and let natives and carpetbaggers work out their own salvation under our forms of law. I cannot imagine any government much worse than this might be, but it is safer than Imperialism, if these lands and these people become a part of our democratic nation. If we must choose, let us stick to republican forms. A folly is always better than a crime. Confusion, bankruptcy and failure probably are better in the long run than Imperialism. They are more easily cured. America has ideals in civil government and to these she must be loyal. The Union can never endure "half slave, half free," half democracy, half empire. We cannot run a republic in the West and a slave plantation in the East. We must set our bondsmen free, however unready they may be for freedom. There is no doubt that our forms of law, the evolution of ages, are ill-fitted for the needs of primitive men. Doubtless it would be better for them to work out their own destiny as we have worked out ours. But if they join us, they must take up with our fashions, because we cannot adapt ourselves to theirs.

The Anglo-Saxon is, doubtless, the grandest of races, pushing, effective, successful. But it is not the most lovable, the most considerate, nor the most just when it covets what another possesses. Many Anglo-Saxon achievements are justified only by success. "The efforts

of our Anglo-Saxon nations," says Professor Lewis G. Janes, "to civilize inferior races by force have always been tragic failures. Witness New Zealand where about 40,000 Maoris survive out of 700,000 who were there a century ago . . . It is not the testimony of history that the best survive. The strongest and ablest resist and are killed off. Those lacking in vitality who supinely submit to the inevitable are the ones who survive . . . It is the fate of all people on whom conditions of life are forced in advance of their functional development. Does the tragedy of the passing of these peoples bring any adequate compensation to the world? The sociologist and ethical teacher is compelled to say no. It brutalizes and depraves the conqueror. It perpetuates despotic methods of government. It prolongs the evil reign of militancy. It debases labor and gives rise to class distinctions.

"The Maoris, the Hawaiians, the Filipinos, the Cubans, are all more competent to rule themselves than we are to govern them, judged by any test that implies their permanent betterment and survival as a people. We have begun at the wrong end in our efforts to civilize the world . . . The path of conquest is gory with the blood of victors and victims alike."

Says Goldwin Smith: "If empire is to be regarded as a field for philanthropic effort and the advancement of civilization, it may safely be said that nothing in that way equals, or ever has equalled, the British Empire in India. For the last three-quarters of a century, at all events, the empire has steadily administered in the interest of Hindu. Yet what is the result? Two hundred millions of human sheep, without native leader-

ship, without patriotism, without aspirations, without spur to self-improvement of any kind; multiplying, too many of them, in abject poverty and infantile dependence on a government which their numbers and necessities will too probably in the end overwhelm. Great Britain has deserved and won the respect of the Hindu; but she has never won, and is now perhaps less likely than ever to win, his love. Lord Elgin sorrowfully observes that there is more of a bond between man and dog than between Englishman and Hindu. The natives generally having been disarmed cannot rise against the conqueror, and their disaffection is shown only in occasional and local outbreaks, chiefly of a religious character; or in the impotent utterances of the native press. But the part of the population which was armed, that is to say the Sepoys, did break out into what was rather an insurrection of caste than a military mutiny, and committed atrocities which were fearfully avenged by the panic fears of the dominant race. It is perilous business all round, this governing of inferior races. Nor is it true that the work is done better by the highest race than by one upon a lower level, on which it is not so impossible to sympathize or even fuse with the lowest. Some of the tribes of the Philippines are said to be as fierce as Apaches. If that is all, Uncle Sam will handle them in his accustomed style.' Is not a warning conveyed in such words? Dire experience has shown that the character of the master suffers as well as the body of the slave.

"War, the almost certain concomitant of empire, is alleged to have a more blessed effect on the internal harmony of nations. This we are told not only in the press, but even from the pulpit; some going even so far as to intimate that the restoration of national harmony was a sufficient object for this war. The moral world would be strangely out of joint if a nation could cure itself of factiousness or of an internal disorder by shedding the blood and seizing the possessions of its neighbors. War has no such virtue. The victories of the Plantagenets in France were followed by insurrections and civil wars at home, largely owing to the spirit of violence which the raids of France had excited. The victories of Chatham were followed by disgraceful scenes of cabal and faction as well as of corruption, terminating in the prostration of patriotism and the domination of George III. and North. Party animosities in the United States do not seem to have been banished or even allayed by the Cuban War. Setting party divisions aside, no restoration of harmony appeared to be needed, so far as the white population was concerned. Not only peace, but good-will, between the North and the South had been restored in a surprising degree. The Blue and the Gray had fraternized on the field of Gettysburg. It was to harmonize white and black that some kindly influence was manifestly and urgently needed. But all through the war and since the war, American papers have been almost daily recording cases of lynching, sometimes of such a character as to evince the last extremity of hatred and contempt. The negro is lymphatic, apathetic, patient of degradation and even of insult. But San Domingo saw that he had a tiger in him; and when the tiger broke loose, hell ensued. There has been at least one instance of the retaliatory lynching of a white man; and now we have a bloody battle of races at Virden.

Why should the American Commonwealth want more negroes?"

It is said that we must conquer Aguinaldo because he in turn is unable to subdue the rest of the fourteen hundred islands. We tolerate two republics in Hayti and five in Central America. What matter if two or three exist in the vast extent of the Philippine archipelago? What business is that of ours? These widescattered islands never constituted one nation and never will. The most of them were never in the hands of Spain, except in name. Outside of Luzon there are thirty-two different tribes, it is said, each a little nation of itself, each speaking a different tongue. So far from being "paralyzed by centuries of Spanish oppression" as the editor of the "Outlook" describes them, most of these wild folk have never heard of Spain. What harm if our "new-caught" vassal the Mohammedan Sultan of Sulu shall continue to rule his Mohammedan tribes in Mohammedan fashion? We must let him do it anyhow. We cannot do it any better. Why not a republic of Visayas as well as a republic of Luzon? If separate autonomy suits the people concerned why should we fight for unification? Do we believe that Spanish rule was better than freedom? These wild tribes must work out their own destiny or else go into slavery. Perhaps the latter is their manifest destiny. There is no reason why we should make it ours.

As I have said many times, the function of democracy is not to secure good government, but to strengthen the people so that they may be wise enough to make good government for themselves. The real white man's burden is not the control of delinquent and dependent races,

the turning of indolence into gold. It is the development of what is sound and sane in human nature, the elimination of war and corruption by the force of healthy manhood.

It is said that the politics of America is "insufferably parochial," its problems petty and local, and that to hold a hand in the affairs of the world is essential to the development of great men in freedom. But "insufferably parochial," the affairs of free men must ever be. The best government is that which best minds its own business. Our own affairs are always local and devoid of world-wide interest. Only through usurpation and tyranny do governmental affairs attract the fickle notice of the world at large.

Annexationists now admit that the seizure of the Philippines is a "leap in the dark." But this is not the truth. Every element in the matter is known, and well known, to every student of political science. Our excellent commission can bring us no new facts. What we do not know is which way Congress may decide to leap. Between military rule and democratic anarchy there is all the difference in the world, and the degree of our final disappointment depends on our policy as to conciliation, taxation, and the control of the civil service.

Just when shall we begin democratic rule in the Philippines? How shall we make it work with a people alien and perverse, who have no Anglo-Saxon instincts and no relation to our history? It will take some time, some say 20 years, some 500, of military discipline to prepare them to do their part as citizens of the United States, their part in governing us. Military rule is offensive and costly. The longer it endures the less fitted are the

people for civic independence. Are we ready to meet the expense? Some say that we must wait till the Anglo-Saxon is in the numerical majority. That time will never come. With every rod of Luzon soil marked by an Anglo-Saxon grave, the living Anglo-Saxons would be a hopeless minority.

"At Batavia," says Mr. Valentine, the principal city of Java, which was originally situated in the midst of a deadly swamp, the mortality was appalling, and the settlement in its early years was known as the graveyard of Europeans. Dutch records show that at Batavia, 1,119, 375 deaths occurred between the years 1730 and 1752, or in 22 years; and 87,000 soldiers and sailors died in the government hospitals between the years 1714 and 1776.

"To indicate the small percentage of whites to Malays, I mention, in passing, that at the present time the total population of the district known as the Malay Straits Settlements is probably 550,000 of whom not 4,000 are whites."

If we go further into details of control of the tropics we shall see that difficulties accumulate. When we consider a tariff policy for the Philippine Islands we find ourselves at once between the devil and the deep sea. The "open door" is the price of England's favor, or rather it is the price of the approval of England's ruling politicians. It is the price of our own commerce. A generous policy as to foreign trade is essential to any kind of prosperity. But the open door to commerce marks the doom of our protective system. It is left for Imperialism to give the death-blow to Protectionism. The open door places the veto on our schemes for

Asiatic exclusion. To open the doors of the Orient is to open our doors to Asia as well. To do or not to do is alike difficult and dangerous. The feeling that unless we can exploit the islands and ultimately exterminate their inhabitants, we do not want them at all, is growing, especially in humanitarian circles. The dead hand of monasticism already holds a great part of Luzon. This we cannot tolerate, for it was the head and front of Spanish oppression; nor by our Constitution can we remedy it. We are bound to respect the rights of property, however acquired. Our sole remedy for any ill is freedom. For these problems I see no solution, nor indeed should we hope for any. If the Administration should formulate any policy whatever, two-thirds of the expansionists would repudiate it. There is no scheme on which we can agree which can be made to work.

"Something between an American territory and a British colony," we are told, is to be their final condition. A territory is a waiting state; a colony is land held under martial law or in any other way for the good of trade. To work for something between these is to fail on every hand. As matters are, we shall fall short of Imperialism. On the other hand, we shall fail to give justice. The final result will be a hybrid military imperialistic-democratic occupation, unworthy the name of government, the laughing-stock of monarchy, the shame of democracy. Toward such a condition the movement of events is swiftly rushing us.

I note in the journals that the Secretary of the Treasury in his estimates takes no account of the revenue to be derived from Cuba and the Philippines. For this the papers justly praise his wisdom. There can be no

real revenue from these sources. The only income which any people can receive from colonies is through increase of trade. This goes into private hands, but finally swells the wealth of taxables. Since her experience in 1776, England has never taxed her colonies. The more worthless islands we undertake to conquer and rule the further are we from a favorable balance of accounts.

We now come to the final question: If we take the Philippines, what will they do to us?

If we fail, they will corrupt and weaken us. If we succeed and continue our success, they will destroy our national ideals. To rule them as a vassal nation is to abandon our democracy, to introduce into our government machinery which is not in the people's hands. Shall we handle our vassals through the President, through Congress, or through military occupation? Obviously military occupation, under the direction of the Executive, is the only possible way. Congress is too busy with other things. Paternalism degenerates into tyranny, and without the artificial stimulus of honor and titles which England so lavishly uses, tyranny becomes corruption and neglect. To admit the Filipinos to equality in government is to degrade our own citizenship with only the slightest prospect of ever raising theirs. It is to establish rotten boroughs where corruption, shall be the rule and true democracy impossible. The relation of our people to the lower races of men of whatever kind has been one which degrades and exasperates. Every alien race within our borders to-day, is an element of danger. When the Anglo-Saxon meets the Negro, the Chinaman, the Indian, the Mexican as fellow-citizens, equal before

the law, we have a raw wound in our political organism. Democracy demands likeness of aims and purposes among its units. Each citizen must hold his own freedom in a republic. If men cannot hold their rights through our methods our machinery runs over them. The Anglo-Saxon will not mix with the lower races. Neither will he respect their rights if they are not strong enough to maintain them for themselves. If they can do this they cease to be lower races.

Between Imperialism on the one hand and assimilation on the other, are all unwholesome possibilities. An efficient colonial bureau would be, as in England, an affair of the Crown, its details out of the people's hands. An inefficient one would be simply spoils in the hands of future Tammanies. Unless represented in Congress and potent in party conventions outlying possessions will be wholly neglected. When the newspaper correspondents are called home nobody cares what goes on in Cuba or Manila. We have not yet framed a code of laws for Hawaii or Alaska.

With the war in Luzon a certain class of obligations have arisen. These should be met in manly fashion. But the final result should not be a Philippine State, which shall rule itself and help rule us. Still less do we want an oligarchy of sugar syndicates, or a rule by military force, or a carpet-bag anarchy like that which once desolated the South, nor the equal corruption of rule under agents and pro-consuls sent out from Washington. These alternatives are all abhorrent, and we see no other save that of chronic hopeless guerilla warfare, the condition in Luzon to-day, unless we recognize Philippine independence. This has its embarrassments, too, but

they are honorable ones and can leave no disgrace or regret.

The establishment of a protectorate over the independent Philippines has many difficulties. It is on the one hand a scheme for finally seizing the islands, on the other a device to let them go easily. If we assume unasked responsibilities for them, they will be reckless in making trouble. A protected republic is the acme of irresponsibility. Its politicians may declare war against neutral nations, solely "to see the wheels go round." As matters now stand, however, we have no other course before us, and the blunders in dealing with Aguinaldo have made this course not easy. The protectorate is favored by the best judgment of the Filipinos themselves. They ask the help and sympathy of America.

Ramon Reyes Lala, a full-blooded Filipino, born in Luzon, but educated in England, an American citizen, of standing in New York, is quoted as saying:

"Although I believe we have a great future, I cannot disguise to myself the fact that we are not yet ready for independence. More especially because the Filipinos have not had the preparation for self-government possessed by the founders of the American Republic. And I apprehend that, intoxicated with their new-found liberty, the Filipinos might perpetrate excesses that would prove fatal to the race. I feel this all the more when I consider that the revolutionary leaders, Aguinaldo and his companions, though fervent patriots, do not represent the best classes of my countrymen, who, almost without exception, are for a protectorate, or for annexation.

"And it is this that I, too, a Filipino, desire most ardently. Give us an American protectorate; a terri-

/ torial government; the judiciary, the customs, and the executive in the hands of Federal officials; the interior and domestic administration in the hands of the Filipinos themselves; and their self-selected officials will rule understandingly and well without friction, which would be wholly impossible for alien functionaries begotten of a Western civilization.

"Of you, Americans, I, a Filipino, therefore, beg to not leave my countrymen as you found them! You cannot, in humanity, give them back into Spanish bondage. You cannot, in justice, sell them to some European power to become subject, most likely, to another tyranny. They feel that they have fought for and won their own freedom, though acknowledging that you have facilitated it. They would, therefore, oppose such disposition to the bitter death. And a Filipino knows how to die! Let a thousand martyrs attest!

"You must help them, you who have so nobly assisted in freeing them; you must make it possible for them to attain their destiny—the realization of the national self."

The following words of Mr. Clay McCauley, are worthy of careful consideration in this connection: "As a result of a study of the situation at Manila, I think there are only three ways open to the United States for the solution of the Philippines problem. In the first place the islands must be annexed by force or purchase. The use of force means that the United States will be plunged into the most disastrous foreign war in their history, a war that would entail great loss of life and treasure and the violation of national honor. Purchase means the recognition of the

insurgents as allies during the war with Spain, the reward of the leaders with high office and salaries, the employment of insurgents in military and civil offices, with back pay as allies for some months, etc. Such purchase would secure a compromising gain of doubtful tenure.

"Generally speaking, the Americans in Manila are opposed to annexation in any form. The second way open is to make a complete transfer of the sovereignty in these islands from Spain to the Philippine Republic, the United States retaining for its own use Manila bay and ports-like Hong Kong by Great Britain. This solution means the defenseless exposure of the Philippine Islands to the greed of the world's powers, with a consequent acute crisis in Europe over its far eastern question. This way is neither honorable nor wise. The third is to recognize the autonomy of the Philippines under an American protectorate. This means independence for the Philippine Republic in the administration of its own internal affairs, the United States taking charge of the supreme judiciary and the republic's foreign relations, such as the power to declare war or to enter into treaties with foreign powers and the control of the customs. This solution might bring about tutelage toward absolute independence in the future or voluntary annexation to the United States. Only by the third way can there be peace and prosperity for both the United States and the Philippines. Immediate action is imperative."

As to our true policy of to day I give the fullest indorsement to the sane words of Professor Janes, in substance as follows:

- r. Let us carry out the solemn pledge made to the world with respect to Cuba, and retain military possession only long enough to enable the Cubans to organize a government of their own. We have no right to insist that our own, or any particular form of government, shall be adopted by the Cubans, or to impose qualifications of citizenship upon them.
- 2. The same rule should be adopted in regard to Porto Rico.
- 3. This government should acquire no inhabited country which cannot be made self-governing under our forms and ultimately received into the family of States. If, in the future, the people of Cuba and Porto Rico agree with those of the United States that annexation is mutually desirable, the matter can be decided, and in accordance with the provisions of their constitution and ours.
- 4. Our policy in the Philippines should be exactly the same. Let the people fit their government to their own needs with the guarantee of our protection from outside interference for a time, at least.
- 5. Under no circumstances should distant territory inhabited by an alien population, not self-governing under republican forms, be retained as a permanent possession by the United States.

The immediate necessity of the day is set forth in the petition of the "Anti-Imperialist League:" \*

\* This petition is signed by the following persons:

George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts. George F. Edmunds, of Vermont, John Sherman, of Ohio. Donelson Caffery, of Louisiana. "They urge, therefore, all lovers of freedom, without regard to party associations, to co-operate with them to the following ends:

"First. That our government shall take immediate steps towards a suspension of hostilities in the Philippines and a conference with the Philippine leaders, with a view of preventing further bloodshed upon the basis of a recognition of their freedom and independence as soon as proper guarantees can be had of order and protection to property.

"Second. That the Congress of the United States

W. Bourke Cockran, of New York. William H. Fleming, of Georgia. Henry U. Johnson, of Indiana. Samuel Gompers, of Washington. Felix Adler, of New York. David Starr Jordan, of California. Winslow Warren, of Massachusetts. Herbert Welsh, of Pennsylvania. Leonard Woolsey Bacon, of Connecticut. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts. Samuel Bowles, of Massachusetts. I. J. McGinity, of Cornell University. Edward Atkinson, of Massachusetts. Carl Schurz, of New York. Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland. Herrmann von Holst, of Chicago University, Moorfield Storey, of Massachusetts. Patrick A. Collins, of Massachusetts. Theodore L. Cuyler, of New York. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, of Massachusetts. Andrew Carnegie, of New York. John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky. Charles Eliot Norton, of Harvard University. W. G. Sumner, of Yale University. C. H. Parkhurst, of New York.

shall tender an official assurance to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that they will encourage and assist in the organization of such a government in the islands as the people thereof shall prefer, and that upon its organization in stable manner the United States, in accordance with its traditional and prescriptive policy in such cases, will recognize the independence of the Philippines and its equality among nations, and gradually withdraw all military and naval forces."

There is nothing before us now save to make peace with the Filipinos, to get our money back if we can, to get a coaling station if we must—and get out. These people must first be free before they can enter a nation of freemen.

As to details, it rests with those who have the power to act to lay out a plan of action. It is useless for the plain citizen to urge or suggest anything, for there is no possible line of conduct not fraught with serious difficulties, and none which does not demand the highest order of statesmanship. The worst possible line of conduct is to let matters drift along the current of destiny, in the hope that some easy solution may develop. To postpone action on vital questions may be good politics but it is bad statesmanship. The handling of affairs like this demands indeed the services of "the best ye breed," not as soldiers but as doers of deeds.

I may quote in this connection the noble words of Carl Schurz:

"We are told that, having grown so great and strong, we must at least cast off our childish reverence for the teachings of Washington's farewell address—'nursery rhymes that were sung around the cradle of the republic.' I apprehend that many of

those who now so flippantly scoff at the heritage the Father of his Country left us in his last words of admonition, have never read that venerable document. I challenge those who have to show me a single sentence of general import in it that would not as a wise rule of national conduct apply to the circumstances of to-day. What is it that has given to Washington's farewell address an authority that was revered by all until our recent victories made so many of us drunk with wild ambitions? Not alone the prestige of Washington's name, great as that was and should ever remain. No, it was the fact that under a respectful observance of those teachings this Republic has grown from the most modest beginnings into a Union spanning this vast continent, our people having multiplied from a handful to 75,000,000; we have risen from poverty to a wealth the sum of which the imagination can hardly grasp; this American nation has become one of the greatest and most powerful on earth, and, continuing in the same course, will surely become the greatest and most powerful of all. Not Washington's name alone gave his teachings their dignity and weight; it was the practical results of his policy that secured to it, until now, the intelligent approbation of the American people. And unless we have completely lost our senses, we shall never despise and reject as mere 'nursery rhymes' the words of wisdom left us by the greatest of Americans, following which the American people have achieved a splendor of development without parallel in the history of mankind."

The grave responsibility we have assumed, that of bringing freedom to the oppressed, calls us to act with conscience and with caution. We are no longer a child nation, a band of irresponsible human colts, but mature men, capable of wielding the strongest influence humanity has felt. We must shun folly. We must despise greed. We must turn from glitter and cant and sham. We must hate injustice as we have hated intolerance and oppression. We must never forget among the nations we alone stand for the individual man.

The greatness of a nation lies not in its bigness but in its justice, in the wisdom and virtue of its people, and in the prosperity of their individual affairs. The nation exists for its men, never the men for the nation. At the end of our Civil War, in 1865, it was feared that by the compromise of reconstruction the principle of inequality before the law would be again engrafted on our polity. It was then that Lowell put these memorable words into the mouth of his Yankee patriot, Hosea Biglow:

I seem to hear a whisperin' in the air,
A sighin', like, of unconsoled despair,
Thet comes from nowhere an' from everywhere,
An' seems to say, "Why died we? warn't it, then,
To settle, once for all, thet MEN WUZ MEN?
Oh, airth's sweet cup snetched from us barely tasted,
The grave's real chill is feelin' life wuz wasted!
Oh, you we lef', long-lingerin' et the door,
Lovin' you best, coz we loved Her the more,
Thet Death, not we, had conquered, we should feel
Ef she upon our memory turned her heel,
An' unregretful throwed us all away
To flaunt it in a BLIND MAN'S HOLIDAY!"



## IV. COLONIAL LESSONS OF ALASKA.



## IV.

## COLONIAL LESSONS OF ALASKA.\*

"And there's never a law of God or man runs north of Fifty-Three."

KIPLING.

The United States is about to enter on an experience which the London Speaker cleverly describes as "compulsory imperialism." Wisely or not, willingly or not, we have assumed duties toward alien races which can be honorably discharged only by methods foreign to our past experience. In the interests of humanity, our armies have entered the mismanaged territories of Spain. The interests of humanity demand that our influence should not be withdrawn and the duties we have hastily assumed cannot be discharged within a single generation.

For an object lesson illustrating methods to be avoided in the rule of future colonies we have not far to seek. Most forms of governmental pathology are exemplified in the history of Alaska. From this history it is my purpose to draw certain lessons which may be useful in our future colonial experience.

Thirty years ago (1867) the United States purchased

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from Russia the vast territory of Alaska, rich in native resources, furs, fish, lumber, and gold, thinly populated with half-civilized tribes from whose consent no government could "derive just powers" nor any other. In the nature of things, the region as a whole must be incapable of taking care of itself, in the ordinary sense in which states, counties, and cities in the United States look after their own affairs. The town-meeting idea on which our democracy is organized could have no application in Alaska, for Alaska is not a region of homes and householders. The widely separated villages and posts have few interests in common. The settlements are scattered along a wild coast, inaccessible one to another; most of the natives are subject to an alien priesthood, the white men knowing "no law of God nor man." With these elements, a civic feeling akin to the civic life in the United States can in no way be built up.

It is a common saying among Americans in the north that "they are not in Alaska for their health." They are there for the money to be made, and for that only; caring no more for the country than a fisherman cares for a discarded oyster-shell. Of the few thousand who were employed there before the mining excitement began, probably more than half returned to San Francisco in the winter. Their relation to the territory was and is commercial only, and not civil.

Alaska has an area nearly one fifth as large as the rest of the United States, and a coast line as long as all the rest. Outside the gold fields the permanent white population is practically confined to the coast, and only in two villages, Juneau and Sitka, can homes in the American sense be said to exist. Even these towns, rela-

tively large and near together, are two days' journey apart, with communication, as a rule, once a week.

When Alaska came into our hands, we found there a native population of about 32,000. Of these, about 12,000—Thlinkits, Tinnehs, Hydas, etc.—are more or less properly called Indians. Of the rest, about 18,000—Innuits, or Eskimos, and some 2500 Aleuts—are allied rather to the Mongolian races of Asia. There were about 2000 Russian Creoles and half-breeds living with the Aleuts and Innuits, and in general constituting a ruling class among them, besides a few Americans, mostly traders and miners.

Then, as now, the natives in Alaska were gentle and childlike; some of them with a surface civilization, others living in squalid fashion in filthy sod houses. They all supported themselves mainly by hunting and fishing. Dried salt salmon, or ukl was the chief article of diet, and the luxuries, which as time went on became necessities of civilization,—flour, tea, sugar, and tobacco,—were purchased by the sale of valuable furs, especially those of the sea otter and the blue fox. The Greek Church, in return for its ministrations, received, as a rule, one skin in every nine taken by the hunters. The boats of the natives outside the timbered region of southeastern Alaska were made of the skin of the gray sea lion, which had its rookeries at intervals along the coast. With the advent of Americans the sea lion became rare in southern Alaska, great numbers being wantonly shot because they were "big game;" and the natives in the Aleutian region were forced to secure sea lion skins by barter with the tribes living farther to the north. This process was facilitated by the Alaska Commercial Company, which maintained its trading-posts along the coast, exchanging for furs, walrus tusks, and native baskets the articles needed or craved by the natives.

Of all articles held by the latter for exchange, the fur of the sea otter was by far the most important. Since these animals were abundant throughout the Aleutian region thirty years ago, and the furs were valued at from \$300 to \$1,000 each, their hunters became relatively wealthy, and the little Aleut villages became abodes of comparative comfort. In the settlement of Belkofski, on the peninsula of Alaska, numbering 165 persons all told, I found in the Greek Church a communion service of solid gold, and over the altar was a beautiful painting,—small in size but exquisitely finished, -which had been bought in St. Petersburg for \$250. When these articles were purchased, Belkofski was a center for the sea otter chase. With wise government, this condition of prosperity might have continued indefinitely. But we have allowed the sea otter herd to be wasted. The people of Belkofski can now secure nothing which the world cares to buy. As they have no means of buying, the company has closed its trading post, after a year or two of losses and charity. The people have become dependent on the dress and food of civilization. Suffering for want of sugar, flour, tobacco, and tea, which are now necessities, and having no way of securing material for boats, they are abjectly helpless. I was told in 1897 that the people of Wosnessenski Island were starving to death, and that Belkofski, the next to starve, had sent them a relief expedition. I have no information as to conditions in 1898, but certainly starvation is imminent in all the various settle-

ments dependent on the company's store and on the sea otter.\* Some time ago it was reported that at Port Etches the native population was already huddled together in the single cellar of an abandoned warehouse, and that other villages to the eastward were scarcely better housed. However this may be, starvation is inevitable along the whole line of the southwestern coast. From Prince William's Sound to Attu, a distance of nearly 1,800 miles, there is not a village (except Unalaska and Unga †) where the people have any sure means of support. These people, 1,165 in number, have no present outlook save extermination. For permitting them to face such a doom we have not even the excuse we have had for destroying the Indians. We want neither the land nor the property of the Aleuts. When their tribes shall have disappeared, their islands are likely to remain desolate forever.

The case of the sea otter merits further examination. The animal itself is of the size of a large dog, with long full gray fur, highly valued especially in Russia, where it

<sup>\*</sup> In 1897, the trading posts of Akutan, Sannak, Morjovi, Wosnessenski, Belkofski, Chernofski, Kashega, Makushin, and Bjorka were abandoned by the Alaska Commercial Company, while the stores at Atka and Attu were turned over to a former agent.

<sup>†</sup> In Unga the Aleuts find work in the gold mines, at Unalaska in the lading of vessels. Very lately extensive shipyards have been established at Unalaska, and natives from the various settlements in the Aleutian Islands, from Akutan to Attu, are temporarily employed there. It has been found necessary to build vessels destined for the Yukon river at some port in Bering Sea, as none of those constructed to the southward have survived the rough seas of the North Pacific. But this shipbuilding industry must be of very short duration.

was once an indispensable part of the uniform of the army officer. The sea otters wander in pairs, or sometimes in herds of from twenty to thirty, spending most of their time in the sea. They are shy and swift, and when their haunts on land are once disturbed they rarely return to them. Any foreign odor—as the smell of man, or of fire, or of smoke—is very distasteful to them. Of late years the sea otters have seldom come on shore anywhere, as the whole coast of Alaska has been made offensive to them. The single young is born in the kelp, and the mother carries it around in her arms like a babe.

In the old days the Indians killed the otters with spears. When one was discovered in the open sea, the canoes closed upon it, and the hunters made wild noises and incantations. To the Indian who actually killed it the prize was awarded; the others who assisted in "rounding up" the animal, getting nothing. In case of several wounds, the hunter whose spear was nearest the snout was regarded as the killer. This was a device of the priests to lead the Indians to strike for the head, so as not to tear the skin of the body.

Originally, the sea otter hunt was permitted to natives only. By their methods there were never enough taken seriously to check the increase of the species. The Aleut who had obtained one skin was generally satisfied for the year. If he found none after a short hunt, the "sick tum-tum" or "squaw-heart" would lead him to give up the chase.

Next appeared the "squaw-man" as a factor in the otter chase. The squaw-man is a white man who marries into a tribe to secure the native's privileges. These

squaw-men were more persistent hunters than the natives, and they brought about the general use of rifles instead of spears. A larger quantity of skins was taken under these conditions, but the numbers of sea otters were not appreciably reduced.

The success of squaw-men in this and other enterprises aroused the envy of white men less favorably placed. A law was passed by Congress depriving native tribes of all privileges not shared by white men. This opened the sea otter hunt to all men, and thus forced the commercial companies, against their will, to enter on a general campaign of destruction.

Schooners were now equipped for the sea otter hunt, each one carrying about twenty Indian canoes, either skin canoes or wooden dugouts, with the proper crew. Arrived at the Aleutian sea otter grounds, a schooner would scatter the canoes so as to cover about sixty square miles of sea. It would then come to anchor, and its canoes would patrol the water, thus securing every sea otter within the distance covered. Then a station further on would be taken and the work continued. In this way, in 1895, 1896, and 1897, every foot of probable sea otter ground was examined. At the end of the season of 1897 only a few hundred sea otters were left, most of them about the Sannak Islands, while a small number of wanderers were scattered along remote coasts. Of these, two were taken off Año Nuevo Island, California, and two were seen at Point Sur. One, caught alive on land, was allowed to escape, its captor not knowing its value. One was taken in 1896 on St. Paul, one of the Pribilof islands, and one in 1897 on St. George, another of the same group.

The statistics of the sea otter catch have been carefully compiled by Captain Calvin L. Hooper, commander of the Bering Sea patrol fleet, a man to whom the people of Alaska owe a lasting debt of gratitude. These show that in the earliest years of American occupation upwards of 2,500 skins were taken annually by canoes going out from the shore, and this without apparent diminution of the herd. Later, with the use of schooners, this number was increased, reaching a maximum of 4,152 in 1885. Although the number of schooners continued to increase, the total catch fell off in 1896 to 724, these being divided among more than 40 schooners, with nearly 800 canoes. Very many of the hunters thus obtained no skins at all.

At the earnest solicitation of Captain Hooper, this wanton waste was finally checked in 1898. By an order of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gage, all sea otter hunting, whether by white men or by natives, was limited to the original Indian methods. In this chase, no one is now allowed "the use of any boat or vessel other than the ordinary two-hatch skin-covered bidarka or the open Yakutat canoe."

This simple regulation will prevent any further waste. Had it been adopted two years ago, it would have saved \$500,000 a year to the resources of Alaska, besides perhaps the lives of a thousand people, who must now starve unless fed by the government,—a tardy paternalism which is the first step toward extermination. The loss of self-dependence and of self-respect which government support entails is as surely destructive to the race as starvation itself.

Our courts have decided that the Aleuts are American

citizens, their former nominal status under Russian law being retained after annexation by the United States. But citizenship can avail nothing unless their means of support is guarded by the government. They have no power to protect themselves. They can have no representatives in Congress. A delegate from Alaska, even if such an official existed, would represent interests wholly different from theirs. They cannot repel encroachments by force of arms, nor indeed have they any clear idea of the causes of their misery, for they have cheerfully taken part in their own undoing. In such case, the only good government possible is an enlightened paternalism. This will be expensive, for otherwise it will be merely farcical. If we are not prepared to give such government to our dependencies, we should cede them to some power that is ready to meet the demands. Nothing can be more demoralizing than the forms of democracy, when actual self-government is impossible.

In general, the waste and confusion in Alaska arise from four sources,—lack of centralization of power and authority, lack of scientific knowledge, lack of personal and public interest, and the use of offices as political patronage.

In the first place, no single person or bureau is responsible for Alaska. The Treasury Department looks after the charting and the patrol of its coasts, the care of its animal life, the prohibition of intoxicating liquors, and the control of the fishing industries. The investigation of its fisheries and marine animals is the duty of the United States Fish Commission. The army has certain ill-defined duties, which have been worked out mainly in a futile and needless relief expedition, with an

opera bouffe accompaniment of dehorned reindeer. The legal proceedings, within the territory are governed by the statutes of Oregon, unless otherwise ordered. The Department of Justice has a few representatives scattered over the vast territory, whose duty it is to enforce these statutes, chiefly through the farce of jury trials. The land in general is under control of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau of Education has an agent in charge of certain schools, while the President of the United States finds his representative in his appointee, the governor of the territory. The office of governor carries large duties and small powers. There are many interests under the governor's supervision, but he can do little more than to serve as a means of communication between some of them and Washington. It is to be remembered that Alaska is a great domain in itself, and, considering means of transportation, Sitka, the capital, is much further from Attu or Point Barrow than it is from Washington.

The virtual ruler of Alaska is the Secretary of the Treasury. But in his hands, however excellent his intentions, good government is in large degree unattainable for lack of power. Important matters must await the decision of Congress. The wisest plans fail for want of force to carry them out. The right man to go on difficult errands is not at hand, or, if he is, there is no means to send him. In the division of labor which is necessary in great departments of government, the affairs of Alaska, with those of the customs service elsewhere, are assigned to one of the assistant secretaries. Of his duties Alaskan affairs form but a very small part, and this part is often assigned to one of the subordinate clerks.

One of the assistant secretaries, Mr. Charles Sumner Hamlin, visited Alaska in 1894, in order to secure a clear idea of his duties. This visit was a matter of great moment to the territory, for the knowledge thus obtained brought wisdom out of confusion, and gave promise of better management in the future.

To this division of responsibility and confusion of authority, with the consequent paralysis of effort, must be added the lack of trustworthy information at Washington. Some most admirable scientific work has been done in Alaska under the auspices of the national government, notably by the United States Coast Survey, the United States Fish Commission, and the United States Revenue Service. But professional lobbyists often have posed as authorities in Alaskan affairs. Other witnesses have been intent on personal or corporation interests, while still another class has drawn the long-bow on general principles. Such testimony has tended to confuse the minds of officials, who have come to regard Alaska chiefly as a departmental bugbear.

Important as the fur seal question has become, its subject matter received no adequate scientific investigation until 1896 and 1897. Vast as are the salmon interests, such investigation on lines broad enough to yield useful results is yet to be made. The sole good work on the sea otter is that of a revenue officer whose time was fully occupied by affairs of a very different kind.

Thus it has come to pass that Alaskan interests have suffered alike from official credulity and official skepticism. Matters of real importance have been shelved, in the fear that in some way or other the great commercial companies would profit by them. At other times



the word of these same corporations has been law, when the department might well have asserted its independence. The interest of these corporations is in general that of the government, because they cannot wish to destroy the basis of their own prosperity. To protect them in their rights is to prevent their encroachments. These facts have been often obscured by the attacks of lobbyists and blackmailers. On the other hand, in minor matters the interests of the government and the companies may be in opposition, and this fact has been often obscured by prejudiced testimony.

Another source of difficulty is the lack of interest in distant affairs which have no relation to personal or partisan politics. The most vital legislation in regard to Alaska may fail of passage, because no Congressman concerns himself in it. Alaska has no vote in any convention or election, no delegate to be placated, and can give no assistance in legislative log-rolling. In a large degree, our legislation at Washington is a scramble for the division of public funds among the different congressional districts. In this Alaska has no part. She is not a district filled with eager constituents who clamor for new postoffices, custom-offices, or improved channels and harbors. She is only a colony, or rather a chain of little colonies; and a colony, to Americans as to Spaniards, has been in this case merely a means of revenue, a region to be exploited.

Finally, the demands of the spoils system have often sent unfit men to Alaska. The duties of these officials are delicate and difficult, requiring special knowledge as well as physical endurance. Considerable experience in the north, also, is necessary for success. When positions

of this kind are given as rewards for partisan service, the men receiving them feel themselves underpaid. The political "war-horse," who has borne the brunt of the fray in some great convention, feels himself "shelved" if sent to the north to hunt for salmon-traps, or to look after the interests of half-civilized people, most of whom cannot speak a word of English. A few \* of these men have been utterly unworthy, intemperate and immoral, and occasionally one, in his stay in Alaska, earns that "perfect right to be hung" which John Brown assigned to the "border ruffian." On the other hand, a goodly number of these political appointees, in American fashion, have made the best of circumstances, and by dint of native sense and energy have made good their lack of special training. The extension of the classified civil service has raised the grade of these as of other governmental appointments. The principles of civil service reform are in the highest degree vital in the management of colonies.

As an illustration of official ineffectiveness in Alaska, I may take the control of the salmon rivers by means of a body of "inspectors." In a joint letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in 1897, Captain Hooper and I used the following language:—

"At present this work is virtually ineffective for the following reasons: The appointees in general have been men who know little or nothing of the problems involved, which demand expert knowledge of salmon, their kinds and habits, the methods of fishing, and the conditions

<sup>\*</sup>According to Governor Brady, himself a competent and honest man, eleven per cent. of the government officers in Alaska are now under indictment for official malfeasance.

and peculiarities of Alaska. For effective work, special knowledge is requisite, as well as general intelligence and integrity. These men are largely dependent upon the courtesy of the packing companies for their knowledge of the salmon, for their knowledge of fishing methods, for all transportation and sustenance (except in southeastern Alaska), and for all assistance in enforcing the law. The inspectors cannot go from place to place at need, and so spend much of their time in enforced inaction. They have no authority to remove obstructions or to enforce the law in case of its violation. For this reason, their recommendations largely pass unheeded.

"To remedy these conditions, provision should be made for the appointment only of men of scientific or practical training, thoroughly familiar with fishes or fishery methods, or both, and capable of finding out the truth in any matter requiring investigation. For such purposes, expert service is as necessary as it would be in bank inspection or in any similar specialized work. The department should provide suitable transportation facilities for its inspectors. It should be possible for them to visit at will any of the canneries or salmon rivers under their charge. They should be provided with means to pay for expenses of travel and sustenance, and should receive no financial courtesies from the packing companies, or be dependent upon them for assistance in carrying on their work. The inspectors should be instructed to remove and destroy all obstructions found in the rivers in violation of law. They should have large powers of action and discretion, and they should have at hand such means as is necessary to carry out their purposes."

Under present conditions, the newly appointed inspector, knowing nothing of Alaska, and still less of the salmon industry, is landed at some cannery by a revenue He becomes the guest of the superintendent of the cannery, who treats him with politeness, and meets his ignorance with ready information. All his movements are dependent upon the courtesy of the canners. He has no boat of his own, no force of assistants, no power to do anything. He cannot walk from place to place in the tall, wet rye-grass, and he cannot even cross the river without a borrowed boat. All his knowledge of the business comes from the superintendent. If he discovers infraction of law, it is because he is allowed to do so, and he receives a valid excuse for it. It is only by the consent of the law-breaker that the infraction can be punished. The law-breaker is usually courteous enough in this regard; for his own interests would be subserved by the general enforcement of reasonable laws. The most frequent violation of law is the building of a dam across the salmon river just above the neutral tide water where the fish gather as if to play, before ascending the stream to spawn. Such a dam, if permanent, prevents any fish from running, and thus shuts off all future increase. Meanwhile, by means of nets, all the waiting fish can be captured. This is forbidden by law, which restricts the use of nets to the sea beaches. dams exist to-day in almost every salmon river in Alaska; even in those of that most rigidly law-abiding of communities, New Metlakahtla, on Annette Island. The lawlessness of the few forces lawlessness on all.

All that the inspector can do in the name of the government is to order the destruction of an unlawful dam.

He has no power to destroy it; and if he had, he must borrow a boat from the company and do it himself. Then, in the evening, as he sits at the dinner table, the guest of the offending superintendent, he can tell the tale of his exploits.

The general relation of the salmon interests to law deserves a moment's notice. Most of the streams of southern and southwestern Alaska are short and broad, coming down from mountain lakes, swollen in summer by melting snows. The common red salmon, which is the most abundant of the five species of Alaska, runs up the streams in thousands to spawn in the lakes in July and August. One of these rivers, the Karluk, on the island of Kadiak, is perhaps the finest salmon stream in the world, having been formerly almost solidly full of salmon in the breeding season. The conditions on Karluk River may serve as fairly typical. A few salmon are smoked or salted, but most of them are put up in one-pound tins or cans, as usually seen in commerce. This work of preservation is carried on in large establishments called canneries. One of these factories was early built at Karluk, on a sand-spit at the mouth of the river. All Alaska is government land. The cannery companies are therefore squatters, practically without claim, without rights and without responsibilities. The seining-ground on this sand-spit of Karluk is doubtless the best fishing-ground in Alaska. The law provided that no fish should be taken on Saturday, that no dams or traps should be used, that no nets should be placed in the river, and no net set within one hundred feet of a net already placed. This last clause is the sole hold that any cannery has on the fishing-ground where it is situated. Soon other factories

were opened on the beach at Karluk by other persons, and each newcomer claimed the right to use the seine along the spit. This made it necessary for the first company to run seines day and night, in order to hold the ground, keeping up the work constantly, whether the fish could be used or not. At times many fish so taken have been wasted; at other times the surplus has been shipped across to the cannery of Chignik, on the mainland. Should the nets be withdrawn for an hour, some rival would secure the fishing-ground, and the first company would be driven off, because they must not approach within a hundred feet of the outermost net. With overfishing of this sort the product of Karluk River fell away rapidly. Some understanding was necessary. The stronger companies formed a trust, and bought out or "froze out" the lesser ones and the canneries at Karluk fell into the hands of a single association. All but two of them were closed, that the others might have full work. Under present conditions, Alaska has more than twice as many canneries as can be operated. Some of these were perhaps built only to be sold to competitors, but others have entailed losses both on their owners and on their rivals.

Meanwhile, salmon became scarce in other rivers, and canners at a distance began to cast greedy eyes on Karluk. In 1897 a steamer belonging to another great "trust" invaded Karluk, claiming equal legal right in its fisheries. This claim was resisted by the people in possession,—legally by covering the beach with nets, illegally by threats and interference. More than once the heights above Karluk have been fortified; for to the "north of Fifty-three" injunctions are laid with the rifle. On the

other hand, "Scar-Faced Charley" of Prince William's Sound and his reckless associates stood ready to do battle for their company. In one of the disputes a small steamer sailed over a net, cast anchor within it, then steamed ahead, dragged the anchor, and tore the net to pieces. In another case, a large steamer anchored within the fishing-grounds. The rival company cast a net around her, and would have wrecked her on the beach. The claim for damages to the propeller from the nets, with the more important claim that the fishermen of the company were prevented by armed force from casting their nets, brought this case into the United States courts. Fear of scandal, and consequent injury to the company's interests in the east, is doubtless the chief reason why these collisions do not lead to open warfare. The difficulty in general is not due to the lawlessness of the companies, nor to any desire to destroy the industry by which they live. Our government makes it impossible for them to be law-abiding. grants them no rights and no protection, and exacts of them no duties. In short, it exercises toward them in adequate degree none of the normal functions of government. What should be done is plain enough. The rivers are government property, and should be leased on equitable terms to the canning companies, who should be held to these terms and at the same time protected in their rights. But Congress, which cannot attend to two things at once, is too busy with other affairs to pay attention to this. The utter ruin of the salmon industry in Alaska is therefore a matter of a short time. Fortunately, however, unlike the sea otter, the salmon cannot be exterminated, and a few years of salmon-hatching,

or even of mere neglect, will bring the industry up again.

It may be urged that much the same condition of lawlessness exists in Oregon at the mouth of Rogue River. But the real condition is very different. On Kadiak the sole remedy rests with Congress. The people interested are helpless. But in Oregon, the remedy rests with the people and with them alone. If the people of Curry County or of the State of Oregon as a whole prefer law and order, the machinery adequate to bring it is in their own hands.

Of the marine interests of Alaska, the catch of the fur seal is by far the most important, and its details are best known to the public. Whenever the fur seal question promises to lead to international dispute, the public pricks up its ears; but this interest dies away when the blood ceases to "boil" against England. The history of this industry is more creditable to the United States than that of the sea otter and the salmon, but it is not one to be proud of. When the Pribilof Islands came into our possession, in 1867, we found the fur seal industry already admirably managed. A company had leased the right to kill a certain number of superfluous males every year, under conditions which thoroughly protected the herd. This arrangement was continued by us, and is still in operation. If not the best conceivable disposition of the herd, it was the best possible at the time; and to do the best possible is all that good government demands.

We were, however, criminally slow in taking possession of the islands after their purchase from Russia. In 1868, about 250,000 skins of young males (worth per-

haps \$2,000,000), the property of the government, were openly stolen by enterprising poachers from San Francisco. As only superfluous males were taken, this onslaught caused no injury to the herd. It was simply the conversion to private uses of so much public property, or just plain stealing. After 1868 the Pribilof Islands yielded a regular annual quota of 100,000 skins for twenty years, when "pelagic sealing," or the killing of females at sea, rapidly cut down the breeding herd. This suicidal "industry" originated in the United States; but adverse public opinion and adverse statutes finally drove it from our ports, and it was centered at Victoria, where, as this is written, it awaits its coup de grâce from the Quebec commission of 1898.

During the continuance of this monstrous business,\* the breeding herd of the Pribilof Islands was reduced from about 650,000, females (in 1868-84) to 130,000 (in 1897). It is not fair to charge the partial extinction of this most important of fur-bearing animals to our bad government of Alaska, inasmuch as it was accomplished by foreign hands against our constant protest. Yet in a large sense this was our own fault, for the lack of exact and unquestioned knowledge has been our most notable weakness in dealing with Great Britain in this matter. The failure to establish as facts the ordinary details of the life of the fur seal caused the loss of our case before the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration. Guesswork, however

<sup>\*</sup> Monstrous in an economic sense, because grossly and needlessly wasteful; monstrous in a moral sense because grossly and needlessly cruel; withal perfectly legal, because not yet condemned by any international agreement in which Great Britain has taken part.

well intended, was met by the British with impudent assertion. British diplomacy is disdainful of mere opinion, though it has a certain respect for proved fact. Moreover, it was only after a long struggle that our own people were prevented (in 1898) from doing the very thing which was the basis of our just complaint against Great Britain.

The other interests of Alaska I need not discuss here in detail. The recent discovery of vast gold fields in this region has brought new problems, which Congress has made little effort to meet. If we may trust the newspapers, our colonial postal system is absurdly inadequate, and the administration of justice remains local or casual. The Klondike adventurers make their own laws as they go along, with little responsibility to the central government. Lynch law may be fairly good law in a region whence criminals can escape only to starve or to freeze; but martial law is better, and the best available when the methods of the common-law are out of the question.

The real criminals of Alaska have been the "wild-cat" transportation companies which sprang up like mushrooms with the rush for the Klondike. There are three or four well-established companies running steamers to Alaska, well-built, well-manned, and destined to ports which really exist. But besides the legitimate business there has been a great amount of wicked fraud. A very large percentage of the Klondike adventurers know nothing of mining, nothing of Alaska, little of the sea, and little of hardship. These people have been gathered from all parts of the country, and sent through foggy, rock-bound channels and ferocious seas, in vessels unsea-

worthy and with incompetent pilots, their destination often the foot of some impossible trail leading only to death. I notice in one circular that a graded railroad bed is shown on the map, through the tremendous icefilled gorges of Copper River, a wild stream of the mountains, in which few have found gold and from whose awful glaciers few have returned alive. In the height of the Klondike season of 1898, scarcely a day passed without a shipwreck somewhere along the coast, -some vessel foundering on a rock of the Alaskan archipelago or swamped in the open sea. Doubtless most of the sufferers in these calamities had no business in Alaska. Doubtless they should have known better than to risk life and equipment in ships and with men so grossly unfit. But the public in civilized lands is accustomed to trust something to government inspection. The common man has not learned how ships may be sent out to be wrecked for the insurance. In established communities good government would have checked this whole experience of fraud; but in this case no one seemed to have power or responsibility, and the affair was allowed to run its own course. The "wild-cat" lines have now mostly failed, for the extent of the Klondike traffic is far less than was expected, and the Alaska promoter plies his trade of obtaining money under false pretenses in some other quarter.

The control of the childlike native tribes of Alaska offers many anomalies. As citizens of the United States, living in American territory, they are entitled to the protection of its laws; yet in most parts of Alaska the natives rarely see an officer of the United States, and know nothing of our courts or procedures. In most

villages the people choose their own chief, who has vaguely defined but not extensive authority. A Greek priest is furnished to them by the established church of Russia. He is possessed of power in spiritual matters, and such temporal authority as his own character and the turn of events may give him. The post trader, representing the Alaska Commercial Company, often a squaw-man of some superior intelligence, has also large powers of personal influence, which are in general wisely The fact that the natives are nearly always in debt to the company \* tends to accentuate the company's authority. The control of the Greek priest varies with the character of the man. Some of the priests are devoted Christians, whose sole purpose is the good of the flock. To others, the flock exists merely to be shorn for the benefit of the church or the priest. But there are a few whom to call brutes, if we may believe common report, would be a needless slur on the bear and the sea lion.

On the Pribilof Islands, an anomalous joint paternalism under the direction of the United States government and the lessee companies has existed since 1868. The lessees furnish houses, coal, physician, and teacher, besides caring for the widows and orphans. The government agent has oversight and control of all operations on the islands, and is the official superior of the natives, having full power in all matters of government. This arrangement is not ideal, and is in part a result of early accident. It has worked fairly in practice, however, and the natives of these islands are relatively prosperous and intelligent. The chief danger has been in the

<sup>\*</sup>The credit system has been almost wholly abandoned recently, as the future of the sea otter leaves no hope of payment of debts.

direction of pampering. With insurance against all accidents of life, there is little incentive to thrift. Outside of the seal-killing season (June and July) the people become insufferably lazy. There are records of occasional abuses of power in the past,\*—abuses of a kind to be prevented only by the sending of men of honor as agents. In general, self-interest leads the commercial companies to send only sober and decent men to look after their affairs; and the government cannot afford to do less, even for Alaska. Of this the appointing power at Washington seems to have a growing appreciation.

Among the irregular methods of government in Alaska we must mention one of the most remarkable experiments in the civilization of wild tribes yet attempted anywhere in the world.† I refer to the work of William

\*For example, some ten or twelve years ago N. K. was fined fifty dollars by the government agent in charge of the Pribilof Islands, for "disturbance of the peace." His fault was a too vehement remonstrance against the violation of his young wife by American scoundrels temporarily employed on the island. The case was a most flagrant one, but the weak-minded agent felt unable to cope with it. With the plea that "boy will be boys" he excused the culprits, visiting the punishment on the injured husband. The ill feeling resulting from this action is still a source of embarrassment on St. Paul Island.

† Rev. William Duncan, a Scottish clergyman of the Anglican communion, some thirty or forty years ago, entered the lands of the Simsian Indians, a fierce tribe of cannibals living on the west coast of British Columbia, south of the Alaskan line. By sheer force of personal courage and with many hairbreadth escapes, he won the confidence of this people, and proceeded in his way to civilize and Christianize them. After a time, under his direction, they built the pretty village of Metlakahtla and became comfortably self-supporting.

The Church took notice of his work and sent out a bishop to

Duncan, the pastor and director of a colony of Simsian Indians at New Metlakahtla. I can only mention Duncan's work in passing, but his methods and results deserve careful study,—far more than they have yet received. The single will of this strong man has, in thirty years, converted a band of cannibals into a sober, law-abiding, industrious community, living in good houses, conducting a large salmon cannery, navigating a steamer built by their own hands, and in general proving competent to take care of themselves in civilized life.

direct it. The bishop insisted on the use of wine at communion. To this Mr. Duncan strenuously objected, as even the taste of intoxicants had a maddening effect on his people, who were kept in temperance by the most rigid prohibition of alcoholic drinks. Moreover the belated presence of the bishop as a director of work already accomplished and beyond his power to aid, was resented by the followers of Mr. Duncan.

At last, they arranged with the United States Government for the occupancy of Annette Island, in Alaska, some fifty miles more or less from their former homes. Hither nearly all the people migrated, under Mr. Duncan's leadership, leaving the bishop with the abandoned town.

On Annette Island, a new village, New Metlakahtla, was built, together with a small steamer and a salmon-cannery, besides their own church and school-house. It is a village of the most perfect order, with its own brass-band, church-choir, Sunday-school and societies for culture. For a long time after their steamer was built they were not allowed to use it, because not being citizens, they could not be licensed as pilots, or engineers, and the duly licensed pilots would not work for Indians. This absurd embargo was raised by the order of Assistant Secretary Hamlin.

I am indebted to Mr. Hamlin for a copy of the following inscription which is placed over the town house of New Metlakahtla;

"We leave the King of the Beasts for he is a deceiver; he

One of the least fortunate acts of the United States Congress in regard to Alaska has been the enactment of a most rigid prohibitory law as to alcoholic liquors. This is an iron-clad statute forbidding the importation, sale, or manufacture of intoxicants of any sort in Alaska. The primary reason for this act is the desire to protect the Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos from a vice to which they are excessively prone, and which soon rufins them. But a virtuous statute may be the worst kind of law, as was noted long ago by Confucius. This statute has not checked the flow of liquor in Alaska, while it has done more than any other influence to subvert the respect for law. Usually, men who "are not in Alaska for their health" are hard drinkers, and liquor they will have. is shipped to Alaska as "Florida water," "Jamaica ginger," "bay rum." Demijohns are placed in flour barrels, in sugar barrels, in any package which will contain them.\* With all this there is a vast amount of outright smuggling, which the Treasury Department tries in vain to check. All southeastern Alaska is one vast harbor, with thousands of densely wooded islands, mostly uninhabited. Cargoes of liquors can be safely hidden almost

says no one is slave under his flag. So every year he punishes us without cause; he held up his naughty gun to crush our village. Now I find my good friend, he is King of Birds; he has sharp eyes to watch over our village if the enemy surround it. I bid the Lion farewell."

Independence Day, August 7, 1887.

Over the inscription there is a carved picture of a Lion and an

Eagle.

\* It is said that when the Umatilla foundered off Port Townsend, August, 1896, those who took away her cargo found in each of the sugar barrels consigned to Alaska only a demijohn of whiskey, the sea having dissolved the sugar.

anywhere, to be removed piece by piece in small boats. Many such cargoes have been seized and destroyed; but the risk of capture merely serves to raise the price of liquor. Once on shore the liquor is safe enough. Upwards of seventy saloons are running openly in Juneau, and perhaps forty in Sitka. There are dives and groggeries wherever a demand exists. Most of the tippling-houses are the lowest of their kind, because as they are outlaws to begin with, the ordinary restraints of law and order have no effect on them.

In 1878, it is said, a schooner loaded with "Florida water" came to the island of St. Lawrence, in Bering Sea, and the people exchanged all their valuables for drink. The result was that in the winter following the great majority died of drunkenness and starvation, and in certain villages not a person was left. Sometimes the stock in trade of whisky smugglers is seized by the Treasury officials. But high prices serve as a sort of insurance against capture, and there are ways of securing a tip in advance when raids are likely to occur. This traffic demoralizes all in any way connected with it. But one conviction for illegal sale of liquors has ever been obtained in Alaska, so far as I know; and, I believe, that this was a test case for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the law.\* A jury trial in

<sup>\*</sup> The appeal of this case (Endleman et al. vs. the United States) has proved a matter of the greatest importance in relation to the government of American colonies. It was contended (according to the New York Evening Post) "that the law on which the prosecution was based was unconstitutional, because the government of the United States can exercise only those specific powers conferred upon it by the Constitution; that the Constitution guarantees to the citizens the right to own, hold, and acquire property,

any case means an acquittal, for every jury is made up of law-breakers, or of men in sympathy with the law-breaking. This fact vitiates all other criminal procedure in Alaska. It should secure the entire abolition of jury trials and other forms of procedure adapted only to a compact civilization.\*

Whatever laws are made for the control of the liquor traffic in Alaska should be capable of enforcement. They should be supported, if need be, with the full force of the United States. To impose upon a colony laws with which the people have no sympathy, and then to leave these people to punish infraction for themselves, is to invite anarchy and to turn all law into a farce.

Whisky is the greatest curse of the people of Alaska,
—American, Russian, and native. I have not a word to
say in favor of its use, yet I am convinced that unrestricted traffic, that any condition of things, would be
better than the present law, with its failure in enforcement. The total absence of any law would not make

and makes no distinction as to the character of the property; that intoxicating liquors are property, and are subject to exchange, barter, and traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of property exists; that inasmuch as the power to regulate commerce was committed to Congress to relieve it from all restrictions, Congress cannot itself impose restriction upon commerce by prohibiting the sale of a particular commodity; and that if Congress has the power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within the territories as a police regulation, it can only enact laws applicable to all the territories alike."

\* These facts were stated in detail a few years ago by a special agent of the United States Treasury. As a result, this truthful witness was indicted by the grand jury at Sitka for slander,—a futile act, but one which was the source of much annoyance.

Judge W. W. Morrow, of the United States Circuit Court of

matters much worse than they are. In fact, the law would hardly be missed. In any case, Alaska gets along fairly well,—much better than any tropical region would under like conditions. Cold disinfects in more ways than one, and Alaska gets the benefit of it.

We cannot throw blame on the officials at Washington.

Appeals for California, declaring the decision of the court upon these claims, said:—

"The answer to these and other like objections urged in the brief of counsel for the defendant is found in the now wellestablished doctrine that the territories of the United States are entirely subject to the legislative authority of Congress. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government as the organic law, but are the creation exclusively of the legislative department, and subject to its supervision and control. The United States, having rightfully acquired the territories, and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire domain and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal and state. Under this full and comprehensive authority, Congress has unquestionably the power to exclude intoxicating liquors from any or all of its territories, or limit their sale under such regulations as it may prescribe. It may legislate in accordance with the special needs of each locality, and vary its regulations to meet the circumstances of the people. Whether the subject elsewhere would be a matter of local police regulations or within the state control under some other power, it is immaterial to consider; in a territory, all the functions of government are within the legislative jurisdiction of Congress, and may be exercised through a local government or directly by such legislation as we have now under consideration."

In other words, the colonies are under the absolute control o Congress, subject to no restrictions of any sort, and free from the operation of any form of constitutional checks and balances. Only through such freedom is colonial government under the United States possible.

They do the best they can under the circumstances. The dishonest men at the capital are not many, and most of them the people elect to send there. The minor officials in general are conscientious and painstaking, making the best possible of conditions not of their choosing. The primary difficulty is neglect. We try to throw the burden of self-government on people so situated that self-government is impossible. We impose on them statutes unfitted to their conditions, and then leave to them the enforcement. Above all, what is everybody's business is nobody's, and what happens in Alaska is generally nobody's business. No concentration of power, no adequate legislation, no sufficient appropriation,—on these forms of neglect our failure chiefly rests.

If we have colonies, even one colony, there must be some sort of a colonial bureau, some concentrated power which shall have exact knowledge of its people, its needs, and its resources. The people must be protected, their needs met, and their resources husbanded. This fact is well understood by the authorities of Canada. While practically no government exists in the gold fields of Alaska, Canada has chosen for the Klondike within her borders a competent man, thoroughly familiar with the region and its needs, and has granted him full power of action. The dispatches say that Governor Ogilvie has entire charge through his appointees of the departments of timber, land, justice, royalties, and finances. federal government believes that one thoroughly reliable, tried, and trusted representative of British laws and justice, and of Dominion federal power, can better guide the destinies of this new country than a number of petty untried officials with limited powers, and Ogilvie thinks so himself." \*

Under the present conditions, when the sea otters are destroyed, the fur seal herd exterminated, the native tribes starved to death, the salmon rivers depopulated, the timber cut, and the placer gold fields worked out, Alaska is to be thrown away like a sucked orange. There is no other possible end, if we continue as we have begun. We are "not in Alaska for our health," and when we can no longer exploit it we may as well abandon it.

But it may be argued that it will be a very costly thing to foster all Alaska's widely separated resources, and to give good government to every one of her scattered villages and posts. Furthermore, all this outlay is repaid only by the enrichment of private corporations,† which, with the exception of the fur seal lessees, pay no tribute to the government.

Doubtless this is true. Government is a costly thing, and its benefits are unequally distributed. But the cost would be less if we should treat other resources as we have treated the fur seal. To lease the salmon rivers and to protect the lessees in their rights would be to insure a steady and large income to the government, with greater profit to the salmon canneries than comes with the present confusion and industrial war.

But admitting all this, we should count the cost before

<sup>\*</sup> San Francisco Chronicle, August 15, 1898.

<sup>†</sup> The interests of Alaska, outside of mining, are now largely in the hands of four great companies,—the Alaska Commercial Company, the North American Commercial Company, the Alaska Packers' Association, and the Pacific Steamer Whaling Company.

accepting "colonies." It is too late to do so when they once have been annexed. If we cannot afford to watch them, to care for them, to give them paternal rule when no other is possible, we do wrong to hoist our flag over them. Government by the people is the ideal to be reached in all our possessions, but there are races of men now living under our flag as yet incapable of receiving the town meeting idea. A race of children must be treated as children, a race of brigands as brigands, and whatever authority controls either must have behind it the force of arms.

Alaska has made individuals rich, though the government has yet to get its money back. But whether colonies pay or not, it is essential to the integrity of the United States itself that our control over them should not be a source of corruption and waste. It may be that the final loss of her colonies, mismanaged for two centuries, will mark the civil and moral awakening of Spain. Let us hope that the same event will not mark a civil and moral lapse in the nation which receives Spain's bankrupt assets.

## V.

## THE LESSONS OF THE PARIS TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION.



## V.

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The second administration of President Cleveland was especially characterized by the effort to promote certain governmental reforms regarded by the President and his advisers as vitally important to the welfare of the United States.

Most notable among these was the proposed treaty of arbitration with Great Britain. It was hoped that by its peaceful operation all bitterness of feeling between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations was to be avoided in the future. All disputed questions were to be removed from the category of war and diplomacy, from the arbitrament of force and intrigue to be settled on a basis of simple justice and international law.

In spite of the most strenuous efforts of the President and the earnest advocacy of the able Secretary of State the proposed treaty of arbitration failed to receive the approval of the Senate of the United States. That arbitration should rightfully supersede war is doubtless the almost universal opinion of intelligent citizens of both nations, but that the treaty in question would have this

result many of them were led to doubt. Among the arguments urged against the proposed treaty of 1896 was the fact of the failure of the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration of 1893, to secure justice or equity. Its decision, inconsistent with itself, not only failed to settle the fur seal dispute, but brought it to an acute phase, for which no remedy was furnished. This condition of things has passed by without serious friction solely because more striking matters have cast it into the shade. The international good feeling which now exists has no relation to the principle of arbitration, and the question at issue in 1893 is still unsettled.

Setting aside minor claims and side issues, the Paris Tribunal rendered its decision in favor of the "protection and preservation" of the fur seal in the waters of the North Pacific and Bering Sea. To insure this "protection and preservation" the same tribunal prescribed regulations, having, by the consent of the nations concerned, the validity of international law. These regulations have in three years achieved the commercial destruction of the valuable animal they were intended to protect and preserve. In a few years more, unless rescinded by international agreement, they must accomplish its actual biological extinction. If these regulations had been designed to promote destruction and extermination instead of "protection and preservation," they could hardly have been more effective to that end. It is not to be supposed that the high Tribunal of international arbitration so stultified itself as to do this on purpose. The plain intention of the Tribunal was actually to protect and preserve, and it failed in this intent simply through its neglect or inability to master the facts in the natural history of the animal with which it had to deal.

The acceptance of the principle of arbitration may be taken for granted. The practical details of its application are more important than the principle itself. This fact has been commonly overlooked by the advocates of arbitration. It has been virtually assumed that the principle would work itself. But it is evident that if such a tribunal of arbitration can be deceived or confused as to plain vital facts, its decision does not settle the question in dispute. If the question is not settled some higher tribunal is necessary. This can only be the force of arms or the force of public opinion, and neither of these has been found infallible in the establishment of justice. If one nation or the other is wronged or betrayed in arbitration the danger of war is not avoided by its operation.

The Paris Tribunal of Arbitration is, to be sure, only one of many in which England and the United States have been concerned. But it was more important than most of the others, because it had to consider not merely conflicting claims for money-damages, but facts and laws of science and their bearing on new principles of international law. Its business was to ascertain facts and to make these the basis of new precedents in action. The question of damages was merely incidental to the main problem.

In this relation compulsory compromise, the mere abatement of extreme claims on both sides, is inadequate and ineffective. If arbitration is to take the place of war, it must be operative even in cases where one nation is wholly in the right or wholly in the wrong in some or all

of its contentions. If its final verdict is to be sound, it must be based on accuracy of fact, not on a rough average of contending claims.

It may happen that with conflicting equities and confusing testimony the tribunal will be tempted to cut the knot by arbitrary compromise. If the sole question is one of damages more or less, this solution is easy, for obvious reasons. But no tribunal can change a law of nature nor alter a matter of fact.

In the interest of arbitration in the future we may examine in some detail the operations of the Paris Tribunal, that we may discover the reasons of its failure, and perchance make use of the lessons it should teach.

The case at issue was at bottom a very simple one. The fur seal herds of the North Pacific breed on islands situated in Bering Sea belonging to the United States and Russia. On these islands (Pribilof and Komandorski) they receive all necessary protection. The existence of the herds demand such protection, as well as further protection, when they are feeding or migrating in the open sea beyond the usual three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. The animals visit certain islands in the summer. They breed on them, and make them their home. The young remain there until driven away by the storms of winter. The adults leave the islands in summer only to feed, going to a distance of from 100 to 200 miles for that purpose. The winter is spent by the entire herd in the open sea, their migrations extending from 1,000 to 2,500 miles to the southward of their breeding resorts. For many years, both under Russian and American control, the females have received absolute protection on land, the killing for skins being restricted to the herds of superfluous males. As only about one male in thirty is able to maintain himself on a rookery or to rear a family, about twenty-nine out of every thirty are necessarily superfluous. The survival of one male in a hundred is sufficient for the actual needs of propagation. The young males on land are as easily handled and selected as sheep, and no diminution whatever to the increase of the herd has arisen from selective land-killing. 'The number of females in the herd bearing young each year was in the earlier days about 650,000 on the American islands and perhaps half as many on the Russian. The number of males and of young was in each case about twice as many more. This gave a total on the American or Pribilof Islands each year of about 2,000,000 animals of all classes, while on the Russian islands or Komandorski, there were about 1,000,000. About 1884, different persons known as pelagic sealers, chiefly citizens of Canada, but some of them from the United States, began to attack the herd in Bering Sea. Here no selective killing was possible. The females were always in the numerical majority, as the males had become less numerous on account of the land killing and as they left the islands less frequently in the summer. Each female above two years of age, when taken in the sea died with her unborn young. Most of the adult females taken in the sea after July 1st, had left young seals or pups on the islands, and these orphan pups invariably starved to death.

Through the agency of pelagic sealing and for no other cause, the herd rapidly declined in numbers. In 1897, there were about 130,000 breeding seals on the Ameriian islands, or about 400,000 of all classes. On the Russian islands the number of breeders was less than 65,000.

For this great reduction in numbers there was but one cause, a cause plain, self-evident and undeniable,—the slaughter of breeding females at a rate largely in excess of the rate of increase. While other causes have been assigned for diplomatic purposes none of these alleged explanations are worthy of the slightest consideration in explaining the decline.

It was evident even in 1893 to all capable of forming an opinion that pelagic sealing was the sole known cause of the decline of the fur seal herds. It was also evident that as an industry it must be self-destructive, since if permitted to exist on any scale, which would make it profitable, it must destroy the herd on which it operates.

It was equally evident, on the other side, that there was no existing canon of international law by which it could be prohibited. International law is simply the sum of the tacit consents and formal agreements of nations one with another. There was no other valuable animal having habits similar to those of the fur seal. There could thus be no adequate precedent for its protection. To slaughter animals feræ naturæ anywhere in the open sea is assumed as a right of any citizen of any nation, unless prevented by the statutes of that nation. A "right" in this sense has no sort of sacredness. It is simply a case in which the affair is nobody's business and therefore not forbidden. The progress of civilization and the growth of international law have been marked by the steady elimination of "rights" of this kind, that is of rights which are inimical to life or

property of others. Salus populi, suprema lex, the needs of the people override all statutes, and it is affirmed that the needs of the civilized world demand the preservation of the world's most valuable beast of the sea.

In the unquestionable absence of international law on the subject it lay within the province of the Paris Tribunal to make new international law, if the interests of civilization would be aided thereby. This in fact, they did, through their regulation of pelagic sealing, though in such an ineffective way that their action was without value unless as a legal precedent.

The case was complicated in the beginning by additional claims of the American government; namely, (a) the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the herd wherever found, and (b) over the sea in which it roamed and fed, together with (c) the right to use force in support of such jurisdiction. This right to use force it had actually put into effect, by the seizure of numerous vessels, under the British flag, found killing seals in Bering Sea. The vital claim of the United States, stripped of verbiage was that the fur seal was of value to civilization, that from the nature and the habits of the animal selective killing of males on land only could be safely allowed, that such condition had long existed forming an established and valuable industry, that pelagic killing was sure to bring the extinction of the herd, and that such extinction was already far advanced. Hence the interests of civilization demanded the abolition of pelagic killing and the recognition that the ownership and the protection of the breeding homes must carry with it the ownership and the protection of the animals themselves. I assume that the right to protect the fur seal is the

essential portion of the American contention, because all other parts of the contention would be useless without it. They were valuable chiefly for the purpose of strengthening the main case. They were of little importance in themselves, but were pretentious in form and of such a character as to awaken popular interest which the real matter at issue might fail to excite. These further contentions were in brief:

- 1. That Bering Sea was mare clausum, a closed sea, being entirely surrounded by the territory of Russia and the United States, and therefore its waters were under the control of these governments as the waters of a harbor are.
- 2. That in view of such control, the government of the United States was justified in forbidding pelagic sealing in these waters, in warning vessels not to engage in it, and in seizing those which disregarded such prohibition and such warning.
- 3. That inasmuch as the American fur seal herd made its home on the Pribilof Islands, returning there each season to breed, and landing nowhere else, the herd, wherever found, belonged to the owners of these islands. The animal has then the animus revertendi, or purpose to return on leaving the islands, and this purpose being based on the instinct of reproduction is the strongest impulse known in nature, either to man or beast.

The British authorities practically denied all these contentions and in general all the alleged facts on which they seemed to rest. After much diplomatic correspondence, lasting through nearly two years, it was finally agreed to submit all of these claims, and the counter-claims for damages through the forcible interrup-

tion of pelagic sealing, to a high tribunal of arbitration, to meet in Paris in 1893. The Tribunal was composed of seven judges, two from Great Britain, two from the United States and one each from France, Italy and Norway.

As to these contentions it may be said,—

- r. The vital claim to which the others were all subordinated seems to be true and just beyond dispute. The protection and preservation of the fur seal appeals to the interest of civilization.
- 2. The claim to control and ownership of Bering Sea rests partly on historical evidence, partly on legal precedent. It was put forth as above stated primarily as a device to justify interference with pelagic sealing. It was set aside by the Tribunal, apparently with justice.
- 3. The seizure of the British ships could be justified only as an act of war. If we were willing to fight in defense of our action, the act might be justified by the results of war. To submit it to arbitration was to confess judgment at the start, leaving us no alternative but to pay the bill.
- 4. The claim of the actual ownership of the herd is one of natural justice, not of prescribed law. It could become an enforceable claim only through international agreement, or through the action of a tribunal of arbitration. Neither could be made retroactive, hence we could have no legal claim against Great Britain for damages through the wanton destruction of the fur seal herds.

It is evident that in a case of arbitration the final verdict must vindicate itself, otherwise the sole value of this method of settling disputes is lost. It is therefore vitally important that the arbitration tribunal should correctly understand the facts at issue. Without a clear comprehension of all the relevant facts, a just decision is impossible. In proportion as error exists in the fundamental propositions, so must the final result be vitiated. In international affairs, the judges should be men of exceptional integrity and of exceptional intelligence, capable of weighing and valuing the most varied forms of evidence. Perjury, pettifogging and concealment would be alike an insult to such a court, and every device which experience has shown necessary in the extraction of truth from testimony should be in the hands of the tribunal.

All this would seem self-evident, but in the organization of the Paris Tribunal it seems not to have received due thought. In considering the proceedings of this court, the following facts are apparent:

It was arranged that all testimony should be presented in printed form. It was arranged that all testimony as to matter of fact should be given in *ex parte* affidavits. It was arranged that no witness should be present in person. It was therefore impossible to cross-question any one of the hundreds of deponents, to ascertain the range of his experience or his mental or moral fitness to give testimony. Neither the members of the American nor those of the British commission of investigation, who had visited the fur seal islands in person, and who were supposed to have full knowledge of the vital facts of seal life, were brought before the Tribunal. The American commissioners, who should have been the very center of the American case, were not even called to Paris.

The omission of all safeguards against perjury seems to indicate:

- 1. That one party or both had perfect confidence in the self-evident justice of its case; or
- 2. That one party or both had perfect confidence that the other would not try to manufacture evidence, or suborn perjury; or
- 3. That one party or both intended to take advantage of the other to confuse the court by the submission of evidence that would not bear cross-questioning; or
- 4. That one party or both, from ignorance of natural history, failed to recognize the vital importance of exact knowledge of the habits of the animal in question.

It may be observed in passing that diplomacy may be as effective in the organization of a tribunal of arbitration as in any other sphere of action, and as successful in defeating justice.

The choice of two representatives from each of the contending nations implied that each was to have two advocates on the bench. The unquestioned eminence of the four thus balanced against one another would have no real weight in determining the final results. This left the remaining three as the real arbiters and destroyed from the first the character of the court as an impartial tribunal by dividing it against itself. As to the other judges it may be said, that their choice from nations not in sympathy with the supposed imperialistic tendencies of the United States, shown by its claim of exclusive jurisdiction over a vast sea, may have left the burden of prejudice against the American case. This is merely an inference resting on no knowledge of the

fact. A more serious difficulty arose from the fact that the knowledge of the English language by two of the three judges, or the majority of the sole final arbiters, was none too perfect. None of the seven judges had any knowledge whatever of natural history, and hence the volume of testimony tended to confuse rather than enlighten them. Probably neither they nor many others since have ever read through, with a view to seriously weighing its value, the vast mass of guesswork and casual opinion offered as testimony. That this is true appears in the fact that during the sessions of the Tribunal various unofficial brief summaries of evidence were printed for the use of the court. These were elementary statements of the claims of one side or the other, almost puerile in their simplicity, and the need for them shows clearly that the more elaborate testimony was not understood. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that the work of the Tribunal was done in undue haste. After the first novelty of the situation was over each person concerned was anxious to make an early escape from the August heat of Paris, to some cooler retreat, or more congenial duties.

The testimony offered before the Tribunal we may here briefly analyze.

On the side of the United States there was:

1. The report of the American Commissioners. One of these gentlemen is a noted physicist, the other a naturalist of high distinction. The two visited the Pribilof Islands in person, spending some ten days in examining the breeding rookeries. They consulted fully with different persons who had enjoyed large opportunities for observing the herd year by year, and the work of

compilation of the final report was prosecuted with the exact methods of a trained naturalist.

The work of the commission can hardly be called a scientific investigation, inasmuch as its stay on the islands was too short for the critical examination of any phase of fur seal life. On the other hand the report was emphatically a work of science. In its preparation the commissioners showed a masterly knowledge of the value of evidence. All accessible sources of information were examined. Not a fact vital to the real question at issue was overlooked, concealed or misstated. The elaborate later investigations of 1896, and 1897, under direction of the present writer have only confirmed the conclusions of the earlier commission. Additional facts of many kinds have since come to light and more exact statistics as to numbers have been attained, but none of these affect the main contention of the American commission of 1891, that pelagic sealing, and that alone, was destroying the fur seal herd.

- 2. In addition to this the case of the United States was supported by a long array of affidavits. These may be divided into three classes:
- (a) The statements of trained observers who had visited the islands for one reason or another and made scientific observations of the animals.
- (b) The statements of government officials in Alaska, especially those of agents in charge of the Pribilof Islands. Some of the testimony was of high value; most of it consisted of the conjectures and impressions of careless minds, more or less biased by the desire to help on the American contention.
  - (c) The affidavits of the seal hunters of San Francisco

and elsewhere. Most of these statements were in the form of responses to a set of prepared questions made by men ignorant of all matters outside of their trade of shooting and skinning seals. Of the appearance of the animal marked for slaughter, they were able to speak with some precision, but on the larger questions of its habits and condition, their opinions, however honestly given, and however favorable to the American contention, were of little value. To this there were naturally occasional exceptions. One of the whaling captains for example was a naturalist of exceptional ability, the author of a valuable work on the mammals of the sea.

- (d) Testimony of London furriers, experts in questions of furs and skins, but only remotely acquainted with the animals from which they are taken.
- 3. Besides these sources of evidence on the main question of the decline of the herd, and its cause, a large amount of evidence for the subsidiary contentions was put forward.

This consisted of documents, maps, etc.:

- (a) Historical testimony concerning Russian claims to ownership of Bering Sea, and
- (b) Historical precedents as to claims of jurisdiction ever marine animals beyond the three-mile limit.

In favor of the British contention appears:

r. The report of the British commissioners, the one a geologist of repute, the other known as a politician and member of Parliament. These gentlemen had spent a summer in Bering Sea, about two weeks of it on the Pribilof Islands. Neither of them were naturalists and neither made any pretense of scientific investigation. Their report was of the nature of a lawyer's brief, in

favor of pelagic sealing. It had no scientific value or validity whatever, and its effectiveness lay chiefly in its bold denial of many of the well established facts in the natural history of the fur seal.

2. The testimony of the pelagic sealers in Victoria. Analysis of the many published affidavits show them to be virtually the work of one person. Series of leading questions are asked. These are answered by the sealers, doubtless honestly enough, but all in such a way as to favor the British contention. These men had never visited the Pribilof Islands nor seen the animal in question in its haunts. Most of them could no more testify as to the nature and habits of the fur seal than could so many butchers' apprentices could bear witness as to the origin of breeds of cattle. Of matters within their own observation they were more competent to speak, but here it is evident that their opinions were clouded by their supposed interests. This relation of opinion to interest is well understood by lawyers, and is the basis of Lord Bowen's epigram, "Truth will out, even in an affidavit."

By these affidavits it was sought to prove:

- (a) That the number of seals shot at sea and not recovered was about 3 per cent. (1 to 12 per cent.)
- (b) That the number of females in the pelagic catch did not usually exceed that of the males.
  - (c) That a large percentage of these were barren.
- (d) That the Russian and American herds freely intermingled and were indistinguishable.
  - (e) That not all fur seals visited the islands in summer.
- (f) That the fur seals were steadily increasing in numbers under pelagic sealing.
  - (g) That they mated in the sea as well as on land.

- (h) That they were not confined to the known breeding islands but have rookeries on islands as yet unknown.
- (i) That they resorted from time to time to new breeding places.
- (j) That the sexes could not be distinguished by the appearance of the skin.
  - (k) That the sexes traveled together at sea.
- (1) That it was an easy thing to raid the Pribilof Islands.

To these statements all of them partly false, and most of them wholly so, all of them moreover partly matters of opinion to the deponents, we may add three other fictions useful to forward the British contention. One of these is the assertion that orphaned seal pups feed on sea-weeds, and are nourished by the milk of other mothers than their own. This was a pure invention, without a fact or an analogy to back it.

More important than this and more damaging to the American cause, because originally of American origin, were two other falsehoods, unsupported by any facts whatever, but none the less effective in producing confusion in the minds of the judges. These were (a) the statement that the driving of the males on land destroys the virility of those \* turned back from the killing, and (b) the assertion that the number of males had been unduly reduced by land killing, leaving a supposed class of "barren females," that had failed of impregnation.

A final and perhaps decisive element of importance in

<sup>\*</sup> The seals above or below the "killable" age of three years are mostly released. At three years the skin is at its best for the uses of the furrier.

the British contention was a piece of testimony secured from Russia by some kind of diplomatic deal. While the Americans were contending for the exclusion of pelagic sealing for a radius of 200 miles from the islands, or throughout Bering Sea, Russia was induced to accept a closed zone of thirty miles radius around her fur seal islands. This agreement was of course, not in the interest of the Russian fur seal herds, and it had no value as indicating the size of the closed zone necessary to give the animals protection about the American islands. But it had value as influencing a court already bewildered as to the facts. Its dramatic introduction in the midst of a closing speech after the counsel of both sides had rested their case, and when no opportunity of showing its worthlessness was left, was a piece of sharp practise which the dignity of the high tribunal of international arbitration might have resented. The testimony was, to be sure, withdrawn, on the protest of the opposing counsel, but whether retained or withdrawn, it served the same purpose.

The sole purpose of the British authorities in the whole matter was to win the case for the Canadian sealers, not to protect the herd, nor to secure justice, nor to establish high precedents in international law.

3. On the British side was also produced a collection of historical documents bearing on Bering Sea, with counterevidences that the precedents claimed by the Americans are not full precedents at all. The pertinence of all of this we may freely admit, as the decision of the Paris Tribunal settled once for all the questions of international law, though it could not change the laws of natural history.

The purpose of the present paper is not to reargue the question, still less to award blame or praise. I wish solely to call attention to the defective organization of the court as regards preparation for ascertaining the truth about disputed questions of fact. As one of the American commissioners has cleverly said, the verdict of the Paris Tribunal would have been different had there been some one present "who knew how to laugh at the right place." If some one who knew the real facts of the case, had had the authority "to laugh at the right place," the eloquent pathos by which the British counsel told of the horrors of the seal-drive would have been laughed out of court. As no one on either side knew the facts at first hand, its absurdity was not apparent. Naturally, the eminent counsel on both sides devoted most of their attention to questions of law. But the fundamental question was one of fact. Under what conditions of protection can these animals live and propagate their kind? That the facts of fur seal life were not understood by the Tribunal accounts for the selfcontradictory regulations laid down in their final verdict.

The final decision of the Tribunal was, in brief,-

- 1. Denial that the Bering Sea is mare clausum.
- 2. Denial that the fur seal herds are the property of the United States when in the open sea.
- 3. Denial of the right of seizure of sealing vessels on the open sea, this decision requiring that vessels already seized should be paid for.
- 4. Provision for the protection and preservation of the fur seal in the interests of humanity.

This last object it was sought to accomplish through a series of regulations, by which pelagic sealing was

recognized as legal, but subjected to the following restrictions, in brief:

- 1. No fur seals are to be taken within a closed zone of 60 miles distance from the Pribilof Islands.
- 2. No fur seals are to be taken at sea from May 1 to July 31, inclusive.
- 3. Only sailing vessels with undecked boats or canoes can be used in sealing.
- 4. Each sealing vessel shall take out a special license and shall fly a distinguishing flag.
- 5. Each master of vessel engaged in fur-seal fishing shall record in his official log-book the place, number, and sex of fur seals captured each day.
- 6. The use of nets, firearms, and explosives in Bering Sea is forbidden.
- 7. The two Governments must see that men engaged in fur-seal fishing shall be fit to handle the weapons used.
- 8. These regulations shall not apply to Indians of either country using undecked boats of the usual sort, outside of Bering Sea, and not under contract for delivery of skins to any particular person.
- 9. These regulations for "the protection and preservation of the fur seals" shall remain in force until they have been in whole or in part abolished or modified by common agreement between the United States and Great Britain. The regulations are to be submitted every five years to a new examination, and to be modified if experience shows the need of change.

This award gave a great stimulus to pelagic sealing, by taking it out of the category of illicit adventure or piracy. On the contrary it slightly prolonged the process of destruction, by preventing close approach to the rookeries and preventing slaughter in May, June and July of the American herd. These months were used by the sealers in operations on the Russian herd, which by the ingenious stroke of diplomacy already mentioned had been deprived of the protection of a close season.

The final result has been, in the language of the Joint Commission of Fur Seal Experts of 1897, that "in its present condition the herd yields an inconsiderable return either to the lessees of the islands or to the owners of the pelagic fleet."

In other words five years of the "protection and preservation" under the regulations of the Paris Tribunal have achieved the commercial destruction of one of the two most valuable and almost the sole remaining herds of this most important of marine mammals. Its biological extermination cannot be far distant, if these regulations are continued, for it can hardly be supposed that the costly defense of the breeding islands will be maintained by the United States if no corresponding return is possible.

I trust that it will not seem unduly presumptuous for me to express an opinion as to what the verdict of the Paris Tribunal should legitimately have been. In my judgment it should have been declared:

- r. That Bering Sea is not mare clausum \*; its waters are not the exclusive property of Russia and the United States.
- 2. That the ownership of the fur seal herds while the animals are in the open sea cannot be recognized in existing international law or by existing precedent, as belonging to the nations owning their breeding homes.

<sup>\*</sup> In this and other matters of purely international law, I assume the verdict of the tribunal is above question

- 3. That the United States should therefore pay the value of British vessels seized for killing fur seals in the open sea.
- 4. That the value of these vessels and their equipment should be ascertained by an acceptable jury of experts, the question of the degree to which, if at all, contingent or possible profits of future cruises should be considered to be determined by the Tribunal of Arbitration.
- 5. That the "protection and preservation of the fur seal" is a matter of importance to the interests of the civilized world.
- 6. That the question of the regulations necessary to this end should be left to a jury of natural history experts, familiar with the habits of marine mammalia and competent to sift evidence concerning them.
- 7. That in case absolute or virtual prohibition be found necessary to this end, as claimed by the American commission, such prohibition be ordered by the Tribunal, this order to have the force of international law, over all nations consenting to the decision of the Tribunal.
- 8. In such case Canada should yield the possession of certain recognized rights, inasmuch as prohibition of pelagic sealing, with protection on land and sea, is tantamount to ownership of the herd by the United States.
- 9. The legitimate money value of such rights, ascertained by a proper jury or tribunal, the legal considerations governing which to be determined and laid down by the high tribunal itself, should be paid by the United States.
- 10. That such decision should establish the precedent for an international game law, whereby all animals, feral or domesticated, crossing limits of territorial jurisdic-

tion in food-seeking or in annual migrations would be protected in the same degree as if their habitat were confined to the territory of a single nation. Such precedents would govern the mismanaged fisheries of the Great Lakes of America, the salmon fisheries of the Rhine, the pearl beds of Ceylon, as well as the fur seal and sea otter herds of Bering Sea. Such an international agreement for the protection of valuable animals would be a natural sequence to those agreements or canons which have striven to abolish the slave-trade. which have exterminated piracy and checked privateering, which have made foreign travel possible, and which are humanizing the terrible art of war. "Salus populi, suprema lex." The ultimate purpose of all statutes is the good of the people, not of one nation alone, but of all the earth.

Such an ultimate agreement is indeed foreshadowed in the regulations for "the protection and preservation of the fur seal" and in the provision for the revision of these regulations at the end of five years by the nations directly concerned. This precedent may indeed prove valuable in future efforts at arbitration in the interests of humanity. If so, it is the sole worthy result of the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration, and its one contribution to international law.

Such a decision as that above indicated would have been consistent with itself. It would have "protected and preserved" the fur seal herd—the only important matter at issue from a financial standpoint. It would have done full justice to the rights of both Canada and the United States while it would have paved the way for the development of still broader principles. Such a

decision would have given strength and dignity to the plan of arbitration.

This summary of a vast and complicated case is of necessity a very brief one, too brief to deal justly with all its varied phases. We may, however, deduce from it certain lessons, as to the organization of similar tribunals in the future.

In case of future international tribunals of arbitration:

- 1. There must be an agreement as to all facts in question based on the most thorough investigations of competent experts in the subject in question, leaving to the tribunal solely the decision of the legal or international bearings of these facts with their financial estimate if necessary; or else,
- 2. We must grant to such international tribunal every safeguard found necessary to the highest courts of law, including time to mature its deliberations and investigations, power to call for persons and papers wherever situated, power to cross-examine witnesses, to sift evidence and to punish perjury or diplomacy or any other attempt to deceive the court as to question of fact.

If the principle of arbitration is to win the support of the two great Anglo-Saxon peoples its operations in practice must be worthy of their respect. It must indeed be the Supreme Court of Christendom. It must be composed of judges only, not of warring advocates, and these judges must be as great in the science of jurisprudence as the generals they replace have been great in the art of war. They must never be deceived as to fact or law and their verdict must be the final word of an enlightened civilization as to the subject in question.



## VI. A CONTINUING CITY.



### VI.

### A CONTINUING CITY.\*

The ideal of democracy is "government of the people, by the people and for the people." Such "a government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed." More than this, it is solely through the intelligent co-operation of the governed that its powers can be exercised. The thought and force of each man is demanded and the composite will of the majority, when all is summed up, is recognized as the will of the people. As to the theory, all are in accord, but the need of operating through representatives and civil servants complicates matters of public administration and brings in many new problems in addition to those arising from the development of democracy.

For democracy brings with it no guarantee of good government. Excellence of rule is not even its main purpose, not good government but good people. There is in government a higher function than economy, dignity and effectiveness in public management. These are important but they are not all. The function of self-government is the making of men. A republic is a huge

<sup>\*</sup> Address before the New Charter Club of San Francisco, April, 1898.

training school in public affairs which will in time bring better men, and thus produce the sole effective final guarantee of good government. This is the intelligent "consent of the governed." Such a training school demands experiments in bad government as well as in good. It demands experiments in blunders as well as in successes. It demands the pain and humiliation of loss and failure as well as the pride of victory or the joy of gain. The surest way out of folly is to give full play to its demands. "If you think that a law is unjust," said General Grant, "enforce it: the people will do the rest." Each experiment must teach its own lesson. The test of fitness for self-government is found in the degree to which such lessons are heeded. In the long run men are governed as well as they deserve. To demand good government is the first essential in securing it. "Eternal vigilance" is its price, and the results of apathy are found in corruption and waste.

In one regard our fathers failed to see the line of development of our forms of government. In the early days the town-meeting was the safeguard of freedom. In New England each citizen had a primary interest in local affairs. The constant necessity for local action kept this interest alive. People care permanently only when they can act. Men are indifferent toward that which they cannot help. The town-meeting was the local school in public administration. Its graduates were sent on to farther duties, to the legislature of the state or to the national congress. There many of them made worthy names in the history of the administration. In the old days "the people sent their wisest men to make the laws." In their scattered villages with slow transpor-

tation and few newspapers, the people had but dim ideas of national affairs. They therefore attended to their own local affairs and gave their wisdom full play in managing them. But with all this the people found a fascination in national questions, however vaguely understood. Whatever they could learn of them they used to their advantage. The influence of the town-meeting worked its way out to the state.

This growing interest in national matters was greatly stimulated by the development of the applied sciences. The postal service, the railway train, the telegraph and the daily newspaper have destroyed distances. Whatever of importance happens in the civilized world is correctly known in every American household almost at once. What happens near home in the town or county is not thus known. The great events overshadow the lesser. Local matters are inaccurately or sensationally reported. They do not attract attention unless spiced with exaggeration or distorted by caricature. Especially is this true of matters of administration. The great national problems, finance, taxation, colonial extension interest us all. The fact that we are powerless to deal with them we lose sight of. We have made up our minds in regard to them and we all watch eagerly every attempt of our representatives to carry our ideas into action. Once in four years all manner of questions are or seem to be referred back to the people, and to each of these public questions each citizen is ready with some sort of a response. Men who were never able to pay their own debts have very positive ideas of national finance. Those who cannot keep their own children out of the streets know exactly what should be our policy toward the "silent, sullen peoples, half devil and half child," who dwell in the antipodes. Men who never had a bank account are self-constituted authorities as to the national banking system, in which we are all to be partners, those with nothing to lose as well as those with something to gain. We shout for "principles" but in the original thought of the fathers the common voter was to select wise men, who should themselves be the judges of principles. In the multiplicity of public officials we have no certain knowledge of those who ask our suffrage. Having no tests of character we judge them by their expressed opinions.

Thus the public attention is turned away from the local affairs which furnished the business of the town-meeting. It has degenerated into the caucus and is largely in control of those whose relation to government is personal and selfish. The men who manage local politics care nothing for shadows. They have their own end in view. Their operations do not interest us because we cannot follow them and we do not understand them. They are scantily reported in the newspapers, and when favorable accounts of evil transactions are desired the newspapers will furnish them. The partisan organ is always ready to shield its own rascals while it blackens impartially the fame of its opponents. Thus it comes about that the details of our government are worse managed as they come nearest to the people. The general government absorbs nearly all of the public attention. With all its faults, the administration of affairs at Washington is in general better than the administration anywhere else. It is in the light of keener criticism. It is nearer to people's minds than local administration is.

But it is much farther from their interests. The loss

through local waste and corruption affects the individual man more than anything that Congress can do, or leave undone. Say what we may, exaggerate as we may, the cost of the appreciation of gold, the waste of extravagant pensions, the loss through an ill-balanced monetary system,—none of these nor all of these equal the waste of municipal corruption. These become disastrous only as they are added to the cost of local profligacy. The injuries from defective sewage, from filthy streets, from badly managed and badly taught schools, from saloon politics, from bad roads, from the cultivation of slums, from adulterated food, from poisoned water, vastly outweigh in importance to the individual the great questions of party politics for which we pass them by.

The complaint is made that American political affairs are "insufferably parochial" and it is urged that the remedy is to be found in a "vigorous foreign policy" of which the details shall command the attention of the people but with which they shall have no power to meddle. But the affairs of a democracy ought to be "parochial" and the people must have a hand in every one of them. The more local and provincial its details, the better for its administration and therefore the better for the people. A democracy is a form of government adapted to minding its own business. That attention to foreign affairs and large problems has smothered our interest in parochial details of justice and economy, is the chief cause of our failure in municipal government. The new destiny of the United States with its idle hopes of commercial greatness, keeps us from watching the tax collector and the deputy sheriff. The town-meeting was the very essence of parochialism. It was the tap root of our democracy and a certain failure in the process of government by the people has resulted from its decline. In large public affairs it is, "principles, not men" that first concern us. In local administration it should be the choice of men rather than political principles.

The evils of bad local administration are not peculiar to our cities. County government almost everywhere is just as ineffective. The county affairs of almost every state are in the hands of party henchmen, who build up under cover of local administration a huge machinery of corruption. I make no sweeping charge against county officers. These men in general are honest enough, and at the worst they simply follow the letter of the law. Law and rightfulness are not the same in this case. They take nothing which is not legally theirs to take. The defect is that of irresponsible management. There is no head in county affairs and no direct responsibility to the people. No one can be blamed if things go wrong nor is one rewarded for faithful public service. No one watches the actions of county boards save those who gain by wrong action. We have in all local affairs avoided the tyranny of centralized power by the substitution of the worse tyranny of official irresponsibility. There can be no good government without direct responsibility to some power adequate to control; to some king, or governor, or party, or the people.

In view of all this we deserve all the evil we receive, as well as all the good. The government of any community in all its grades is as good as the people are entitled to have. As we come to earn a better administration of national affairs, we find that we receive it. As our interest in local affairs has waned so have grown the

evils of local corruption. In a democracy, the government can be good only as the people demand good government. We ask for good government on no other terms. It may be that bad forms of government are responsible for misrule, rather than the people themselves. Where this is the case the bad forms will be changed if the people deserve any better. And the present general movement for municipal reform shows that the people are becoming more alive to the need of attention to local affairs. If our republic is to be permanent, if America is ever to have one "continuing city" we must learn how to live in cities and in so living to guard our property and our lives. As matters are we protect neither life nor property, and the city is a center of degeneration and waste.

Among the causes of ineffective local government we may name the following;

The lack of seriousness. As a people we have a very fine sense of humor and it is exercised impartially in all things. In our journals, corruption and inefficiency appear as a joke. A newspaper cartoon tells us the story, and with this it ends. As cartoons are easily made and may be as unjust as any other form of criticism, they cease at length to be taken in evidence at all. An administrative crime has no adequate punishment. We do not know whether it has taken place or not, and in the hopelessly good nature of the American people, whether it has taken place or not, it is equally and speedily forgiven.

The lack of permanence in our population is the source of other evils. Migration diverts attention from local questions. A man who moves from place to place may be just as good an American as one who stays at home,

—often a better,—but he is not so good a Californian. He is national rather than parochial in his interests, and he is not so useful a citizen in his relation to local affairs.

The spoils system in politics is the greatest foe of democracy. In all its forms and ramifications, it is fatal to good government. There can be no wise, economical or dignified administration of public affairs when places are given in reward of personal or partisan service. The spoils system has been to a great degree eradicated in the minor branches of national affairs, but in state, county, and municipal politics it is almost everywhere still dominant. It is even growing worse in many of our large cities, because the purification of national administration has narrowed the sphere of its virulence. The "pull" and the "push," the "combine" and the "solid dozen" control our cities, and wherever the "boys" are at "work" there is waste, ineffectiveness, and corruption.

The spoils system is in general dependent on the organization of the votes of the unenlightened, the indifferent and the discontented. There are many causes for the prevalence of what is known as social discontent. Some of these a wise administration could avoid; others are inherent in human nature. But the political influence of discontent is almost always evil. It is opposed to law and order. It is opposed to hopefulness and patience. It is opposed to frugality and continuity of purpose.

The predatory poor and the predatory rich feed upon and propagate each other. Two of the most noxious elements in our political life are the "friend of the poor" and the tool of the rich. Both are parasites who live by the greed of those who take what they have not earned. Very often the two characters are united in the same person. The relation alters as opportunities develop, just as the right bower of hearts becomes, as the trumps change, the left bower of diamonds.

The hope of getting something for nothing which draws thousands of men to our great cities, makes of these same men the worst of citizens. Nothing worth having ever goes for nothing except to the thief. Hence arises great co-operative political associations, represented in the councils of every party, and whose sole business is under party names to work the offices for "all they are worth." Their interest in public affairs is to see what can be made out of them. By the promise of something for nothing they hold together the worst elements of the community. Their work is done in the dark, and their motto is, "Addition, division, and silence."

These associations encourage the public interest in national affairs to divert it from local ones. They are familiar with all the catch-words of the day. But while people cry out for imperialism, expansionism, for sound money, for free trade, for free silver, for free Cuba,—whatever they please, the political rings devote themselves to the picking of pockets. They look after the matters of street cleaning, police service, railway franchises, saloon licenses, school furnishing,—and so long as these profitable enterprises are in their hands they care not who has the glory or who put up or down the figure-heads of authority. If in their business they need these figureheads they know how to own them without the appearance of doing so.

Allied to the habit of seeking something for nothing is

the disposition to look to national legislation as a relief from personal discomfort. The recent movement on Washington, of the Coxey "Commonweal Army" of idlers is a visible sign of this disposition. It is not often that prosperity waits on national legislation. National blunders have evil consequences, but there is not much to be gained from any positive action. In general the most that Congress can do is to repair its own past mistakes. The real prosperity of a country comes from the prosperity of the individual citizen and from that alone. If he is frugal, industrious and sober, he will be the type of a successful community. If each man should solve or even try to solve his own labor problem, this problem would disappear. If we were all good citizens we would have no trouble with the management of our cities. But we are not all good citizens; and there are many rich and many poor whose interests are served by bad administration. And there are those who are weak in mind and weak in will, who are swayed back and forth by the professional agitator. An agitator, in general, is one who has nothing to lose, and who finds his sustenance through the confusion of others. Honest agitators there are, though such are often insane, while the worst of those who foment discontent are neither sane nor honest.

The chief source of failure in local government is, however, due to lack of personal responsibility in administration. This difficulty is the result of unwise political forms. It is therefore a matter which may be readily detected, and which admits of remedy.

Whenever any important work is to be done it should be done under one authority, controlled by one will, and working to a definite end. In case of good administration the success will be distinct and unquestionable. In case of failure there should be one person to be held responsible. An individual head is necessary to the control of an army, of a ship, of a team of horses, of a railway, of a school. It is equally necessary to a city. Wellington once said that "an army may get along very well under a bad general; it never will succeed under a debating society." This is the vital principle in good local administration. The fact that in our state constitutions this principle has been neglected is one reason why people have lost interest in local affairs. The blame for failure rests on so many shoulders that practically no one can be held responsible for it.

Municipal government is not a branch of national politics. A city is a business corporation, with business powers and existing for business purposes. It must be treated as such. It is not a confederation of states but an association of men. In our local elections the people of the city have to choose from a long series of names selected in the dark by those who make such matters their business. These men are mostly unknown to the individual citizen. Those he knows he rarely trusts and so he favors a close limitation of their authority. They remain equally unknown at the close of their term of office, for they have little individual power or responsibility. It is impossible to know whether their work is well done or ill done. In most cases it is not distinctly either, and in few cases can good services or bad services materially affect permanence in office.

Political changes in city affairs come from changes in national politics. A republic is governed by see-saw, a certain number changing their party allegiance as one party

or another fails, after four-years' trial, to satisfy their ideas or interest. The city election goes with the rest. For this condition the first remedy is to make municipal matters important. To separate municipal from general elections is a step in the right direction. But it is a short step. To insure good government the executive head must be responsible for matters of administration. He must control subordinates if he is held to answer for them. He must have such freedom of action that his character may be a matter of public concern. A bad mayor of a city must have power to make his badness felt; else the people will not bestir themselves to get a good one. An unfit mayor should be a distinct calamity. But with full responsibility, really bad administration would rarely come. A poor driver of an unruly team is better than no driver; a weak general is better than a debating society. A weak man or a bad man under the public eye with full responsibility for his actions sometimes becomes surprisingly capable. Responsibility brings caution. Caution leads men to seek good advice, and to follow good advice is not very different from capability. But an effective responsibility, as we shall see, can hardly be secured so long as cities are ruled under federal forms, with constitutional checks and balances, and a fixed tenure of office for each official.

The desire for responsible government for cities is not, as many suppose, a movement toward severity of individual restriction. It is not a device of the rich for the oppression of the poor. It is not a movement for a larger police force, or the abatement of agitators or other public nuisances. It arises simply from

the need to hold some one responsible for administration. No one can be responsible for action beyond the limits of his power to act. In the national government this principle is recognized to some extent. The President chooses his own administrative officers and acts through their action. The governor of a state has no voice in the choice of his cabinet. The county has no executive officer at all, and the mayor of a city is in the main a figurehead, with sometimes the special function of police court judge.

In the English system of government the use of power is not limited by constitutional checks and balances, but by the unwritten will of the people. The Premier has unlimited power, but he dare not use it, except with the approval of the majority of the representatives of the people. If he use it recklessly his administration comes to an end and that at once and without warning. The only check is the disapproval of the party, and behind the party, that of the people. Hence in party matters the best men are put forward. The party leader is its cleverest mouthpiece, its wisest administrator, or at least the one whom his associates and the people naturally rank as such.

In the American system are introduced a number of checks and balances as preventers of mischief. These serve as antidotes to tyranny but not to corruption or folly. The evils which our fathers feared were mainly those of centralized power, the force of arms, the pomp of imperialism, the domination of the church, the rule of the aristocracy, inequality before the law. These were the ills from which they had fled in England. These evils they would forever keep away from the shores of the

new republic. They had no experience in industrial miscalculations nor in financial blunders. The congestion of population in cities was unforeseen by them. They knew nothing of the collective folly of mobs, the enterprise of corporations, nor the pertinency of those who live by sucking blood wherever blood is found.

They tried to prevent tyranny by scattering power among many functionaries, each one to be a check upon the others. In one state it was decreed that a member of the state council should always sleep with the governor to prevent him from developing any scheme of oppression.

Such an arrangement tended to prevent personal tyranny but it opened the way to many abuses, and it is from such governmental methods that the evils of the "Ring system" arise. If the governor were wicked he might corrupt the councilor. If he were weak the councilor might manipulate him. From such beginnings came the mistake of trying to prevent tyranny by weakening government rather than by strengthening responsibility. It was thought to make officials harmless by making them powerless. Thus we succeeded in displacing individual tyranny by organized tyranny, official tyranny, by unofficial tyranny. When a thing has to be done there must be the power to do it. If the official is prevented by hampering forms of law, it will be informally and illegally done by his political boss.

England has never tried to prevent abuse of administrative authority, by weakening power or scattering responsibility. Her ideal has been not limited authority but "conditional authority." No high efficiency can exist without a wide range of discretion. Complete and

immediate responsibility is the only condition necessary for the safe exercise of power. "An English prime minister can do anything,—always with this reservation, that if he doesn't do the right thing he may cease to be prime minister and that without notice."

The most essential condition of successful government is therefore singleness of purpose. Treat the collective interests of a city as you would those of a great corpo-Make the mayor the trusted representative of the corporation, to be discarded by it if he prove false to his trust. This plan has proved everywhere successful in Great Britain. It should succeed equally well in the United States. When this is done there is room for great extension of collective action. Let the city have a political see-saw of its own independent of that arising from national elections. Let the mayor be personally responsible for the fitness and honesty of the subordinate heads of departments. Let him hold each of them in turn responsible for those under their direction. In business places have only those who know their business. Emphasize men, not principles. Men are tangible and can be reached; party principles are vague and deceptive. Let everything stand in open light; thus unclean men who work in darkness only have no interest in it. In most branches of the civil service of cities technical training is vitally important. The man who knows how to do a thing is the only one who will do it in the right way.

The authority given must be commensurate with the service required. One individual must be held responsible for the whole of one transaction. A stage coach on a mountain road would not be rendered safer with

four drivers one for each horse, or one for each of the guiding reins. Doubtless the coach might not be driven on the wrong road under such conditions, but it would stand a good chance to be overturned.

But how shall the driver of the coach be selected and what shall be the term of his services? Obviously those who ride must choose and he must hold the reins only so long as he commands the confidence of his passengers. Accepting the principle of the majority rule as the only principle practicable in public affairs the driver should hold his place as long as his acts are approved by the majority of those whom he serves.

It is plain that a fixed tenure of office regardless of conduct is an unnatural and arbitrary arrangement. has the advantage of stability of plan, but it permits the development of schemes adverse to the good of the people. In the case of the stage coach the question of confidence can be settled in a moment and without formality. In the case of a city the method must be different; the principle is not. In such cases the people cannot act as individuals in a mass-meeting. Obviously they must be represented in some form of a council or a congress. That body will be most effective which most perfectly reflects the will of the people in all its organizations, tendencies and ramifications, the stupid and the evil as well as the wise and good, and each in its degree. To this end some form of election by proportional representation is apparently necessary. The British system recognizes this and its plan has great claim on my confidence because it has shown itself successful. voter in the community selects a certain number of men according to the details of the plan chosen. He votes for these as his personal representatives in the city council. Those men having the greatest number of votes are chosen. The larger the council the more perfectly representative and the less subject to illegitimate influences. The smaller, the more effective in direct action which is a matter of minor importance, as the council should be a regulative rather than an administrative or even a legislative body. The council once chosen, selects the mayor, whose power is limited chiefly by the council's own approval. If the mayor carries the council with him he can develop the most elaborate plans in all details. If the majority come to distrust him his authority is withdrawn and that on the shortest notice.

The majority of the council are likely to put forward the best man of the number for the sake of their own prestige. Carefully made minor appointments usually follow as a matter of course. The checks and balances of charter and constitution are unnecessary, for the executive will not often dare to oppose the teachings of common sense. Elaborate rules controlling the civil service are scarcely necessary because the city business must be conducted on business principles, wherever full personal responsibility exists. Fraud or favoritism would destroy confidence. The loss of confidence would turn the power over to the minority. Thus such a plan results in England. It would work in the same way with us.

In England this general system holds in parliamentary matters as well as in local affairs. The whole of Great Britain and Ireland becomes a unit in matters of administration, the empire being in no sense a federation in its governmental relations. The federal system with its

wheels within wheels makes the adoption of a similar system at Washington a matter of doubtful expediency. In the use of the federal system for non-federal relations we find the most serious mistake in American local The Union is a federation of sovereign government. states, having interests more or less divergent and originally swayed by deep and overmastering jealousies. checks and balances of our constitution were intended in large degree to protect the individual state from the possible tyranny of the others. The separation of executive, legislative and judicial functions and the establishment of the two houses of Congress were all matters associated with the protection of states under federal relations. Whether the need for these safeguards is past or whether the higher safeguard of party responsibility should take their place, as in England, or whether some minor modification in that direction would be still better, are questions I cannot discuss here. They are vitally important but they do not touch our present problem.

It was, however, beyond a doubt, a serious error to take the forms of federal union as the type of local government. The Union is a federation of sovereign states, but the state is not a federation of sovereign counties. The county is an artificial division of the state made for convenience of administration. The individual county stands in no danger from the tyranny of the majority. In like manner we cannot regard the county as a federation of townships. Still less is the city a federation of wards. Yet in our choice of aldermen it is treated as such. By a skilful arrangement of wards and a suitable manipulation of the caucus it is possible to partly disfranchise the inhabitants of some of them.

Thus the better elements remain in large degree unrepresented in our city councils. To destroy the tyranny of the ward heeler we limit his authority. We make the various officials of the city independent of one another and all of them responsible to nobody. They are bound by the iron provisions of the charter perhaps, but these provisions do not enforce themselves. To reduce power used in the daylight means its greater exercise in the dark.

The system of proportional representation destroys, in a large degree, the illegitimate power of cliques and associations. It sets aside the false idea of federation when no federation exists, and it tends to unify administration and responsibility of the city as a unit. The city council thus chosen will have good elements and bad elements. It is simply an epitome of the people with an emphasis laid on the greater intelligence, for people under these conditions are less likely to vote for men they do not know, or whom they regard as incompetent or derelict.

The business of such a council is supervision rather than legislation and its chief function that of fusing the public opinion into a single indivisible will. This will the mayor represents so long as his course receives its approval and his will is reflected in his subordinates and heads of departments.

Exactly this principle applies to the successful control of affairs of great corporations. The president of a railroad has the most extended powers, if he satisfies the directors, who in turn represent the stockholders. In proportion as such power and its attendant responsibliity are real will be the success of the road, other matters

being of course equal. If the president abuse his powers it will be when the directors neglect their duties. For popular ignorance or indifference, no system can offer a remedy.

The control of American universities has been likewise successful in the degree to which it approaches this model. The freer the rein given the president, other things being equal, the more effective the work of the institution. But this free rein must take with it the watchful confidence of boards of trustees or of the alumni, or of the public for which the institution exists. The majestic work of Dr. Eliot at Harvard well exemplifies all this. With very definite, very wise and very advanced views of all educational problems, he has taken full rein in carrying them out. But he has sought at the same time to carry with him the confidence and co-operation of graduates, faculty and overseers. Without this confidence, freely given because fully deserved, Harvard University could never have been made what it is.

In few branches of the public service is the spoils system so deeply intrenched as in the public schools. In no other place can it do a tithe of the mischief. It shows itself on the one hand in the wanton selection of incompetents or favorites; on the other, in the provision of life tenures for worthless persons its evil is equally prominent. No teacher should be chosen save for efficiency, no teacher should be retained unless this efficiency continues. If appointments are on the basis of merit only, there is no danger of wanton removals, and any law protecting a teacher from dismissal works against the interests of the children, a party whose interests in some of our great cities have been totally ignored. What

with the strife on account of life tenures of teachers chosen by the trustees in the past, and with the desire of present trustees to provide similarly for their own indigent relatives, the public schools of at least one of our great cities are worse than no schools at all. To use positions in the schools for purposes of charity is to use them for corruption. If relieved from the great expenses now incurred better schools would arise under private control. The remedy for this condition is not to abolish public schools. It is not the institution which is discredited but our management of it; and this through our own lack of interest and our bad administrative methods. The former no doubt, is in part an outgrowth from the latter. Our duty is to repeal all statutes which limit responsibility, place the schools in the hands of a competent superintendent and adopt such forms as will hold this superintendent to a real and 'constant responsibility.

Our varied failures in local administration are therefore in great part the results of efforts to make federal forms of government do the impossible and of our attempts to hold men to responsibility without giving them power. The affairs of no business corporation could be conducted in such a fashion without immediate disaster. If these are necessary methods of "Americanism," they are also methods of bankruptcy. No city, or county or state can be well governed that does not associate with exercise of authority, personal responsibility for its results.

The first need in good government is to enlist the services of men who know what ought to be done, and who have the will and the virtue to do it. Such men are

called forth when the people feel the need of them. As matters now are we do not need good men because we have no way of using them. In public office they can only watch and do nothing. This does not suffice for a man of action. So he will rather go on with his own affairs which he can control and for which he is actually responsible. Thus the public affairs fall into the control of co-operative associations of thieves, for which the city furnishes a figurehead. All constitutional checks and balances in administration are of but slight importance compared with the personality of men. Let us try men in our public affairs, and see if Americanism is not strengthened by the change.

# VII. THE CAPTAIN SLEEPS.



### VII.

### THE CAPTAIN SLEEPS.\*

In the Outlook for April 22 is an editorial record of the "Philippine history" which to me is very painful reading. Its narrative of alleged facts doubtless represents the record of what the authorities of the United States wished to do, and of what thousands of good people think has been done. But it is not "Philippine history." Our rulers have shown the most singular misconceptions of the nature of the tropics and their inhabitants, while our own people have equally forgotten the nature of our own government, its strength, its limitations and the principles on which it rests. As a result we are trying to hold a large and active population by force, without visible plan or purpose, or reason for so doing. In the process we find ourselves in the midst of a war of extermination, one of the most horrible in the records of civilization. These people fight for freedom. This we understand. We fight for law and order, so we are told, because without examination of the facts, we assume that the first republic of Asia would be unable to maintain order. They fight for freedom because they can see with their own eyes that the first republic of America urges on them a military despotism. If we could under-

<sup>\*</sup> Letter to the editor of the Outlook, April 26, 1899.

stand each other better, we should each know that the real purposes of the other are more rational than they seem.

The Outlook passes lightly over the huge blunders which have brought on this war, mistakes that would bring on war anywhere whenever made. Doubtless these delays and blunders were well intentioned, but the fates judge men and nations by the results, not the purposes, of their acts. Good intentions lie at the bottom of the greatest crimes of history. The present writer has opposed federal union with the Filipinos, because however just morally, such unequal yoking politically would help neither them nor us. Against imperial or colonial dominion he is opposed from principle, knowing that industrial success in "control of the tropics" is inconsistent with "equality before the law." The justification for slavery and that of the "Crown Colony" is one and the same, nor is there appreciable difference in the results. The empire can exist, the republic cannot, with such dominion accepted as part of its function.

But these theoretical considerations have little part to-day. It is no longer a question of imperialism or of expansion. It is one of saving the lives of an innocent people, of saving the honor and self-respect of our own republic. We can have no future in these islands save that which comes through the present.

Does the *Outlook* know what really takes place in the Philippines? Of course it is familiar with official dispatches and with the text of proclamations. These tell of a difficult task slowly and unwillingly accomplished, with deeds of heroism on the part of brave men, and the loss of precious lives both Saxon and Malay.

#### THE CAPTAIN SLEEPS.

This is true, but it is not all. We fail to read between the lines. For the rest, we must take the word of naval officers and of soldiers, sick or wounded, sent back to their homes. California was the first to catch the fever of expansion because it is nearest the glamour of the Orient. It will be the first to recover, because it first meets face to face the heroes of Manila.

Does the Outlook know what these men have to say? Their words contradict the Spanish slander of Aguinaldo as a bribed soldier of fortune. They show him rather as a patriot, the ally of our leader, the valued "protégé" of men who had authority to ask his help. They tell of his weary waiting for some indication of purpose on the part of the United States government, of the Constitutional Convention at Malolos, of the adoption after a long debate of the principle of religious equality in a country of Catholics, of the choice of a President by a free ballot; of the Cabinet and Congress containing educated men, many of them graduates of Universities of Europe. They tell us that, till the fatal Fifth of February, "life and property was as safe in the Malolos as in San Francisco" and that the sole anarchy and destruction of property which has taken place in any of these islands since Manila surrendered has been in the few square miles occupied by our troops. Except about Manila and Iloilo, selt-government of the natives is the sole government existing to-day, apparently the sole which has ever existed. Except in Luzon apparently no other is contemplated. The Mohammedan sultan still enjoys undisturbed sway, and I am told that we pay him the same tribute he exacted from Spain. Even savage races for the most part are at peace within themselves. They are savage only to the alien invader. A wasp's nest is a home of peace till an alien torce assails it.

What does the man who was on the ground say to the argument that "we destroyed the only stable government in the Philippines: is it our duty to set up another like it in its place? Is military despotism the only government we know how to set up? Does the *Outlook* know what Manila is becoming under military rule? We hear of four hundred saloons on the Escolta, where two were before: that twenty-one per cent. of our soldiers are attacked by venereal disease, that according to the belief of the soldiers, "even the pigs and dogs on the streets have the syphilis."

Does the *Outlook* realize that Malabon, a prosperous suburb of Manila, a town in which the kindly and cultivated people had shown special courtesies to the officers and men of the McCullough, was burned to the ground by the men of the Monterey, under orders from the commandant at Manila. It is easier to hold a city that has no suburbs; for this reason the town was burned and its people driven out to starve in the swamps.

Does the *Outlook* know how it feels for a young man of culture to set the torch to "two hundred acres of houses" while the people are kneeling and praying at his feet?

Does the *Outlook* realize the picture of the "half-naked savages" driven from Santa Ana, while in one of their spacious "huts" five pianos were found, one of which was thrown out of the second story window, to make more room for something else?

Does the *Outlook* understand that of 30,000 or more Filipinos slaughtered thus far, half are estimated to have been non-combatants?

Does the *Outlook* know that our soldiers say that they were ordered to fire on white flags? Does it remember that since February 6th, when audience was refused to Aguinaldo, these people have had no chance to be heard?

Does the *Outlook* know that some regiments of United States troops have "taken no prisoners?"

Does the *Outlook* know that the general in command is described as a man who rarely leaves his office, where he conscientiously devotes himself to the adding of accounts, "to the work of a quartermaster's clerk?" Does it know that the simple-hearted, loyal hero of Manila is conscientiously sacrificing his reputation and his judgment because he serves the United States under the orders of the military commander?

Does the *Outlook* know why all the general officers who can get away, escape from Manila? Can it be as the soldiers say that they would avoid responsibility for what they cannot help?

Does the *Outlook* realize that few of the officers at Manila have any military training, and that over many of the bravest troops in the world are placed as commissioned officers men who were lawyers, insurance agents, printers, elevator boys, bartenders, and drivers of beer-wagons, a year ago in civil life?

Does the *Outlook* realize the effect of the promiscuous looting of towns and the murder of "every man that sticks his head out of the door" on the men engaged in it?

Some of them glory in it. "It is like a Colorado rabbit drive on a grand scale." More loathe the very idea of war and everything and every man concerned in it.

Does the *Outlook* realize the effect on the country when both these classes return home?

One soldier says, "If the United States were on fire from end to end, I would never raise my hand to put it out." Another would "toss in a blanket the officials at Washington, as we toss a cheating corporal." Another says in print, referring to the abuse of the soldiers by their superiors in pay:

"Yes, I knew that war would be hell before I got into it. But I did not know that war would be Hell deliberately and fanatically inflicted. I expected to sleep in mud puddles with my head on a stone for a pillow, and go hungry for days on forced marches and away from a base of supplies. But I never dreamed that I would have to sleep in leaky and exposed sheds when there was plenty of good shelter elsewhere, and when thirty officers had fine apartments in which there was room for five hundred men; neither did I expect to be fed on coffee grounds and foul canned meat for weeks when we were right next to a base of supplies, and when our officers lived on the choice of the commissary's department. Now any young man whose ire will not arouse at such deliberate deviltry is not worthy to live under despotic Russia.

Does the *Outlook* believe that a country as large as California and with about as many people as Mexico, and quite as capable and civilized on the average, can be subdued by any army the American people will maintain? Can it be held when once subdued? Why must it be subdued? Why ought it to be?

It is true enough that not all these people are in arms against us. But all with whom we have come in contact are. If we try to bring "Law and order" to Mindanao, do we not know that the whole island will be in flames? Has the *Outlook* heard from one high in authority, that we have "to kill off half the population" of these islands

in order "to give good government to the rest?" Does the *Outlook* realize "what is the character of that calm when the law and the slaveholder prevail?" Has it heard from high authority that "we must hold up the American flag even if we shoot down ten millions of niggers, dagoes and missing links?" It may be that its staff will become so bloody that no free man will grasp it.

Does the *Outlook* believe that the commanding general with 30,000 troops, mostly volunteers held over time, will conquer the Filipinos in a thousand years? Has the *Outlook* read the history of the Straits Settlements? Does the *Outlook* believe that with 100,000 men, a brave Indian fighter can conquer these people in five years? Does the *Outlook* know the story of Achin? Is it true that our Consul at Manila declares that he does not expect to live to see the end of this war?

Has the *Outlook* read the story of Mexico? Does it know how a feeble people cast off an alien yoke and spurned foreign help, developing at last into a peaceful, strong and orderly nation solely through forces within itself?

Now it may be that soldiers exaggerate the things they have seen. Perhaps so. I may be deceived by them, and the nightmare I have conjured up may be my own and theirs. But the men I have trusted had learned to see clearly when they left California. Their words are not so mild as those I have chosen. If the *Outlook* knew all that has come to those of us in California who have sought for the truth, it would set up no plea of mitigation. The magazines are full of stories of "What I did in Cuba" from officers who took part in that campaign.

But no one prints "What I saw in Luzon." Not glory but the court-martial awaits the man who saw. If it were seen by the country, the country would burn with wrath hotter than the flames that consumed Malabon.

In such case, what is the duty of the President? What is the duty of Congress? What of Christian citizens? What of the editor of the Christian journal?

Do what you will with the Philippines, if you can do it in peace—but stop this war.

It is our fault and ours alone that this war began. It is our crime that it continues.

We make no criticism of the kindly and popular President of the United States, save this one: He does not realize the wild fury of the forces he has unwillingly and unwittingly brought into action. These must be kept instantly and constantly in hand. The authority to do rests with him alone, and if ever "strenuous life" was needed in the nation, it is in the guiding hand of to-day. The ship is on fire. The Captain sleeps. The sailors storm in vain at his door. When he shall rise, we doff our hats in respectful obeisance. If we have brought a false alarm, on our heads rests the penalty.

# VIII. THE LAST OF THE PURITANS.



#### VIII.

#### THE LAST OF THE PURITANS.\*

I HAVE a word to say of Thoreau, and of an episode which brought his character into bold relief, and which has fairly earned for him a place in American history, as well as in our literature.

I do not wish now to give any account of the life of Thoreau. In the preface to his volume called "Excursions" you will find a biographical sketch, written by the loving hand of Mr. Emerson, his neighbor and friend. Neither shall I enter into any justification of Thoreau's peculiar mode of life, nor shall I describe the famous cabin in the pine woods by Waldon Pond, already becoming the Mecca of the Order of Saunterers, whose great prophet was Thoreau. His profession of land-surveyor was one naturally adopted by him; for to him every hill and forest was a being, each with its own individuality. This profession kept him in the fields and woods, with the sky over his head and the mold under his feet. It paid him the money needed for his daily wants, and he cared for no more.

He seldom went far away from Concord, and, in a

<sup>\*</sup>Address before the California State Normal School, at San-Jose, 1892.

half-playful way, he used to view everything in the world from a Concord standpoint. All the grandest trees grew there and all the rarest flowers and nearly all the phenomena of nature could be observed at Concord.

"Nothing can be hoped of you," he said, "if this bit of mold under your feet is not sweeter to you than any other in this world—in any world."

Although one of the most acute of observers, Thoreau was never reckoned among the scientific men of his time. He was never a member of any Natural History Society, nor of any Academy of Sciences, bodies which, in a general way, he held in not altogether unmerited contempt. When men band together for the study of nature, they first draft a long constitution, with its attendant by-laws, and then proceed to the election of officers, and, by and by, the study of nature becomes subordinate to the maintenance of the organization.

In technical scientific work, Thoreau took little pleasure. It is often pedantic, often bloodless, and often it is a source of inspiration only to him by whom the work is done. Animals and plants were interesting to him, not in their structure and genealogical affinities, but in their relations to his mind. He loved wild things, not alone for themselves, but for the tonic effect of their savagery upon him.

"I wish to speak a word for nature," he said, "for absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil, to regard man as an inhabitant, a part and parcel of nature, rather than as a member of society. I wish to make an extreme statement; if so, I may make an emphatic one, for there are enough champions of civilization. The minister and the

school committees, and every one of you, will take care of that."

To Thoreäu's admirers, he is the prophet of the fields and woods, the interpreter of nature, and his every word has to them the deepest significance. He is the man who

"Lives all alone, close to the bone,
And where life is sweetest, constantly eatest."

They resent all criticism of his life or his words. They are impatient of all analysis of his methods or of his motives, and a word of praise of him is the surest passport to their good graces.

But the critics sometimes miss the inner harmony which Thoreau's admirers see, and discern only queer paradoxes and extravagances of statement where the others hear the voice of nature's oracle. With most literary men, the power of disposition of those who know or understand their writings is in some degree a matter of literary culture. It is hardly so in the case of Thoreau.

The most illiterate man I know who had ever heard of Thoreau, Mr. Barney Mullins, of Freedom Center, Outagamie County, Wisconsin, was a most ardent admirer of Thoreau, while the most eminent critic in America, James Russell Lowell, does him scant justice. To Lowell, the finest thoughts of Thoreau are but strawberries from Emerson's garden, and other critics have followed back these same strawberries through Emerson's to still older gardens, among them to that of Sir Thomas Browne.

But, setting the critics aside, let me tell you about Barney Mullins. Twenty years ago, I lived for a year in the northern part of Wisconsin. The snow is very deep in the winter there, and once I rode into town through the snowbanks on a sled drawn by two oxen and driven by Barney Mullins. Barney was born on the banks of Killarney, and he could scarcely be said to speak the English language. He told me that before he came to Freedom Centre he had lived in a town called Concord, in Massachusetts. I asked him if he had happened to know a man there by the name of Henry Thoreau. He at once grew enthusiastic and he said, among other things: "Mr. Thoreau was a land-surveyor in Concord. I knew him well. He had a way of his own, and he didn't care much about money; but if there ever was a gentleman alive, he was one."

Barney seemed much saddened when I told him that Mr. Thoreau had been dead a dozen years. On parting, he asked me to come out sometime to Freedom Centre, and to spend a night with him. He hadn't much of a room to offer me, but there was always a place in his house for a friend of Mr. Thoreau. Such is the feeling of this guild of lovers of Thoreau, and some of you may come to belong to it.

Here is a test for you. Thoreau says: "I long ago lost a hound, a bay horse, and a turtle-dove, and am still on their trail. Many are the travelers I have spoken to regarding them, describing their tracks, and what calls they answered to. I have met one or two who have heard the hound and the tramp of the horse, and even seen the dove disappear behind the cloud, and they seemed as anxious to recover them as if they had lost them themselves."

Now, if any of you, in your dreams, have heard the horse, or seen the sunshine on the dove's wings, you may

join in the search. If not, you may close the book, for Thoreau has not written for you.

This Thoreau guild is composed, as he himself says, "of knights of a new, or, rather, an old order, not equestrians or chevaliers, not Ritters, or riders, but walkers, a still more ancient and honorable class, I trust."

"I have met," he says, "but one or two persons who understand the art of walking; who had a genius for sauntering, which word is beautifully derived from idle people who roved about the country in the Middle Ages and asked charity, under pretense of going 'à la Sainte Terre'—a Sainte-terrer, a Holy-Lander. They who never go to the Holy Land in their walks, as they pretend, are indeed mere idlers and vagabonds; but they who go there are saunterers, in the good sense. Every walk is a kind of crusade preached by some Peter the Hermit within us, to go forth and reconquer this Holy Land from the hands of the Infidels.

"It is true that we are but faint-hearted crusaders, who undertake no persevering, never-ending enterprises. Our expeditions are but tours, and come round again at evening to the old hearth-side from which we set out. Half the walk is but retracing our steps. We should go forth on the shortest walk, perchance, in the spirit of undying adventure, never to return, prepared to send back our embalmed hearts only as relics to our desolate kingdoms. If you are ready to leave father and mother, and brother and sister, and wife and child, and friends; if you have paid your debts, and made your will, and settled all your affairs, and are a free man, you are ready for a walk."

Though a severe critic of conventional follies, Thoreau

was always a hopeful man; and no finer rebuke to the philosophy of Pessimism was ever given than in these words of his: "I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of a man to elevate his life by a conscious endeavor. It is something to be able to paint a particular picture, or to carve a statue, and so make a few objects beautiful; but it is far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere and medium through which we look. This, morally, we can do."

But it is not of Thoreau as a saunterer, or as naturalist, or as an essayist, that I wish to speak, but as a moralist, and this in relation to American politics. Thoreau lived in a dark day of our political history. At one time he made a declaration of independence in a small way, and refused allegiance and poll-tax to a Government built on a corner-stone of human slavery. Because of this he was put into jail, where he remained one night, and where he made some curious observations on his townspeople as viewed from the inside of the bars. Emerson came along in the morning, and asked him what he was there for. "Why are you not in here, Mr. Emerson?" was his reply; for it seemed to him that no man had the right to be free in a country where some men were slaves.

"Voting for the right," Thoreau said, "is doing nothing for it; it is only expressing feebly your desire that right should prevail." He would not for an instant recognize that political organization as his government which was the slave's government also. "In fact," he said, "I will quietly, after my fashion, declare war with the State. Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.

I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, or if one honest man in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to remain in this copartnership, should be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. It matters not how small the beginning may seem to be, what is once well done is done forever."

Thoreau's friends paid his taxes for him, and he was set free, so that the whole affair seemed like a joke. Yet, as Robert Lewis Stevenson says, "If his example had been followed by a hundred, or by thirty of his followers, it would have greatly precipitated the era of freedom and justice. We feel the misdeeds of our country with so little fervor, for we are not witnesses to the suffering they cause. But when we see them awake an active horror in our fellow-men; when we see a neighbor prefer to lie in prison than be so much as passively implicated in their perpetration, even the dullest of us will begin to realize them with a quicker pulse."

In the feeling that a wrong, no matter how great, must fall before the determined assault of a man, no matter how weak, Thoreau found the reason for his action. The operation of the laws of God is like an incontrollable torrent. Nothing can stand before them; but the work of a single man may set the torrent in motion which will sweep away the accumulations of centuries of wrong.

There is a long chapter in our national history which is not a glorious record. Most of us are too young to remember much of politics under the Fugitive Slave Law, or to understand the deference which politicians

of every grade then paid to the peculiar institution. It was in those days in the Middle West that Kentucky blackguards, backed by the laws of the United States, and aided not by Northern blackguards alone, but by many of the best citizens of those States, chased runaway slaves through the streets of our Northern capitals.

And not the politicians alone, but the teachers and preachers, took their turn in paying tribute to Cæsar. We were told that the Bible itself was a champion of slavery. Two of our greatest theologians in the North declared at Princeton and at Bowdoin in the name of the Higher Law, that slavery was a holy thing, which the Lord, who cursed Canaan, would ever uphold.

For these men believed sincerely that the poor and the weak should serve the strong and the wise for their own good as well as for material prosperity. The Unknown God of the nations, they know not how to worship cares for manhood, not order nor prosperity. For every drop of blood drawn by the lash in their despotic benevolence, He drew "another by the sword."

In those days there came a man from the West—a tall, gaunt, grizzly, shaggy-haired, God-fearing man, a son of the Puritans, whose ancestors came over on the Mayflower. A dangerous fanatic or lunatic, he was called, and, with the aid of a few poor negroes whom he had stolen from slavery, he defied the power of this whole slave-catching United States. A little square brick building, once a sort of car-shop, stands near the railway station in the town of Harper's Ferry, with the mountain wall not far behind it, and the Potomac River running below. And from this building was fired the shot

which pierced the heart of slavery. And the Governor of Virginia captured this man, and took him out and hung him, and laid his body in the grave, where it still lies moldering. But there was part of him not in the jurisdiction of Virginia, a part which they could neither hang nor bury; and, to the infinite surprise of the Governor of Virginia, his soul went marching on.

When they heard in Concord that John Brown had been captured, and was soon to be hung, Thoreau sent notice through the city that he would speak in the public hall on the condition and character of John Brown, on Sunday evening, and invited all to be present.

The Republican Committee and the Committee of the Abolitionists sent word to him that this was no time to speak; to discuss such matters then was premature and inadvisable. He replied: "I did not send to you for advice, but to tell you that I am going to speak." The selectmen of Concord dared neither grant nor refuse him the hall. At last they ventured to lose the key in a place where they thought he could find it.

This address of Thoreau, "A Plea for Captain John Brown," should be a classic in American history. We do not always realize that the time of American history is now. The dates of the settlement of Jamestown, and Plymouth, and St. Augustine do not constitute our history. Columbus did not discover us. In a high sense, the true America is barely thirty years old, and its first President was Abraham Lincoln.

We in the North are a little impatient at times, and our politicians, who are not always our best citizens, mutter terrible oaths, especially in the month of October, because the South is not yet wholly regenerate, because not all which sprang from the ashes of the slave-pen were angels of light.

But let us be patient while the world moves on. Forty years ago not only the banks of the Yazoo and the Chattahoochee, but those of the Hudson, and the Charles, and the Wabash, were under the lash. On the eve of John Brown's hanging not half a dozen men in the city of Concord, the most intellectual town in New England, the home of Emerson, and Hawthorne, and Alcott, dared say that they felt any respect for the man or sympathy for the cause for which he died.

I wish to quote a few passages from this "Plea for Captain John Brown." To fully realize its power, you should read it all for yourselves. You must put yourselves back into history, now already seeming almost ancient history to us, to the period when Buchanan was President—the terrible sultry lull just before the great storm. You must picture the audience of the best people in Massachusetts, half-sympathizing with Captain Brown, half afraid of being guilty of treason in so doing. You must picture the speaker, with his clear-cut, earnest features and penetrating voice. No preacher, no politician, no professional reformer, no Republican, no Democrat; a man who never voted; a naturalist whose companions were the flowers and the birds, the trees and the squirrels. It was the voice of Nature in protest against slavery and in plea for Captain Brown.

"My respect for my fellow-men," said Thoreau, "is not being increased these days. I have noticed the cold-blooded way in which men speak of this event, as if an ordinary malefactor, though one of unusual pluck,

'the gamest man I ever saw,' the Governor of Virginia said, had been caught and was about to be hung. He was not thinking of his foes when the Governor of Virginia thought he looked so brave.

"It turns what sweetness I have to gall to hear the remarks of some of my neighbors. When we heard at first that he was dead, one of my townsmen observed that 'he dieth as the fool dieth,' which, for an instant, suggested a likeness in him dying to my neighbor living. Others, craven-hearted, said, disparagingly, that he threw his life away because he resisted the Government. Which way have they thrown their lives, pray?

"I hear another ask, Yankee-like, 'What will he gain by it?' as if he expected to fill his pockets by the enterprise. If it does not lead to a surprise party, if he does not get a new pair of boots or a vote of thanks, it must be a failure. But he won't get anything. Well, no; I don't suppose he could get four-and-sixpence a day for being hung, take the year around, but he stands a chance to save his soul—and such a soul!—which you do not. You can get more in your market for a quart of milk than a quart of blood, but yours is not the market heroes carry their blood to.

"Such do not know that like the seed is the fruit, and that in the moral world, when good seed is planted, good fruit is inevitable; that when you plant or bury a hero in his field, a crop of heroes is sure to spring up. This is a seed of such force and vitality, it does not ask our leave to germinate.

"A man does a brave and humane deed, and on all sides we hear people and parties declaring, 'I didn't do it, nor countenance him to do it in any conceivable way.

It can't fairly be inferred from my past career.' Ye needn't take so much pains, my friends, to wash your skirts of him. No one will ever be convinced that he was any creature of yours. He went and came, as he himself informs us, under the auspices of John Brown, and nobody else.

"'All is quiet in Harper's Ferry,' say the journals. What is the character of that calm which follows when the law and the slaveholder prevail? I regard this event as a touchstone designed to bring out with glaring distinctness the character of this Government. We needed to be thus assisted to see it by the light of history. It needed to see itself. When a government puts forth its strength on the side of injustice, as ours, to maintain slavery and kill the liberators of the slave, it reveals itself simply as brute force. It is more manifest than ever that tyranny rules. I see this Government to be effectually allied with France and Austria in oppressing mankind.

"The only government that I recognize—and it matters not how few are at the head of it, or how small its army,—is the power that establishes justice in the land, never that which establishes injustice. What shall we think of a government to which all the truly brave and just men in the land are enemies, standing between it and those whom it oppresses?

"Treason! Where does such treason take its rise? I cannot help thinking of you as ye deserve, ye governments! Can you dry up the fountain of thought? High treason, when it is resistance to tyranny here below, has its origin in the power that makes and forever re-creates man. When you have caught and hung all its human rebels, you have accomplished nothing but your own

guilt. You have not struck at the fountain-head. The same indignation which cleared the temple once will clear it again.

"I hear many condemn these men because they were so few. When were the good and the brave ever in the majority? Would you have had him wait till that time came? Till you and I came over to him? The very fact that he had no rabble or troop of hirelings about him, would alone distinguish him from ordinary heroes. His company was small, indeed, because few could be found worthy to pass muster. Each one who there laid down his life for the poor and oppressed was a picked man, called out of many thousands, if not millions. A man of principle, of rare courage and devoted humanity, ready to sacrifice his life at any moment for the benefit of his fellow-man; it may be doubted if there were as many more their equals in the country; for their leader, do doubt, had scoured the land far and wide, seeking to swell his troop. These alone were ready to step between the oppressor and the oppressed. Surely they were the very best men you could select to be hung! That was the greatest compliment their country could pay them. They were ripe for her gallows. She has tried a long time; she has hung a good many, but never found the right one before.

"When I think of him and his six sons and his son-inlaw enlisted for this fight, proceeding coolly, reverently, humanely to work, for months, if not years, summering and wintering the thought, without expecting any reward but a good conscience, while almost all America stood ranked on the other side, I say again that it affects me as a sublime spectacle. "If he had had any journal advocating his cause, any organ monotonously and wearisomely playing the same old tune and then passing around the hat, it would have been fatal to his efficiency. If he had acted in such a way as to be let alone by the Government, he might have been suspected. It was the fact that the tyrant must give place to him, or he to the tyrant, that distinguished him from all the reformers of the day that I know.

"This event advertises me that there is such a fact as death, the possibility of a man's dying. It seems as if no man had ever died in America before. If this man's acts and words do not create a revival, it will be the severest possible satire on words and acts that do.

"It is the best news that America has ever heard. It has already quickened the feeble pulse of the North, and infused more generous blood in her veins than any number of years of what is called political and commercial prosperity. How many a man who was lately contemplating suicide has now something to live for!

"I am here to plead his cause with you. I plead not for his life, but for his character, his immortal life, and so it becomes your cause wholly, and it is not his in the least.

"Some eighteen hundred years ago Christ was crucified; this morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung. These are the two ends of the chain which is not without its links. He is not Old Brown any longer; he is an angel of light. I see now that it was necessary that the bravest and humanest man in all the country should be hung. Perhaps he saw it himself. I almost fear that I may yet hear of his deliverance, doubting if a prolonged life, if any life, can do as much good as his death.

"'Misguided! Garrulous! Insane! Vindictive!' So you write in your easy-chairs, and thus he, wounded, responds from the floor of the Armory—clear as a cloudless sky, true as the voice of Nature is! 'No man sent me here. It was my own promptings and that of my Maker. I acknowledge no master in human form.'

"And in what a sweet and noble strain he proceeds, addressing his captors, who stand over him.

"'I think, my friends, you are guilty of a great wrong against God and humanity, and it would be perfectly right for any one to interfere with you so far as to free those you wilfully and wickedly hold in bondage. I have yet to learn that God is any respecter of persons.

"'I pity the poor in bondage, who have none to help them; that is why I am here, not to gratify personal animosity, revenge, or vindictive spirit. It is my sympathy with the oppressed and the wronged that are as good as you are, and as precious in the sight of God.

"'I wish to say, furthermore, that you had better, all of you people at the South, prepare yourselves for a settlement of that question, that must come up for settlement sooner than you are prepared for it. The sooner you are prepared the better. You may dispose of me now very easily—I am nearly disposed of already,—but this question is still to be settled, this negro question, I mean; the end of that is not yet."

"I foresee the time," said Thoreau, "when the painter will paint that scene, no longer going to Rome for his subject. The poet will sing it; the historian record it; and, with the Landing of the Pilgrims and the Declaration of Independence, it will be the ornament of some future national gallery, when at least the present form of slavery shall be no more here. We shall then be at liberty to weep for Captain Brown. Then, and not till then, we will take our revenge."

A few years ago, while on a tramp through the North Woods, I came out through the forests of North Elba, to the old "John Brown Farm." Here John Brown lived for many years, and here he tried to establish a colony of freed slaves in the pure air of the mountains. Here, too, his family remained through the stirring times when he took part in the bloody struggles that made and kept Kansas free.

The little old brown farmhouse stands on the edge of the great woods, a few miles to the north of the highest peaks of the Adirondacks. There is nothing unusual about the house. You will find a dozen such in a few hours' walk almost anywhere in the mountain parts of New England or New York. It stands on a little hill, "in a sightly place," as they say in that region, with no shelter of trees around it.

At the foot of the hill in a broad curve flows the River Au Sable, small and clear and cold, and full of trout. It is not far above that the stream takes its rise in the dark Indian Pass, the only place in these mountains where the ice of winter lasts all summer long. The same ice on the one side sends forth the Au Sable, and on the other feeds the fountain-head of the infant Hudson River.

In the little dooryard in front of the farmhouse is the historic spot where John Brown's body still lies moldering. There is not even a grave of his own. His bones lie with those of his father, and the short record of his

life and death is crowded on the foot of his father's tombstone. Near by, in the little yard, lies a huge, wandering boulder, torn off years ago by the glaciers from the granite hills that hem in Indian Pass. The boulder is ten feet or more in diameter, large enough to make the farmhouse behind it seem small in comparison. On its upper surface, in letters two feet long, which can be read plainly for a mile away, is cut the simple name—

#### JOHN BROWN.

This is John Brown's grave, and the place, the boulder, and the inscription are alike fitting to the man he was.

Dust to dust; ashes to ashes; granite to granite; the last of the Puritans!

THE END.











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